


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Pearl Harbor in Pacific Strategy, 1898-1908



WILLIS E. SNOWBARGER *

I

WHILE American interest in Hawaii in the nineteenth century is a well-known part of "manifest destiny," the considerations of strategy involved in that interest are not so familiar. As early as 1840, the explorations of the Charles Wilkes expedition included a careful survey of Pearl Harbor and in his report Wilkes cited its value as a base for naval or commercial operations in the Pacific.¹ In 1884, when the reciprocity treaty of 1875 came up for renewal, the United States attached the question of "exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of the vessels of the United States. . . ." ² The treaty, as amended, was renewed but only after a long struggle involving tensions leading to the more direct action of the Hawaiian Revolution of 1893.

The Pearl Harbor Amendment and the activities of Americans in the Revolution of 1893 betrayed the strategic, as well as economic, concerns involved. While Hawaii waited "outside the gate," the United States theoretically had a harbor there. But what did she have? In fact, the United States had only a sheet of water separated from the ocean by a reef which technically disqualified it as a harbor. Though the potentiali-

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¹ Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845), IV, 79-80.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, Appendix II, 170-72.

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ties were generally recognized, no sea-going vessels could enter the harbor. In addition to this difficulty, the United States owned no land on the water's edge, was to encounter difficulty in extinguishing claims to fishing rights, and was uncertain as to her tenure in the rights she did enjoy in the Pearl River.

The failure of annexationist plots had left the United States in a very difficult position. As the Hawaiians threatened to abrogate the renewed treaty of 1887, including the Pearl Harbor Amendment, some of them moved to buy the land most desirable for a naval base in the area surrounding Pearl Harbor. The United States hesitated to improve the harbor until she could be more certain that it would not be lost to another power. Representatives Cannon and Hilborn argued forcefully that the United States should not improve the channel until it had purchased the land, the price of which was soaring daily. If dredging were started, the "owners of 'corner lots'" would raise their price tenfold, argued Cannon.³ To this argument, Representative Simpson of Kansas asked when the land would be any cheaper. He argued that since the country had \$20,000,000 invested in a navy, it was time to take some steps toward putting it in a position to be used. Under the circumstances, the United States could not exercise eminent domain and the Ewa speculators had everything their own way.

The stalemate brought about by this combination of circumstances at Pearl Harbor was brought to light when in 1897 the Senate amended an appropriation bill by including \$50,000 "for the improvement of the entrance to Pearl Harbor . . . according to the report of Rear-Admiral J. G. Walker" of 1894.⁴ In spite of a valiant fight in behalf of this amendment by Representative Hitt of Illinois, the House defeated it by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-three. Although some would have agreed with Representative Sayers of Texas that there was "no

³ *Congressional Record*, 55 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 11, 1897), 1024.

⁴ *Ibid.* (April 31, 1897), 776.

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immediate and no pressing necessity for this expenditure," their courtesy in extending additional time for Mr. Hitt to explain the situation makes it appear that the rejection was based on disagreement as to which step should be taken first. Within less than a month additional surveys were authorized⁵ but the United States had decided that existing conditions would make the establishment of the projected naval station very costly. If sufficient reasons could be shown to prove the necessity for such a station, those same reasons would probably justify acceptance of the Hawaiian offer of annexation arranged by the McKinley administration on June 16, 1897.

Considering the impatience of those who were speculating in land near Pearl Harbor and the steady drummings of the "Big Navy" advocates, complete control of the harbor by the United States would seem to have been only a matter of time. The activities of Dewey, however, furnished the drama to clinch the decision without the uncertainty of a rough political battle. Both the treaty of 1897 and a joint-resolution for annexation were languishing when Dewey defeated the Spaniards in Manila Bay. Three days after the victory, another joint resolution revealed "a new appreciation of the strategic importance of Hawaii."⁶

Several weeks before the outbreak of war, ardent annexationist Lorrin Thurston had suggested that the Navy Department buy all the coal in Honolulu. Theodore Roosevelt sent the dispatches and it was done. Hawaii was hardly in a position to be neutral since the annexation treaty was pending, but it was only natural that she should remind the United States of her "unselfish" assistance to the cause. On June 1, 1898, Spain had filed a protest against unneutral participation by Hawaii but the latter undoubtedly felt safer to be aiding

⁵ *Senate Documents*, No. 105, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 41.

⁶ Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American War," *American Historical Review*, XXXVI (April, 1931), 556; Outten Jones Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power 1897-1917* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947), pp. 8, 16-18.

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actively the United States than to be pretending neutrality. Meantime, Hawaiians did go "all out" to accommodate the troops as they passed through, undoubtedly hoping that the impression created would hasten annexation. However, it would appear that the presence of American troops and ships in the Philippines and the prospect that even those islands might be retained, made the annexation of Hawaii seem much less chimerical.

It was a strategic consideration which motivated the United States in the annexation of Hawaii. Sugar furnished a motive on the Hawaiian side, and the charges of governmental instability impressed the propertied groups both in Hawaii and America, but the United States gained only in making the Pacific frontier a little safer.⁷ Some "manifest destiny" was present, of course, but strategic considerations made those arguments more logical than usual. Mahan was freely quoted concerning the unusual defensive position of the Islands in relation to Alaska, the Isthmus, and the Pacific coast. He asserted that the United States required a larger navy without Hawaii than if annexation were accomplished. He assured Senator Kyle that an invasion of the Pacific coast was impracticable without possession of Hawaii as a base. These arguments recur frequently in the debates on the annexation resolution.⁸

The defense argument, however, "was not so much connected with the war then being fought as with a future one." We had the use of the Islands for the war and made offensive, not defensive use of them. Only two ships in the navy at that time were capable of sailing from San Francisco to Manila without refueling, but a coaling station at Kiska, as advised by the anti-imperialists, would have been much nearer Manila and on a shorter great-circle route. Still, annexation had a long

⁷ Julius W. Pratt, "The Hawaiian Revolution: A Reinterpretation," *Pacific Historical Review*, I (Sept., 1932), 284.

⁸ *Senate Reports*, No. 681, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 98-99 and *Congressional Record*, 55 Cong., 2 Sess. (June 11, 1898), 5770-95.

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history and strong backers who would not fail to take such an opportunity to see their dream consummated. The United States finally reversed itself and accepted its commitment to Hawaii. The previous policy which had refused the responsibility of an official protectorate while claiming "exclusive rights" was abandoned.

Though one may say, generally, that the war paved the way to annexation, it was as the war brought the United States and Japan into closer competition that the strategic position of Hawaii as a defensive outpost of the United States drew increased appreciation. In 1893, the British seemed most likely to take Hawaii if the United States should back down. By 1897, with the help of statements inspired by naval expansionists, to the delight of Hawaiian land speculators, it was made to appear that Japan posed a very real threat to the integrity of the Islands if the United States should delay annexation.⁹

As early as 1871, Japan had signed a most favored nation immigration treaty with Hawaii, but there was no sizeable influx until the later eighties.¹⁰ It is estimated that from the early 1880's to 1896, the Japanese population in Hawaii increased from approximately one hundred to nearly twenty-five thousand. The anxiety of the Hawaiian government finally showed itself in new immigration laws which were enforced against about one-thousand would-be immigrants early in 1897.¹¹ The Japanese charged that the treaty had been violated and dispatched a warship to gain redress. Hawaii eventually paid a \$75,000 indemnity but, to the annexationists, the propaganda was worth it.

⁹ See Julius W. Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XIX (Sept., 1932), 219-42, and Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 319.

¹⁰ Edwin Albert Falk, *Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power* (New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1936), p. 135n.

¹¹ Alfred L. P. Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928), p. 103; Hilary P. Conroy, "The Japanese Expansion into Hawaii, 1869-1898" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, 1949), pp. 229-42.

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In June of 1897, the Japanese lodged a vigorous protest against the pending annexation treaty on the grounds that it would change existing conditions in the Pacific, which might lead to international difficulties, and that it might interfere with the rights of Japanese citizens in Hawaii. In view of the fact that the Nipponese government had only "glowered in silence" in 1893, it is difficult to account for the changed attitude four years later. It should be noted, however, that the Japanese protected steel cruiser *Naniwa*, under the command of one Togo Heiachiro, was on hand during the tense days of 1893-94.¹² This ship was easily the best warship in the harbor, according to Edwin A. Falk, and its commander repeatedly snubbed the Provisional Government (and "His Bewhiskered Majesty," Judge Dole) which Japan did not recognize. Thus the protest of 1897 carried forward an earlier objection. When United States immigration laws were extended to include Hawaii after annexation, still another protest came from Japan which has led to the conjecture that Japan did have in mind a skillful penetration of Hawaii by immigration and development of economic interests "until the opportunity should arise whereby the Japanese flag might float over Honolulu."¹³

Although Japan denied such a "mischievous suggestion" and the United States replied that such reports "were not credited here and needed no denial," this was the occasion for one of Theodore Roosevelt's oft-quoted statements. To be on the safe side, he wrote,

my own belief is that we should act instantly before the two new Japanese warships leave England. I would . . . hoist our flag over the island leaving all details for after action. . . . I believe we should build the Nicaragua Canal at once, and . . . should build a dozen new battleships, half of them on the Pacific Coast. . . . I am fully alive to the danger from Japan.¹⁴

¹² Falk, *Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power*, pp. 136n., 137ff.

¹³ Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy*, p. 106.

¹⁴ Quoted in Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, p. 218.

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In July, 1897, the Navy Department ordered its forces at Honolulu to try to get on amicably with the Japanese but to proclaim a provisional protectorate at the first sign that Japan might resort to force. The naval attache at Yokohama was instructed to warn his government by telegraph of any significant movements of the Japanese fleet.¹⁵ Before this excitement is dismissed too lightly, it should be noted that Japan was trying, even after annexation, to lease some of the islands northwest of Oahu "of which Midway was one of the most important and well known."¹⁶ The Japanese consul at Honolulu explained that "the object of this lease is to assure permission or right of fishing and bird cataching (*sic*) by the Japanese subjects."

Anxiety on the part of American leadership should not seem too surprising even though the extent of the Japanese threat was probably overestimated.¹⁷ While the Japanese in Hawaii were definitely oriented toward their rising mother country and, in this period, noted her victories with pride, their movement eastward had not been part of the same expansionist movement which was carrying them into Formosa. The strong tone of the protest against the annexation treaty may have been due to the fact that the Japanese minister had been informed by forgetful Secretary Sherman that no annexation treaty was being negotiated only a few days before its signature was announced. The inquiry about the ownership of the islands and the attempt to lease might have been an effort to

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220; Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power*, p. 12.

¹⁶ Miki Saito, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Sanford B. Dole, Governor of Hawaii, August 24, 1900 (copy), in Naval Records and Library, National Archives. The reply and other correspondence indicates that Hawaii claimed the whole chain as far west as Cure Island. Hawaiian claims of these years (Cure, 1886; Necker, 1894; and French Frigate Shoals, 1895) were apparently laid at the suggestion of the United States.

¹⁷ Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," *Journal of Modern History*, III (March, 1931), 61, suggests that the internal political difficulties of Japan dictated a grand play at this time. See also Conroy, "The Japanese Expansion into Hawaii," pp. 225-61.

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avoid trouble. There was, however, no denying "the augmentation that has taken place in the interests of Japan in the Pacific,"¹⁸ and correspondence of the period gave rise to fears and misgivings.

This suspicion of Japanese intentions gave additional importance to the defense argument in support of annexation. The value of Hawaii as a base to support operations farther west, however, was also a consideration. "Our paramount right in the North Pacific" had been pointed out by Commodore George W. Melville, Chief Engineer of the Navy, who also had calculated that the geographic center of our territory "lies westward of the Golden Gate."¹⁹ The authors of the 'large policy' of 1898 had vaguely suggested that America's destiny would constitute a challenge to the greatest naval and commercial powers of the Far East. It would seem that Japan could consider these as "designs" on the area in which she deserved a share.

When the United States decided to annex the Philippines, Japan was more favorable toward American suzerainty than toward an extension of either German or French holdings in the Orient.²⁰ An alternative to annexation of those distant islands was favored by the secretaries of Navy, State, and Treasury. They thought the United States should take only a naval base in the Philippines; a policy that was understandable and may have been sound, since United States commitments to the Philippines would not have been so great. Such a base acquired by the United States, however, would undoubtedly have been counterbalanced through similar acquisitions by other interested powers, notably Germany. Guam was retained as a way station on the route to the Philippines.

¹⁸ Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy*, p. 104.

¹⁹ *Senate Documents*, No. 188, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 14. Commodore Melville included the Aleutians to produce this unusual result.

²⁰ Edgar Irving Stewart, Jr., "American Foreign Policy Incident to the Russian-Japanese War, 1904-05" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, 1939), p. 9.

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Admiral Dewey, however, had advised the peace commissioners to take all the Carolines and Marianas even though only Guam and Kusaie were recommended for naval bases.²¹ He noted that after Spain had lost the Philippines, these scattered isles would be of no value to her. The correctness of his observations was attested by the sale of those islands to Germany a short time after the United States should have taken them. Earl Pomeroy accounts for this error by noting that in all these negotiations with Spain, commercial thinking dominated strategic thinking. The result was that the United States could refuel its vessels on the route to the Orient but had not denied competitors positions along this route which could threaten it in time of war.

The Spanish-American war had a positive influence upon America's decision to annex Hawaii. The annexation of the Philippines gave Hawaii a new value as a base for operations farther west. Had the country studied the political geography of the central and western Pacific as well and as long as the Hawaiian position, it could hardly have allowed the acquisition of an "Achilles' Heel." In addition to the lack of study of the Far Eastern requirements of the United States, however, a new balance of forces in that part of the world was forming which was to confound many statesmen in years to come.

II

Before 1900, the Asian problem was not acute, but at about that time the various international frontiers began to come together and overlap. The effectiveness of a Western power in the Far Eastern competition was measured in inverse ratio to the conflict or threat of conflict that power faced in the West.²² In addition to the appearance of two new, rising

²¹ Earl S. Pomeroy, "The Problem of American Overseas Bases," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXIII (June, 1947), 693.

²² Nathaniel Pfeffer, "Russia on the Pacific," *Asia*, XXXVIII (November, 1938), 693.

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powers — the United States and Japan —, the world scene was complicated by the wide acceptance of the concept of sea power which brought nations into conflict with new enemies.²³ Not being able to ignore the armies of their traditional enemies, the nations generally found their security problem more complicated and expensive.

While several Western powers were interested in Far Eastern politics and commerce, they were all plagued by the gathering storm in Europe. Germany and France could not effectively challenge competitors in the Far East. Russia, being the only European power whose borders were contiguous to China, had a definite advantage. Her strength and prestige suffered a severe blow, however, when Japan defeated her in 1905. Great Britain had fortified herself by making an alliance with Japan in 1902. Without committing herself to the use of force, the United States sought to protect her interests in China through the Open Door notes.

In all this, Great Britain and Japan emerge as the two major naval powers having adequate base facilities in Far Eastern waters. The traditionally minded still thought of Russia as a naval power more important in the Pacific than the United States.²⁴

Perhaps most Americans failed to define carefully just what the interests of the United States required in the way of territorial acquisitions or of naval support. Only a few grasped the strategic problems involved in a choice of the location of the principal naval base in the Pacific. To the rest, the argument over the location of such a facility was similar to those concerning pork barrel legislation with which all were very familiar. Pearl Harbor or Subig Bay were both thousands of miles west. Meantime, America was more and more deeply involved in those areas which were also of interest to Japan.

²³ Alfred Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIV (December, 1939), 514.

²⁴ Friedrich Von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1914), pp. 155-66.

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United States participation in the Open Door notes clearly indicates this overlap of interest in China. The paternalistic attitude of the United States toward Japan was outmoded as the protege emerged with ambitions of her own which conflicted with the broadening sphere of interest of the Americans.²⁵

Americans were slow to adjust their thinking to the new conditions partly because a vocal minority strongly opposed "imperialism" as being contrary to the political ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, Washington's Farewell Address, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.²⁶ Although they never gained control of the American government or policy, this group included many influential leaders, and the extent of United States participation in the Far East was in doubt until time and events overruled them. Even after participation on a larger scale was assured, the United States was further confused by speculation as to the dangers threatened from various other powers. Experiences with Germany and Great Britain in the last decades of the nineteenth century led most Americans to regard their actions with suspicion and to fail to notice the extent to which these powers counter-balanced one another.

In spite of earlier provocative actions from Japan, it was not until her defeat of Russia that Americans fully realized her to be the "probable enemy" in the Pacific. This Japanese victory coincided with increasing friction on the west coast over the question of Oriental immigration. Theodore Roosevelt, grasping the realities of the situation, became extremely fearful lest the American people, forgetting that some Japanese had designs on Hawaii as well as the Philippines, should antagonize the Japanese while neglecting the navy. As he moved to block the Japanese in Manchuria as well, Roosevelt

²⁵ Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 330-31.

²⁶ F. H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXII (September, 1935), 211-30.

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wrote to his Secretary of War questioning whether Hawaii did not need "a regiment or two of troops."²⁷

As in the fright of 1897, the idea of Japanese designs in the Western Hemisphere is almost fantastic. To get a true picture of the information with which policymakers had to work, however, it is well to remember that reports reaching the State Department through American ministers and ambassadors seemed to confirm the worst suspicions. One example was the mission of a Captain M. Itami of the Japanese General Staff to South American countries "to ascertain the strength of the several small states."²⁸ His presence was later reported from Peru. The activities of Japanese immigration companies were reported from Panama, Colombia, and Chile.²⁹ One of these reports on activities in the Atrato valley said that the immigrants were all army reservists. The site chosen in Chile for a fishing colony was reported to include territory around Yelcho Bay. In addition, correspondents returning from the Russo-Japanese war, reported increasing insolence on the part of the Japanese toward Americans as well as other westerners. Though these reports could have been explained as the work of alarmists, policymakers had to recognize the possibilities and implications if the reports should be reliable and indicative of Japan's goals. If there was a Japanese scheme behind these reports, it should have been considered alarming. If Japan were in a position to threaten the Western Hemisphere, a navy based at Pearl Harbor would clearly negate the threat.

Meantime, the worries of Japan were concentrated much closer to her home islands. The extension of Russian control

²⁷ Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925), pp. 159-60.

²⁸ Luke E. Wright, Ambassador to Japan, to Elihu Root, Jan. 18, 1907, Department of State Numerical File, 1906-1910, National Archives.

²⁹ H. C. Squires, Minister to Panama, to Elihu Root, July 22, 1908; T. C. Dawson, Minister to Colombia, to Elihu Root, Sept. 16, 1908; and Grant Smith, Minister to Chile, to Elihu Root, June 29, 1908, all in Department of State Numerical File, 1906-1910, National Archives.

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into Manchuria and Korea was a serious threat to both the security of Japan and her economic interests in that area.³⁰ In the absence of a strong Chinese government, western powers were forced to protect their own interests. In so doing they posed a menace to Japan. When the United States appeared not only to be anticipating Japan in the central and western Pacific but also blocking her on the Asiatic continent, conflict began to seem inevitable. These considerations, in addition to the insult implied in the immigration dispute, were the basis of a serious war scare in 1907 and 1908, which was the occasion for the belated formulation of United States military and naval policy in the Pacific area.

III

Henry Cabot Lodge wrote, a few days after Dewey's capture of Manila, concerning the Philippines, "We must on no account let the islands go. . . . We hold the other side of the Pacific and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination."³¹ This statement is particularly interesting as one considers the strategic implications of the new order in the Pacific world. The United States had been a two-ocean power since 1846, with her coasts separated as though they were on opposite sides of the world. With increasing emphasis on sea power by other nations, the United States would have had to make a choice between two fleets and one fleet plus an Isthmian canal for the naval protection of her home territory.³² The "value" of the Philippines strategically could not have been realized without adopting a scheme of imperialism "beyond imagination." Unless the United States intended to dominate Japan

³⁰ Hugh Byas, "America and Japan: A Trinity of Problems," *Contemporary Japan*, I (September, 1932), 257.

³¹ Quoted in A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1938), pp. 13-14.

³² Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 250-51.

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and any other Far Eastern power which might arise, the Philippines were a "hostage to fortune" in case of war.

Our position in the Philippines was desirable for the support of what force was necessary in the conduct of our China policy, but it also increased the responsibilities of the navy and the danger of war with Japan. Although it is conceivable that fleets could have been built by the United States and Japan to specifications which would have prevented their use to endanger one another, such speculation is purely academic, for it would have been poor policy with which to begin. If both powers built a modern, balanced fleet and if the United States were to base hers in the Philippines, each would be a threat to the other. In order to guarantee the security of the Philippines, the American fleet would have to be so strong as to menace Japan. If Japan had the fleet necessary to control home waters, she would pose a standing threat to the security of the Philippines.³³

Not only the security of the Philippines, but the Open Door policy as well were dependent upon the good will of the Japanese. Thus "the Philippines made the immigration policy dangerous; the immigration policy jeopardized the Philippines."³⁴ It was for these reasons that Theodore Roosevelt decided that we should either fortify and defend the Philippines or give them up. To hold them would have involved the building of a naval base capable of handling major repairs on our largest vessels in the Philippines as well as the building of a fleet much larger than any proposed prior to 1905. In a hearing before the House Naval Affairs Committee in January, 1906, Captain William Swift pointed out that, in the event of a war in the western Pacific, vessels would have to return to California for routine docking every few months even if they were fortunate enough to have avoided enemy damage.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³⁴ Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, p. 349.

³⁵ *Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, 1905-06, 59 Cong., 1 Sess.*, 465, 472, 490, 496.

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This trip would take them from the defense of the Philippines for five or six months, an unconscionable abridgement of the Islands' security unless the fleet were built to an excessive size.

The novel aspect of the strategic situation was the presence of Japan as a major naval power. While the United States might contemplate competition with European powers in the Far East on an equal basis, she could not compete with Japan in the western Pacific. European fleets would be separated from their home ports by a greater distance than American, and European powers would be in an equal struggle for suitable operating bases in the Far East. But Japan, with shipyards, supplies, personnel, and operating bases all in the Far East while at home, could assure her dominance with a much smaller fleet than that required by extra-regional powers.³⁶

Realizing the difficulty of the problem and remembering at the same time the lesson of the Russo-Japanese war, naval opinion was generally opposed to dividing the battle fleet. The time had come when an Isthmian canal was indispensable, but apparently another possibility was hardly considered. At least by 1908, it would appear that there was infinitely more need for our battle fleet in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Great Britain and Germany were in the midst of great building programs which should have counter-balanced one another, but the United States' building plans were based on the likelihood of meeting one or the other of these navies. This was in part due to the "Germanophobia" of Captain Charles D. Sigsbee of the Office of Naval Intelligence who was frightened by German names on the United States navy rolls and whose reports must have influenced policy.³⁷ Likewise, Anglophiles aroused fears of the designs of Germany in order to bind the United States to Great Britain. By 1903, Great Britain was definitely frightened beyond possible cooperation with Germany, an ad-

³⁶ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), pp. 156, 158-59.

³⁷ Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870-1915," *Political Science Quarterly*, LV (March, 1940), 68-69.

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dition to American Atlantic security which our leaders failed to appreciate. Since it was not until 1914 that the Panama Canal became a reality, perhaps one should commend Secretary of the Navy Meyer for having suggested as early as 1911 that with the opening of the Canal it might be desirable to have the fleet spend the greater part of its time on the Pacific side.³⁸

It was primarily traditional thinking which led to the decision to maintain the fleet in the Atlantic rather than to use it in support of Far Eastern diplomacy. A practical reason for this decision was the utter inadequacy of west coast base facilities and the inactivity which would have resulted in east coast yards had the transfer of the fleet been made. Eastern votes would have been required in order to build adequate base facilities on the west coast. The advent of the *Dreadnought* in 1906 was rendering east coast naval yards obsolete, however, and brought demands for modernization. Sound policy would seem to have dictated building new west coast facilities before modernizing more than two east coast yards, but the politics of government spending formed another consideration.

While this problem was being pondered indecisively prior to 1907, half-measures were used to keep naval vessels surprisingly active in the Far East during the Philippine insurrection and the years following. In his report of 1899, the Secretary of the Navy had directed attention to coal as "the very life of the ship," and noted that the rules of international law permitted a belligerent ship to take on board in a neutral port only sufficient coal to enable her to reach her nearest home port.³⁹ Thus, it was necessary to acquire sovereign rights over a coaling station site before the fleet could count on it in time of war. In 1903 there were agreements for supplying coal in sixty-six foreign ports but, of depots actually under United

³⁸ Report of the Secretary, *Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1911*, p. 28.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1899, p. 27.

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States jurisdiction, there were only nine beyond the continental limits. The Bureau of Equipment included in its report charts showing British and American coaling depots, noting that "a comparison of the two is instructive."⁴⁰

Coaling depots, however, were only part of the base facilities necessary to make naval activities in the Pacific self-sufficient in an emergency. The bureaus frequently urged improvement of base facilities, but their recommendations seldom got notice in the report of the secretary. In 1902 the Bureau of Navigation reminded the department and the public that our largest vessels operating in the western Pacific were dependent upon the docking facilities available by the courtesy of the Japanese or a private dock in Hong Kong where the prices were exorbitant.⁴¹ The "fleet train" doctrine was not yet developed, but initial dockings in the floating dry dock *Dewey* had been successful and it was towed to Olongapo in the Philippines early in 1906. The usefulness of floating derricks for lifting guns and machinery was recognized also, but these devices for "keeping the navy afloat" were not developed as rapidly as might have been hoped.⁴²

The major dispute as to the location of docking facilities concerned the relative merits of Manila and Subig Bay in the Philippines.⁴³ A report of a board ordered to investigate the merits of various sites in the Philippines advised in January, 1901 in favor of Subig Bay⁴⁴ and, with only minor wavering, this remained the navy's choice. The army preferred Cavite in Manila Bay for the naval base, insisting that a Subig Bay base would be much more difficult to defend. Admiral Evans charged that the army's decision was dictated by social rather than military considerations. Appropriations were actually

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1903, pp. 352, 358-59.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1902, pp. 458-60.

⁴² *Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives*, 1908-09, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 244.

⁴³ William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLI (June, 1954), 21-40.

⁴⁴ *House Documents*, No. 140, 57 Cong., 1 Sess.

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made for a base at Olongapo in Subig Bay in 1904, but the stipulations as to prices to be paid prevented progress.⁴⁵ Meantime, the General Board advised, on September 29, 1904, that until work at Subig and Guantanamo were farther advanced, appropriations for Pearl Harbor should not be asked.⁴⁶ Manila Bay, being the scene of commercial activity, served the fleet during this period of indecision. The Spanish had some facilities at Cavite but the scale of American naval activities put a strain on this small base.

So long as the United States contemplated giving full protection to the Philippines, the base to be built there took precedence over Pearl Harbor although preliminary steps were taken to acquire land at the Hawaiian site. As late as June, 1906, Rear-Admiral H. W. Lyon wrote, "Pearl Harbor may not be occupied in a dozen years or more, possibly not at all."⁴⁷ Thus, its development was delayed by inability to decide on plans for a Philippine base as well as by the perennial neglect of base facilities in favor of the building of ships.

After the stress laid upon the strategic value of Hawaii during annexation proceedings, the public, and especially Hawaiians, found it difficult to understand the delay in improving Pearl Harbor. In reply to one citizen, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Darling wrote in 1905, "There is no legislation now pending, and in all probability no action in the matter will be taken in the immediate future."⁴⁸ In 1907, both the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants' Association of Honolulu called for the development of Pearl Harbor, anticipating its availability for commercial use.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, 1908-09, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 244.*

⁴⁶ General Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885-1926, National Archives.

⁴⁷ Mss. "History of the Fourteenth Naval District," I, 34 in the Office of Naval Records and History, Navy Department.

⁴⁸ Darling to Atherton Brownell, April 1, 1905, in General Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885-1926, National Archives.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

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A board investigating the "Coast Defences of the United States and Insular Possessions," headed by Secretary of War Taft, however, found Pearl Harbor to be a port of secondary importance in 1906, and found Puget Sound more in need of special defense facilities.⁵⁰ This board found Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, and Subig Bay to be strategically our most important ports in the Pacific. By January, 1908, however, the pressure from Hawaiian and west coast spokesmen was measurably increased.⁵¹ One Hawaiian noted that "if the allies of the aliens now in the islands" were to send an expedition conveyed by one war vessel, "they could take possession and displace us . . . in one day."⁵² West coast commercial bodies and even some from New York City, Wichita, and Minneapolis were represented as demanding that work be started on a naval base at Pearl Harbor "this year." These groups were obviously concerned about the prospects of a naval attack on the west coast by Japan with whom serious trouble had arisen over the subject of immigration and treatment of Orientals in San Francisco.

IV

Incident to the same problem, the President and the defense chiefs had already come to a major decision, though it was not to become immediately apparent. As the crisis with Japan developed in June and July of 1907, studies of the strategy to be followed in the event of a war with Japan were being completed by the General Board of the Navy and the Army War College.⁵³ On June 18, 1907, the Joint Army-Navy Board recommended that the fleet should be sent to the Orient

⁵⁰ *Senate Documents*, No. 248, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 12, 25-26.

⁵¹ *Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives*, 1908-09, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 503-506, 513-515.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 504.

⁵³ Louis Morton, "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines During the War Scare of 1907," *Military Affairs*, XIII (Summer, 1949), 95-104.

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as soon as possible and that preparations should be made for defense of Subig Bay in the Philippines, where most of the existing base facilities for the fleet were located. President Roosevelt concurred in these recommendations and promptly ordered: (1) concentration of all defense facilities around Subig Bay in the Philippines, (2) a large supply of coal to be sent to that base immediately, (3) the four armoured cruisers in the Orient to the Pacific coast of the United States, and (4) the transfer of the entire fleet of battleships to the Pacific Ocean in October. The army was to provide field rations for ten thousand men at Subig Bay, to provide guns at that station as rapidly as possible, to increase the regular army to one hundred thousand, and was to notify the Commanding General in the Philippines of the decisions of the Joint Board.

The final strategy was not agreed to, however, by military authorities on the spot who insisted that Subig Bay could not be defended from the land side. General Wood estimated that it would take the most extensive, permanent fortifications and 80,000 men to hold that position, or without such defense works, 125,000 men.⁵⁴ As a result, the War Department dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel F. V. Abbott and Captain Stanley D. Embick to study the defensive sites in the Philippines. Their report of November 27, 1907, laid the basis of the defense plan for the Philippines which remained practically unchanged to 1941.⁵⁵ This plan provided for the defense of the Manila area, with a first-class fortress on Corregidor, and recommended the north shore of the Pasig River for a naval base in order to further shorten the defense line.

After the fleet reached the Pacific coast, it was announced that it would continue around the world, and that historic cruise attracted the attention of the world while more important and long-lasting decisions were being reached. As a result of the serious study and consultation which accompan-

⁵⁴ Wood to the Adjutant General, Dec. 23, 1907, quoted in *ibid.*, 101.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 99, 101-03.

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ied the war scare of 1907, the projected naval base at Subig Bay was practically forgotten. Cavite was built up gradually, but it was clear that any "base in the Philippines was relegated to a secondary position in the strategy for the Pacific."⁵⁶ As a result of the Joint Board's study, it was decided to make Pearl Harbor the site of the major fleet base in the Pacific.

Since even General Wood considered that "the really all-essential thing is a strong Pacific Fleet, based on these Philippine Islands," it is apparent that the decision to provide only minor facilities there was, in fact, an admission that the cost of naval control of the western Pacific was too great and that, eventually, the United States would sacrifice the Philippines in a war with Japan. These Islands would be provided with a minimum force to hold the shortest line of defense and would be expected to exact a heavy toll of the conquerors, but, without sea communications, the defenders must expect to be overwhelmed.

It was with some surprise that Congressmen suddenly began to hear frequent demands for development of Pearl Harbor from the President and the Navy Department in December, 1907 and January, 1908.⁵⁷ When a bill directing the Secretary of the Navy to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor reached the floor of the House on April 6, the majority seemed to feel that such action was long overdue. The Navy Department was scored for not having recommended such facilities in the "twenty-four years" (since 1884) the United States had rights to the harbor.⁵⁸ Representative Fitzgerald of New York insisted that Congress had been willing and generous but that the Navy Department had withheld a favorable recommendation "for some mysterious reason."

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁵⁷ Roosevelt to Francis Emroy Warren, Jan. 17, 1908, Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (8 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-54), VI, 912-14.

⁵⁸ *Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, 1908-09*, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 486-87, 503; *Congressional Record*, 60 Cong., 1 Sess. (April 6, 1908), 4443-48.

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In reporting the bill, the House Committee on Naval Affairs reviewed the advantages of the position and nature of Pearl Harbor. Then it explained:

In the judgment of your committee the *new developments on the Pacific and among the nations that border its shores* make it imperative that a strong operating base be established for our Navy at Pearl Harbor without further delay.

A naval base at Pearl Harbor is not designed primarily for the protection of Hawaii. Its main purpose is to form a buffer of defense for our entire Pacific coast and to make possible our naval supremacy upon the Pacific.⁶⁰

After a short debate, the House approved the bill by a vote of 246 to one,⁶¹ and on May 13, 1908, it became law.⁶² It appropriated for Pearl Harbor \$1,000,000 in all, to be available immediately, but one item to be started was "one graving dry dock capable of receiving the largest war vessels of the navy," the total cost of which was not to exceed \$2,000,000. Thus, the project was launched.

Studies of the cruise of the fleet in 1908 and of the crisis in the relations between Japan and the United States in this period have frequently misinterpreted the significance of the cruise because of a misunderstanding of the strategic aspects of the subject. It is questionable that the fleet "could have given an excellent account of itself against the entire Japanese navy."⁶³ The fleet was dependent upon foreign colliers, foreign coal depots, and foreign shipyards for any except minor repairs and supplies. Likewise, it hardly indicated "that the United States was prepared to defend its outposts."⁶³ On the contrary, the cruise was part of the larger excitement which brought the United States to the decision that she could *not*

⁶⁰ *House Reports*, No. 1132 and No. 1385, 60 Cong., 1 Sess. Italics mine.

⁶¹ *Congressional Record*, 60 Cong., 1 Sess. (April 6, 1908), Part V, 4443-47.

⁶² *Statutes at Large of the United States*, XXXV (1908), 141.

⁶³ Thomas A. Bailey, "The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, I (December, 1932), 403.

⁶⁴ Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises*, p. 299.

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defend the Philippines. As Professor Thomas Bailey has noted, Japan slashed her naval expenditures in 1908, which does not indicate great alarm. The cruise did direct attention to the Pacific obligations of American defense and demonstrated the inadequacy of naval bases on the Pacific coast and in the islands.

The Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908, would appear to have been a recognition that a price was to be paid by the United States in return for a new Japanese disavowal of aggressive intentions toward the Philippines.⁶⁴ The price was a free hand in Manchuria, and, recognizing her weakness in the Philippines, the United States was willing to pay that price. When Secretary of the Navy Meyer announced the decision to maintain only "a small docking and repair station at Olongapo," and that "its defense would not become one of serious moment," he explained the move as "owing to the changed conditions."⁶⁵ The reason for the change in policy was more adequately stated by the Joint Army-Navy Board in 1908 as being justified

by the altered conditions of war, by the evident transition of a powerful nation close to that base [Subig Bay] from an attitude of strong friendliness to one of possible hostility, and because the whole question had received the best thought and thorough study of both services. . . .⁶⁶

The decision to build a major base at Pearl Harbor was sound in that it clinched the American position in the central and eastern Pacific and made the Pacific approaches to the west coast and the Panama Canal safe beyond reasonable doubt.⁶⁷ However, it should be noted that the dangers in this area,

⁶⁴ Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, pp. 129-30.

⁶⁵ Report of the Secretary, *Annual Reports of the Navy Department*, 1909, p. 30.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power*, p. 64n. Italics mine.

⁶⁷ Roosevelt to Charles W. Fairbanks, February 21, 1908, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VI, 950-52.

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especially in the eastern Pacific, were almost negligible. The decision concerning the Philippines is of more questionable merit. Unless followed by a studied effort on the part of the United States to be rid of all responsibility for those islands, that decision might, and did, lead to a growing disparity between our obligations to them and our ability to meet those obligations. Of course, after an early sacrifice of the Islands, our forces might return to "liberate" them, but one questions whether this likelihood was understood by Filipinos and Americans to be according to plan after the decisions of 1907 and 1908.

Within one decade the United States had decided to annex not only Hawaii, but also the Philippines. These acquisitions, with other obligations in the Far East and the Caribbean, convinced Americans of their need for a large navy. In view of these developments, further delay in the construction of the Isthmian canal could not be tolerated. When faced with the alternative of providing security for all her possessions or for only the home coasts and the all-important link between them, the American people generally applauded the latter course, although perhaps unwittingly. The decision to make Pearl Harbor our main naval base in the Pacific constituted a strategic retreat, but, unfortunately, it could not be accompanied by a complete release from all responsibility for the Philippines. The implications of this decision were only fully realized by the American public as the drama was played out in 1941 to 1945, making famous the names of Bulkeley, MacArthur and Wainwright.

The Mission of Lansing Bond Mizner to Central America



MARY PATRICIA CHAPMAN *

LANSING Bond Mizner, a California lawyer and Republican politician, campaigned conscientiously for Benjamin Harrison in 1888. After Harrison's election, Mizner went to Washington as an office seeker and was rewarded on March 30, 1889, with the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Central America.¹ On April 1st, the new Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, gave Mizner his written instructions. They included the usual advice in regard to promoting harmony, friendly relations, and the interests of the United States. Mizner was also informed that the most important matter pending was the unsettled boundary dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.²

Although Mizner was accredited to all five Republics, his headquarters were in Guatemala City, where he spent most of his time. He, his wife, three of his sons, and their Chinese cook arrived at the port of San José in May, 1889. The party successfully maneuvered the precarious landing by lighter and derrick. Foreign Minister Martínez Sobral was on the dock to

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¹ From 1873 to 1891, United States representatives were accredited collectively to all five Republics. Since 1882, the grade of the Legation had been raised to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. (Judging from the Appointment Papers, Mizner would have preferred Mexico, where he had served as a major during the Mexican War.)

² Blaine to Mizner, April 1, 1889; Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions, Central America, National Archives, Record Group 59, XIX, 222, no. 1. (Hereafter cited as DI, CA, with date of Instruction preceding and volume, page, and Instruction number following.)

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greet them. Minister Mizner, although somewhat shaken, was able to say something suitable in Spanish, astonishing his family with his unexpected flow of foreign words.³ On June 4th, the new United States Minister officially presented his credentials to President Manuel Barillas. Mizner's son later recalled that his father and the President "hit it off well from the day of their first meeting."⁴

Before Mizner could check personally on the difficulties between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, he attempted to settle two local controversies. One, a typical headache for diplomats, concerned long-standing claims lodged against the Guatemalan government by a private United States firm. Mizner managed to settle this matter to the satisfaction of both parties, but the other, involving the treatment of a private citizen of the United States, was far more complicated, and the ramifications from it were to continue to cause ill-will between the United States and Guatemala long after Mizner had left his post.

John H. Hollander, a member of the capital's American colony, was the publisher of the newspaper *La Estrella de Guatemala*. In 1888, he had made a sworn statement before James Hosmer, the United States Consul General, accusing certain Guatemalan officials and the resident United States Minister, Henry Hall, of benefiting from a fraudulent issue of bonds. The reaction of the Guatemalan government was to throw Hollander in jail, give him a summary trial for libel and then expel him from the country. Minister Hall was exonerated by his government, but the relationship between Hall and Hosmer remained strained. With the change of adminis-

³ Edward D. Sullivan, *The Fabulous Wilson Mizner* (New York, 1935), p. 56. Wilson was 13 and Addison 17 in 1889, and their subsequent reminiscences were colorful, if sometimes inaccurate.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61. He also described Barillas as capable and comparatively straightforward; but a Guatemalan contemporary condemned the chief executive for compromising himself with foreign representatives, vacillating in his policy, and retiring from the presidency, in 1892, with a private fortune of \$8,000,000. Antonio Batres Jauregui, *La America Central ante la historia* (Guatemala, 1949), III, 524-525.

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tration in Washington in 1889, Hall was recalled and replaced by Mizner. Hosmer, however, remained at his post until September, 1890.

The new Minister's job was to get the Guatemalan government to consent to Hollander's return for a brief period so he could settle his private affairs. His application was refused. In June, 1889, the case became more complicated because Hollander, then residing in the United States, sued the Guatemalan Consul General in New York, Jacobo Baíz, for libel. Baíz promptly claimed diplomatic immunity from civil suit on the basis of his alleged status as *Chargé ad interim* for his government.

It took until May, 1890, for the United States Supreme Court to rule against Baíz, and it was not until the end of August of that year that the Guatemalan government, confronting far more serious difficulties with the United States, deemed it expedient to permit Hollander to return.⁵

In August, 1889, Mizner traveled to Nicaragua to present his credentials and to implement an arbitral agreement between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. United States interest in a Nicaraguan canal had been revived in 1879, when a French company acquired the Panamá concession, but one obstacle to canal construction was the disputed boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Cleveland had handed down an award in March, 1888, but, before ratifications could be exchanged, Costa Rica had negotiated a canal contract which Nicaragua claimed was in excess of its powers. Both countries subsequently agreed to arbitrate, and Mizner was instructed

⁵ The Baíz decision can be found in John B. Moore, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1906), IV, 650. The decision to permit Hollander to return was discussed in Anguiano to Cruz, September 1, 1890, *Legación y consulados de Guatemala en los Estados Unidos de América, 1888 á 1892* (unpublished documents, National Archives, Guatemala City). See also p. 396 of this paper. Hollander subsequently filed suit against Guatemala for his losses, and the correspondence concerning this issue dotted the diplomatic papers for decades.

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to see to it that they did.⁶ Mizner was officially received in Managua on August 7th. It took until October for him to arrange a *modus vivendi* acceptable to both parties.

In the meantime, he journeyed by one of the proposed canal routes to San José, Costa Rica, and presented his credentials. His son, Addison, accompanied him, and, in later years, he and his brother, Wilson, told a highly amusing anecdote about the party's reception at Limón, Costa Rica. The Mizners had taken "a dismal craft made from a huge dugout tree" from San Juan del Norte to Limón. They arrived, hot, tired, and four hours late, were almost fired upon by an overly cautious sentry, and then had to sit patiently in the boiling sun while the official greeters were rounded up. Later, a pet monkey of Addison's caused considerable consternation during the welcoming ceremonies by leaping from his shoulder onto the plumes of one of the local officials. After the ordeal was behind, Papa Mizner took to his bed for three days.⁷

When Mizner was in Washington, Blaine had said to him: "I have but one instruction to give you, and that is verbal; do what you can to unite those Central American states."⁸ Mizner decided the occasion of his presentation ceremony in San José was a propitious time to carry out Blaine's request. He introduced the subject by saying that the "United States would be pleased to see a Union of all the Central American Republics" and then he continued with these words:

. . . Enlightened liberty can best be maintained by joining human efforts for the protection of human rights; already your most Northern State is about to be deprived of a considerable portion of her territory, on a nice question of boundary, and Costa

⁶ See Gordon Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941), pp. 20-21.

⁷ Sullivan, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63. Addison gave a slightly different version in his autobiography, *The Many Mizners* (New York, 1932).

⁸ Quoted by Mizner in Mizner to Blaine, October 28, 1889; Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Despatches, Central America, National Archives, Record Group 59, Vol. 31, no. 39. (Hereafter cited as DD, CA, with date of Despatch preceding and volume and Despatch number following.)

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Rica may not always be exempt from the ambitious advance of her Southern Neighbor. . . .⁹

The allusion to the boundary controversy between Guatemala and Mexico, and the implication that Costa Rica might experience similar difficulties with Colombia was officially protested by both Mexico and Colombia and unfavorably received by Costa Rica, which "had had no unpleasant relations of late with Colombia, nor does the [Costa Rican] government apprehend trouble."¹⁰

But the strongest reaction came from Alvey A. Adee, acting Secretary of State, who wrote on September 19th that he regretted Mizner's words:

. . . Such remarks, invested as they necessarily were, with significance by the ceremonial occasion of their utterance, indicate a failure to appreciate the impartial attitude of the United States . . . it would be especially unfortunate if your words should be construed as the authoritative expression of a policy on the part of the Government to counsel a defensive alliance of the Central American States for protection against anticipated aggressions from their neighbors.¹¹

Mizner replied that he thought frankness was supposed to be the essence of diplomacy. He himself had been frank, he explained "because astute Central American statesmen know that the United States wants union to make Central America strong enough to defend itself and to be on an equal footing with its adjoining neighbors." And, he added, they do not understand "why the United States doesn't admit this."¹² He pointed out that he intended no offense against either Mexico or Colombia; but one is forced to conclude that parts of Mizner's speech bordered on indiscretion, if not implied coercion.

⁹ Included in Mizner to Blaine, September 3, 1889, DD, CA, Vol. 31, no. 27.

¹⁰ [New York] *Sun*, September 19, 1889, p. 8.

¹¹ Adee to Mizner, September 19, 1889, DI, CA, XIX, 261, no. 38.

¹² Mizner to Blaine, October 28, 1889, DD, CA, Vol. 31, no. 39.

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His efforts to defend his actions sounded more petulant than persuasive.

Mizner returned to the Guatemalan capital in October to discover that his wife had won the admiration of government officials by demonstrating calm in public during a period of unrest.¹³ The mother's popularity (she was henceforth called "señora sin quidado") probably helped to offset the unfortunate impression her sons were making, which culminated in the alleged abetment by Addison of the jailbreak of a future president.¹⁴ His father's official report on the incident simply stated that the United States Minister had successfully interceded with the Guatemalan president on behalf of the prisoner.¹⁵

Mizner's personal problems were soon to be overshadowed by a serious international crisis that not only broke the spell of peace and amity created by the first Pan American Conference and sabotaged the revived attempts at Central American Union (personally pushed by Blaine at the Conference¹⁶), but also abruptly terminated, through dismissal, Mizner's ministerial career.

A pact of Union was in the process of being ratified when Mizner went to El Salvador in April, 1890, to present his credentials. Two months later, after he had returned to Guate-

¹³ President Barillas had asked her to traverse the deserted streets to restore confidence to the populace. Addison Mizner, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁴ Wilson disrupted the traditional Christmas procession by placing firecrackers under the Bishop's canopy. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 64. Edgar, who tried unsuccessfully for a consulate post in Nicaragua, frequently appeared inebriated in public. Records of the Department of State, Appointment Papers, Central America, Record Group 59, 1885-1893, Box 287, contains a letter from a local resident on this. Addison's account of the escape of José María Reyna Barrios is in Alva Johnston, *The Legendary Mizners* (New York, 1953), p. 8. Addison also said this incident inspired Richard Harding Davis to write *Soldiers of Fortune*.

¹⁵ Mizner to Blaine, February 24, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 32, no. 79.

¹⁶ In early 1890, Blaine held meetings with Central American delegates to the Conference to discuss prospects for Union. See Records of the Department of State, Notes from Central American Legations . . . to the . . . Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59, 1884-1893, and Notes to the Guatemalan Legation . . . from the . . . Department of State, *ibid.*, 1866-1906.

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mala, a bloody *coup d'état* established General Carlos Ezeta in power in El Salvador. Guatemala's reaction was to move its troops to the frontier, and, on July 8th, to declare martial law. Mizner, following the diplomatic custom of the times, promptly requested that some war ships be sent to the Pacific to protect United States interests. By July 31st, both the U. S. S. *Thetis* and *Ranger* had reached San José.

In the meantime, on July 16th, Mizner telegraphed the Department that the Guatemalan government had just informed him that the Pacific Mail steamer *Colima*, anchored at San José, was carrying a shipment of arms destined for El Salvador. The Guatemalan officials wanted these arms "conveyed beyond El Salvador and deposited at a neutral port."¹⁷ The *Colima's* captain agreed to remain at anchor until July 20th, by which time Mizner expected to receive instructions from Washington. But, at this point, a complication arose. The cable, laid in 1882 by a United States firm, was connected to Guatemala City by way of La Libertad, El Salvador, and Ezeta closed it. This meant that communications between Mizner and the Department had to go by way of Mexico and El Paso. En route, they were either delayed, garbled, intercepted, or lost. This unfortunate situation contributed greatly toward confusing subsequent developments.¹⁸

While Mizner was waiting to hear from Washington, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister recalled that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company contract with Guatemala precluded the shipment of arms to Guatemala's neighbors, if there were reason to believe they would be used against Guatemala. Although Martínez Sobral felt that Guatemala thus had a right to confiscate the arms, he and Mizner decided to transfer them

¹⁷ Mizner to Blaine, July 16, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 32, no. 120.

¹⁸ An example of the difficulties that developed can be seen in Blaine to Mizner (telegram cipher), July 26, 1890, DI, CA, XIX, 340: "It would seem that the instructions . . . to you are intercepted. . . . Demand immediate investigation and inviolability of your official correspondence. . . ." Mizner later was told to use the telegraph facilities on the *Ranger*, which, in turn, transmitted them to Mexico.

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from the *Colima* to a northbound ship instead, so that they could be deposited in a neutral port. On July 18th, however, while this transfer was being effected to a local lighter, port officials seized the shipment and quickly transported the arms to the capital.¹⁹

When Adee, in Washington, learned of this episode, he at first protested the seizure as a violation of international law, since Guatemala was not at war.²⁰ But, on August 5th, Blaine instructed Mizner that the Company had just informed the Department of the clause in their contract concerning arms shipments, and, since the Company now wanted to file a claim against Guatemala for breach of the arms reconveyance agreement, Mizner was not to act on the earlier instruction until further notice.²¹

The *Colima* affair was already complicated when Guatemala formally declared war on El Salvador on July 23rd. On July 26th, the Department authorized Mizner to tender his good offices "to adjust Central American difficulties." This instruction eventually reached Mizner by the 31st. For the next four weeks, as dean of the diplomatic corps, he presided over various mediation meetings of resident diplomats and took several trips to El Salvador to facilitate negotiations. Guatemala's refusal to recognize the Ezeta regime caused considerable difficulty, and, at one stage, open hostilities temporarily postponed effective mediation. But, by August 27th, the two Republics signed an agreement whereby both sides were to revert to the *status quo ante* and to grant general amnesty. After a three week interlude, free elections were to be held in El Salvador, and both nations were to abide by the results.²²

¹⁹ Mizner to Blaine, August 4, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 32, no. 133. The port commandant explained that he had seized the arms because he had discovered that they were to be shipped to Acapulco, Mexico, instead of to San Francisco, California, as originally agreed.

²⁰ Adee to Mizner (telegram cipher), July 19, 1890, DI CA, XIX, 338.

²¹ Blaine to Mizner, August 5, 1890, *ibid.*, XIX, 345-346, no. 143.

²² *Protocolo y Documentos relativos a la mediación oficiosa del cuerpo diplomático acreditado en Centro America con motivo de la guerra ocurrida*

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During the course of these negotiations, Martínez Sobral, suspected of treason, had been removed as Guatemala's Foreign Minister (August 7th), and the Minister of Interior, Francisco Anguiano, had been appointed to succeed him.²³ It was during Anguiano's term of office that the preliminary peace terms were accepted. It was also during his tenure that the Barrundia episode, the immediate cause for Mizner's dismissal, took place.

General J. Martín Barrundia, like Barillas, had entered Guatemalan politics on the coattails of Guatemala's former president, Justo Rufino Barrios; but Barrundia had been discredited and exiled while Barrios was still in power.²⁴ When Barillas became president, Barrundia was a potential political threat to him. Barrundia had already made several abortive attempts to invade Guatemala from Mexico, and, in August, 1890, he decided to join forces with Ezeta. He boarded another Pacific Mail steamer, the *Acapulco*, at Acapulco, Mexico on August 23rd. In transit south, this ship was scheduled to call at two of Guatemala's Pacific ports — Champerico and San José. When the Guatemalan government learned that Barrundia would be aboard, it ordered the local commandants to apprehend him but also to contact the local United States consuls "in order that measures you may take shall not give rise to subsequent claims."²⁵ Foreign Minister Anguiano then informed Consul General James Hosmer (temporarily in charge of the Legation during Mizner's absence) of Guatemala's intention to seize Barrundia. Hosmer consented. However, when the port commandant at Champerico requested

entre las Repúblicas de Guatemala y El Salvador (Guatemala, 1890), p. 14.

²³ Martínez Sobral apparently was imprisoned briefly. Anguiano was Guatemala's Foreign Minister, 1890-91 and 1898-1900.

²⁴ F. Hernández León, *El libro de los efemérides* (Guatemala, 1930), II, 385-388.

²⁵ *Report of the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Guatemala to the National Legislative Assembly concerning the capture and death of General J. Martín Barrundia* (Guatemala, 1891), p. 13. Hereafter cited as *Report of the Secretary of Foreign Relations*.

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Captain Pitt of the *Acapulco* to surrender Barrundia, the latter communicated with Hosmer first. On August 25th, Hosmer sent Pitt the following telegram:

I believe the Guatemalan Government has a perfect right to search all foreign vessels that may be in the waters of this Republic for persons who may be suspected of being hostile, during time of actual war, and to place them under arrest. You are at liberty to communicate this opinion to the commandant.²⁶

Pitt still hesitated, however. He next asked Hosmer to confirm his telegram in writing. This was the status of the situation when Mizner returned to his post from El Salvador, carrying the revised preliminary peace terms, on August 26th. He promptly conferred with Hosmer and Anguiano. Then, early on the 27th, he wrote Anguiano that he concurred with Hosmer's views, although he admitted that the case was "an unusual one," taken in connection with the peace which was practically concluded last night, and of which general amnesty was a part." He emphasized that Barrundia's life must be preserved, and that all precautions should be taken to guarantee his personal safety.²⁷

In the meantime, Pitt had telegraphed directly to Mizner that he was "awaiting instructions," and suggested that he should bring his ship to San José, where more adequate protection could be afforded in case of trouble. Mizner wired Pitt to proceed. The *Acapulco* docked at San José early in the evening of the 27th. Late that night, Mizner wrote Pitt a letter in which he told him it was his duty to surrender Barrundia.

About 2:00 P.M. the next day, the port commandant at San José, with four policemen, boarded the ship, handed Mizner's letter to Pitt, learned from Pitt that Barrundia was "un-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁷ Mizner to Anguiano, August 27, 1890, Legación de los Estados Unidos ante el gobierno de Guatemala (Unpublished documents, National Archives, Guatemala City), no. 8515.

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armed," and then went with him to Barrundia's cabin. Pitt started to read Mizner's letter to Barrundia. Before he could finish it, Barrundia drew two pistols and started shooting wildly. The Guatemalan policemen promptly shot and killed the General.²⁸

Mizner telegraphed the news to Blaine on August 29th, pointing out that he had "joined with the Consul General . . . in advising Captain to permit arrest under charges of being an enemy, martial law being in force."²⁹ On the same day, he wrote Blaine in detail about the unfortunate incident. On the following day, he had to add a postscript because Barrundia's irate daughter had just entered the Legation in a threatening manner and Mizner had had to ask Hosmer to remove her.³⁰

A portent of Washington's reaction was indicated in a telegram sent on August 30th by William Wharton, the acting Secretary of State. He wired Mizner that the "Department regrets your advising or consenting to surrender especially as no specific charge of violation of the ordinary laws of Guatemala appears and his treatment as an enemy under martial law alone is alleged."³¹ Then, on September 3rd and 27th, respectively, resolutions were presented in the United States House of Representatives demanding a full report on the matter. Congressman McCreary of Kentucky condemned Mizner and Hitt of Illinois defended him — both acting, of course, on inconclusive evidence.³²

²⁸ The various accounts of the killing follow this sequence. This one appeared in the "Boletín de Noticias," inserted in *El Guatemalteco*, August 28, 1890.

²⁹ Mizner to Blaine (telegram cipher), August 29, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 32.

³⁰ Mizner to Blaine, August 30, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 32, no. 150. Jauregui, *op. cit.*, III, 494, said Barrundia's daughter fired a wild shot at Mizner. He also said the rumor circulated that Anguiano had bribed Mizner with \$50,000 for the letter to Pitt. There is no evidence to confirm this.

³¹ Wharton to Mizner (telegram cipher), August 30, 1890, DI, CA, XIX, 364.

³² *Congressional Record*, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1890, XXI, Part 10 (Washington, 1890), 9582, 10379-80. The requested documents were submitted to the House in December and ordered printed. No further action was taken.

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Simultaneously, there was evidence that the Barrundia affair was causing some uneasiness among Guatemalan officials. Although the episode was not taken up either when it occurred or later by Fernando Cruz, the Guatemalan Minister to the United States (nor did it become a subject of direct correspondence between the respective foreign offices),³³ the Guatemalan Foreign Minister apparently realized in late August that the time was propitious to make some conciliatory gestures. On August 29th, the long requested permission for Hollander's return was granted. On August 31st, the arms seized off the *Colima* were placed on another Pacific Mail steamer at San José and shipped back to San Francisco, California. Writing to Fernando Cruz on September 1st, Anguiano, after alluding to Blaine's dissatisfaction over the Hollander and *Colima* cases and to his innumerable complaints about the inadequacies of the telecommunications system, explained that Barillas had decided to make some concessions. On September 10th, in another despatch to Cruz, Anguiano bitterly criticized the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. He cited both the *Colima* and *Acapulco* incidents to demonstrate his point that the Company was hostile to Guatemala.³⁴

On September 23rd, Mizner, in an attempt to fortify his own position in the Barrundia affair, reminded Blaine of the opinion of former Secretary Bayard, who, in 1885, in a somewhat similar case, had ruled that the right of asylum did not apply to a political refugee on a foreign merchant ship anchored in local waters and subject to port jurisdiction. Mizner suggested to Blaine that the time had come when the United States should "make a plain declaration that our fleet of

³³ A careful perusal of the pertinent documents confirms this. See also the statement in the *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations*, p. 95, which said that "neither the Guatemalan Government nor its Legation in the United States ever received one single line about the Barrundia affair."

³⁴ Anguiano to Cruz, September 1, 10, 1890, *Legación y Consulados de Guatemala en los Estados Unidos de America*, 1888 á 1892, *op. cit.*

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steamers cannot be used in local waters as an asylum for revolutionists."³⁵

A few days later, on September 29th, Commander Reiter of the U. S. S. *Ranger*, which had been anchored a short distance from the *Acapulco* during the fatal shooting, was ordered home and subsequently relieved of his command for not insisting that Barrundia be transferred to the safety of his warship and for his further negligence on the afternoon of Barrundia's death.³⁶

During these developments, a prolonged and ominous silence concerning the Barrundia affair had descended upon the Department of State. But, on November 18, 1890, the Secretary sent a twenty-nine page despatch to his unfortunate Minister which, in substance, and in contrast to the Secretary of the Navy's indictment of Reiter, reprimanded Mizner for meddling too much. Blaine first explained that the delay in reaching a verdict was due to the fact that he wanted all the necessary data before him. He then gave a resumé of the events from August 25th to 28th, and concluded with this statement:

... the more the question is examined in the light of important facts tardily disclosed the deeper becomes the regret that you so far exceeded your legitimate authority as to sign the paper which, in the hands of the officers of Guatemala, became their warrant for the capture of General Barrundia. . . .³⁷

Blaine told Mizner that his reference to Bayard's opinion was not pertinent, since Bayard had in no way suggested that

³⁵ Mizner to Blaine, September 23, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 33, no. 170.

³⁶ See U. S. Navy Department, *Message from the President of the United States transmitting in response to the resolution . . . correspondence relating to the conduct of Commander Reiter, in connection with the killing of General Barrundia* (Washington, 1891). Navy Secretary Tracy's scathing condemnation of Reiter's desultory action merits quotation: "It is believed that few cases have ever occurred in the history of the United States Navy where a commanding officer so completely abandoned the responsibilities of his position, as, according to your own showing, you did upon this critical occasion. . . ." (The Senate, on February 6th had demanded and received the correspondence above quoted.)

³⁷ Blaine to Mizner, November 18, 1890, DI, CA, XIX, 402, no. 206.

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it was the duty of a United States Minister to intervene by concurrence or express consent in a matter concerning the right of asylum. He demolished another of Mizner's arguments by reminding him that a preliminary peace had already been signed at the time the Barrundia incident occurred, and, therefore, Guatemala did not even have the belligerent right of visit and search. Blaine also criticized the use of the Company's contract as an argument for Guatemala's action in either the *Colima* or *Acapulco* case. He concluded by observing that the "rights of any person or thing carried . . . are secured under the general principles of international law."³⁸

The final sentence passed against Mizner by Blaine sounded the death knell of Mizner's career as a diplomat:

. . . For your course, therefore, in intervening to permit Guatemalan authorities to accomplish their desires . . . I can discover no justification. You were promptly informed that your act was regretted. I am now directed by the President to inform you that it is disavowed. The President is, moreover, of the opinion that your usefulness in Central America is at an end . . . leave your post with convenient dispatch.³⁹

Although another Californian, a former Governor, Romualdo Pacheco, was immediately appointed to succeed Mizner, the unsuspecting and now unofficial Minister in residence continued to send despatches to the Department for six weeks more. But, finally, on December 31, 1880, Mizner acknowledged the belated arrival of Blaine's communication of No-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 422. Blaine's rejection of Mizner's arguments concerning the right of asylum, belligerency, and legal contract have been mentioned because this case has frequently been misconstrued by historians and other writers. See Alice Felt Tyler, *The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine* (University of Minnesota, 1927), pp. 103, *et seq.*, and Charles Fenwick, *International Law* (2nd ed.; New York, 1934), p. 266, for examples. As Moore, *op. cit.*, II, 871 said: "It was the use of the Mizner letter as a warrant that led to his recall, and not his failure to assert the right of asylum, as has often been said in discussing this case."

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vember 18th. He stated that on that day he had turned the Legation over to the Consul General, pending Pacheco's arrival.

Apparently somewhat bewildered, Mizner wrote that he did not see, however, how the death of one individual could meet with such disapproval when the "all absorbing question [in August] was peace to over two millions of people, and the arrest of a citizen of Guatemala, on one of our merchant ships, either in time of war or peace, was an inconsiderable matter compared with the vast interests involved. . . ." ⁴⁰ Mizner also expressed regret that President Harrison, in his annual message, had seen fit to praise him as a peacemaker and then condemn him for "exceeding the bounds of his authority" in the Barrundia affair. ⁴¹ Mizner explained that since he had felt that Guatemala had the right to seize Barrundia, he would not have thrown any obstacles in the way of exercising that right. He concluded the despatch by expressing the desire that his actions "and unprecedented treatment [be submitted] to the judgment of my countrymen." ⁴²

Mizner left Guatemala shortly after writing this despatch. But both the *Colima* and *Acapulco* incidents continued to cause difficulties for months to come. Blaine decided that both the United States Government and the Company merited an official apology for the *Colima* arms seizure. The Guatemalan government complied with a formal salute to the flag at San José on January 29, 1891; but Blaine wrote Pacheco that he was not satisfied with the way it was handled. ⁴³ He was still demanding another ceremony as late as July 1891. His efforts proved fruitless. In any event, the conclusion has perhaps justifiably been reached that, in the *Colima* case, in spirit if not in letter, Guatemala "had [already] yielded to the physical

⁴⁰ Mizner to Blaine, December 31, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 33, no. 227.

⁴¹ See *Congressional Record*, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1890-1891, XXII, Part I (Washington, 1891), 2-3 for Harrison's speech.

⁴² Mizner to Blaine, December 31, 1890, DD, CA, Vol. 33, no. 227.

⁴³ Blaine to Pacheco, February 28, 1891, DI, CA, XIX, 470, no. 35.

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rather than the legal superiority of the position of the United States."⁴⁴

In regard to the Barrundia incident, however, the Guatemalan government remained adamant, and, in March, 1891, in an effort to offset any further criticism of its position at home and abroad, Guatemala published a bilingual "white paper" that contained many documents and a detailed defense of Guatemala's action. The Government emphasized that, since Barrundia was contraband of war, a criminal, and a political offender, his seizure was justified. It emphasized, too, that Mizner's consent had been sought simply as a matter of comity, and that it had not been juridically necessary.⁴⁵

Guatemala appointed a special agent to circulate this publication in the United States, but the timing was poor. Interest in the Barrundia affair had subsided, after a brief flurry in February caused by the publicity given the Navy's verdict against Reiter.⁴⁶ Blaine told Batres Jauregui, the new Guatemalan Minister to Washington, that such propaganda was simply perpetuating ill-will, and advised him to explain publicly the unofficial status of the agent and to issue an apology for the accidental death of Barrundia. Blaine, in turn, promised to try to calm Congress.⁴⁷

Actually, the repercussions in the United States from the Barrundia episode were most effectively counteracted by the growing difficulties between the United States and Chile in 1891. First the *Itata* and then the *Baltimore* incidents drew the attention of both press and Congress away from one Latin American Republic to the other. In the meantime, Lansing Mizner, who had left Guatemala in failing health, was under-

⁴⁴ Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁴⁵ *Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations, op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴⁶ On February 6, 1891, the Senate requested and received information about Reiter. The matter died in committee.

⁴⁷ Jauregui, *op. cit.*, II, 550, *et. seq.* Since he was the Minister involved, the author's report of this conversation should be accurate.

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going serious financial reverses as his physical condition worsened. He died in San Francisco, California, in 1893.

In evaluating Mizner's mission to Central America, the handicap imposed by the inadequate, inefficient, and uncertain communications system should not be underestimated. The problem had been serious from the time the cable was laid in 1882, and it remained irksome long after Mizner left his post. Certainly, in Mizner's time, it might have been possible to avoid both the *Colima* and *Acapulco* complications, if telegraphic messages had been quickly sent and received. But the inexperienced Minister found himself making decisions on hazy issues of international law that fell within that unmarked frontier where precedents had not yet been sufficient to establish clear and universally recognized rules of conduct. The result was that Mizner risked censure by permitting the arms to be removed from the *Colima* because of a private contract. He apparently blundered when he concurred with the Guatemalan government's decision to seize Barrundia on the *Acapulco*. However, when Blaine censured Mizner because the letter confirming his views was used as a "warrant," one cannot help but sympathize with the minister, to whom such a contingency obviously never occurred.

Earlier in his mission, Mizner was somewhat undiplomatic in his presentation speech in Costa Rica. The indignation caused by his words there, coupled with the ill-will fomented between the United States and Guatemala as a result of the *Colima* and *Acapulco* incidents, probably cannot be cancelled out by Mizner's success as a mediator for a claims case, a dispute over a canal contract, and a brief war. In the last analysis, perhaps Lansing Mizner's most appreciated legacy to posterity was not the record of his diplomatic service, but, rather, the reminiscences by or about his progeny, Wilson and Addison, whose notorious careers, including their youthful escapades in Central America, still make fascinating reading.

French Socialism and the Congress of London of 1896



HARVEY GOLDBERG*

IN SO FAR as the French working class was organized against capitalism in the three decades before World War I, it divided its loyalties between socialism¹ and syndicalism. The cleavage between these two approaches to social reconstruction kept both movements at minimum strength, separated a workers' party from their unions, and left a legacy of personal and doctrinal bitterness. For socialism in particular it had serious consequences — an ineffective approach to unions, a separation of political and economic action, and a frequent lack of generosity toward rivals on the Left. In part, the socialist intransigence which developed was the response to syndicalist intolerance or anarchist irrationalism. But it was also a reflection of the preference for a single course of action over genuine diversity. Such sincere, devoted leaders as the socialist Jaurès and the syndicalist Pelloutier were creative

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¹ In 1890 one could identify seven district socialist groups: (1) the *Parti Ouvrier français*, founded by the Marxist Jules Guesde in 1880, sometimes called the Guesdists; (2) the *Comité Révolutionnaire central*, founded by Edouard Vaillant in 1881, sometimes called the Blanquists; (3) the *Fédération des Travailleurs socialistes de France*, founded by Paul Brousse, sometimes called the Broussists or the Possibilists; (4) the *Parti Ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire*, founded in 1890, after a split within the Possibilists, sometimes called the Allemanists; (5), (6), and (7) three groups originating in the *Société d'Économie sociale*, founded by Benoît Malon in 1885, which split into Boulangists, anti-Boulangists, and neutrals; from these groups the Independents in the socialist movement developed. The histories of these factions can be studied in the following: A. Zévaès, *Les Guesdistes* (Paris, 1911); Charles de Costa, *Les Blanquistes* (Paris, 1912); S. Humbert, *Les Possibilistes* (Paris, 1911); M. Charney, *Les Allemanistes* (Paris, 1912); Albert Orry, *Les Socialistes Indépendants* (Paris, 1911).

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thinkers, but at critical moments they failed to find grounds for collaboration.²

In the development of this cleavage the fourth Congress of the Second International, held in London in 1896, was virtually the last opportunity to bring together the rival approaches to working class action. It is of real interest, therefore, to examine the divergences which preceded London, the events of that meeting, and the effects ensuing from it.

I

While the growing industrial progress of France in the last third of the nineteenth century produced significant urbanization, an increasing proletariat, and a full array of social problems, the laws of the Third Republic offered the workers their first opportunity to organize both politically and economically.³ Socialism thus began to rally in France a full decade after the crushing of the Commune as modest numbers of workers enrolled in political organizations. But by the decade of the 1890's the socialist path to political success was blocked, not only by the opposition of capitalists and their supporters, but also by the competition of anarchists and syndicalists whose theories and actions were designed to deflect the workers from the practice of politics.

The anarchists could trace a theoretical lineage back to that learned son of a poor cooper, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. He had formulated a social theory which aimed to end authority "whether in the form of Church, State, land, or money."⁴ Instead of oppression, he imagined a society in which "debts

² It was a struggle reflected in the entire socialist movement. See G. D. H. Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought*, 2 vols. (New York, 1953-54), II, *passim*.

³ The Constitution of 1875 provided for universal manhood suffrage and a law of 1884 legalized trade unions.

⁴ Proudhon in *Idée générale de la Révolution au XIX^e siècle*, quoted by Jean Maitron, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France, 1880-1914* (Paris, 1951), p. 30. All quotations from this and other French texts in this article are translations made by the author.

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would be paid, bondage abolished, mortgages lifted, rents repaid, expenditures for religion, courts, and the state suppressed; credit would be free, exchange equal, association voluntary; education, work, personal property, home, livelihood guaranteed; and there would be no more antagonism, war, centralization, governments, and priesthoods."⁶ So appealing was this anti-authoritarian doctrine to most later anarchists that, whatever their individual differences, they all showed great reverence for Proudhon.

As labor unrest grew in France in the 1880's,⁶ the anarchists called for a markedly different course of action than the socialists. The latter proposed to the workers that they organize and agitate politically through their own parties to gain improvements within the existing state; the pure Marxists, in particular, believed that the immutable laws of capitalist development would soon bring an end to the existing economy and viewed political action as the way of strengthening and educating labor for its coming day of power.⁷ The anarchists, expecting no gains at all from legal action within a class dominated state, called for illegal action to destroy existing authority and to seize the productive machinery.⁸

The anarchists' objective of destroying the state and their method of direct action were decisively combined in the so-called era of *attentats*.⁹ The essential purpose of violent acts,

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁷ On the condition of the workers and their developing strike action, consult Jean Montreuil, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier en France* (Paris, 1946); Emile Levasseur, *Questions ouvrières et industrielles en France sous la III^e République* (Paris, 1907); and E. Dolléans, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939), II.

⁸ There always existed within Marxist socialism, however, a contradiction between determinism (waiting for history to take its inevitable course) and voluntarism (organizing action to shape history); see the cogent criticisms on this point of M. Drachkovitch, *De Karl Marx à Leon Blum* (Geneva, 1954), *passim*.

⁹ Maitron, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁹ *Attentat* is the word always used to describe an act of anarchist terrorism. It is literally translated as outrage, but since this seems to lack real precision, the French term will continue to be used here.

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out of which came the historic stereotype of the anarchist as bomb-thrower, was to strike directly at organized society, aiming usually at certain obvious symbols of authority; it was hoped, as a result, that anarchist propaganda would spread dramatically among the workers, while the fabric of authority would itself be considerably weakened.¹⁰ When isolated acts of violence in the 1880's turned into almost a reign of terror by 1892, the era of *attentats* was at its full flood.

The names of Auguste Vaillant, who threw a bomb into a crowded session of the Chamber of Deputies on December 9, 1893; Émile Henry, whose bomb at the gare St. Lazare on February 12, 1894, wounded twenty; and Santo Caserio, who fatally stabbed Sadi Carnot, President of the Republic, on June 24, 1894, were associated with the most sensational acts of the period.¹¹

Strong governmental moves against the prevalent anarchist methodology were sufficiently effective, not only in France but internationally, to force a new direction on the movement after 1895. So highly influential a theorist as Peter Kropotkin had been urging since the start of the decade that anarchists were running the risk through their terrorism of isolating themselves completely from the people. That warning, added to repression, persuaded the French anarchists to change tactics and to turn increasingly to the union movement as their center of influence. They aimed to bring workers out of organized political activity into revolutionary strike action.¹²

Throughout the era of *attentats* the socialists developed a position which was hostile to anarchist tactics, though sympathetic to the despair which could drive men to such acts. Jean Jaurès, the young philosopher who became one of the three leading socialists of the prewar Republic,¹³ illustrated the

¹⁰ Maitron, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-195.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-231.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 245-247.

¹³ The other two would certainly be Guesde, the Marxist, and Edouard Vaillant, the Blanquist. The best biography of Jaurès is the latest, by Marcelle

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socialist attitude in his criticism of anarchist individualism. Attacking the notion of the complete autonomy of each individual as a thought worthy of *laissez-faire* liberals, Jaurès proposed as the key to real liberation the collectivist reorganization of society, which would eliminate the profit motive and guarantee to each the economic independence requisite for his freedom.¹⁴ Guesde, writing with his characteristic bluntness after the Vaillant bombing, condemned violence, declaring that "socialism will succeed only by the peacefully expressed will of the people."¹⁵ This leader of Marxism, who had uttered such violent calls to action a decade before, was reflecting a growing devotion to legalism, now that socialists had managed to win fifty seats in the general elections of 1893.

Doctrinal opposition gave way to deep socialist resentment of anarchism as a result of the famous *lois scélérates* of 1893 and 1894.¹⁶ For it then seemed obvious to the socialists that the manifest threat of the anarchists had become a smoke screen behind which the government could cripple what it considered the latent but more serious threat of socialism.

The first of the three laws, passed by both houses on December 12, 1893, three days after the Vaillant bombings, altered the liberal press law of July 29, 1881. Now not only direct and demonstrable provocation to criminal action was to be the basis for suppressing a paper and imprisoning its personnel, but also so vague a crime as indirect provocation. In short, the government had a powerful instrument for threatening the opposition press. Despite some criticisms by the socialists and a few Radicals like Goblet and Pelletan, this

Auclair, *La Vie de Jean Jaurès* (Paris, 1954). Jaurès remained an Independent in socialism until the party was unified in 1905.

¹⁴ *La Petite République*, December 31, 1893.

¹⁵ Quoted by Maitron, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

¹⁶ The term *lois scélérates* is difficult to render exactly into English. It is a term of hostility applied to the laws by critics, and would most accurately be rendered as the nefarious laws.

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drastic change was quickly agreed to by the strong majority of 413 to 63.¹⁷

The second law, approved 464 to 39 just a few days later on December 15, limited the freedom of association by empowering the government to suppress not only organizations actually proved guilty of plotting a crime, but also those in any manner suspected of such plots.¹⁸ The assassination of Carnot was the occasion for the third of these laws limiting the civil liberties of Frenchmen. Passed by the Chamber of Deputies on July 26, with somewhat greater opposition reflected in the 269 to 163 vote, it set down stiff penalties for any and all acts of propaganda disruptive of public order. The accused, moreover, were to be tried, not before juries of their peers, but before special tribunals without many of the customary safeguards.¹⁹

As the socialists indicated in their strenuous Parliamentary opposition to the laws, they feared that they had been caught in a repressive trap through the madness of anarchism. Jaurès, who led the socialist attack, interpellated the government on April 30, 1894, when the anti-socialist effects of the laws were already being felt. Anarchist acts, he charged, had become a convenient excuse for discrediting any labor and socialist activity; and when such acts didn't exist, the government or the capitalists hired anarchists to create them. To illustrate, Jaurès reported in detail the activities of one Tournadre during the Carmaux coal strike of 1892; that anarchist had boasted, said Jaurès, that the money he offered to strikers for the purchase of dynamite had been supplied to him by capitalists of Paris.²⁰

¹⁷ Francis de Pressensé, *Le Lois scélérates de 1893-1894* (Paris, 1899), pp. 9-11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-24. For the full texts of the three laws, *ibid.*, pp. 55-62.

²⁰ Jean Jaurès, *Discours parlementaires* (Paris, 1904), pp. 599-600. There appear to have been many witnesses to Tournadre's statement as to the source of his money. That *agents provocateurs* were used is implied by the Prefect of Police of Paris, E. Reynaud; see Maitron, *op. cit.*, p. 218. Jaurès gave examples in *La Dépêche de Toulouse*, March 12, 1894.

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Such activities, the socialists claimed, were the work of the new conservative front which the Parliamentary majority, led by Dupuy, Casimir-Perier, and Barthou, had thrown up against all manner of leftist opinion and action. In the phrase of one of its key members, Eugène Spuller, the majority in the Chamber of Deputies between 1893 and 1898 had "a new spirit." In order to make common cause with the Catholic monarchists, who had just rallied to the Republic, the republicans had dropped anticlericalism as a key measure and replaced it with repressive acts to defend the threatened society.²¹

In his extensive contribution to the debate on the third law, Jaurès pushed the socialist accusation against governmental repression even further. If the Ministry had intended simply to prevent anarchist disorders, it would not have moved against socialists, who were trying to teach workers the futility of anarchism.²² But such was not the Ministerial aim. "A long time ago," Jaurès wrote bitterly, "the men of Panama²³ vowed mortal hatred against freedom of press and speech."²⁴ This was not the interpretation of the anti-socialist critics, however, who sought to link socialism and anarchism, charging that the constant socialist attacks on authority had encouraged the anarchist outrages.²⁵ The broad restrictions on freedom of the press and assembly were thus deemed necessary to suppress all potentially dangerous ideas and organizations.²⁶ The editorialist of *Le Matin* spoke for a large body of moderate and conservative opinion when, in summing up the significance of the *lois scélérates*, he wrote: "The freedom of

²¹ Jacques Chastenet, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1952-1955), III, 56-59.

²² Jaurès, *op. cit.*, p. 761.

²³ The reference here is to those politicians implicated in the Panama financial scandal.

²⁴ *La Dépêche de Toulouse*, July 24, 1894.

²⁵ *Le Temps*, December 14, 1893.

²⁶ *Le Matin*, July 9, 1894.

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speech is far from being universal and absolute. And it is the same for writing, especially in the press."²⁷

The way of the anarchists seemed to the socialists to be rooted in a futile irrationalism. The way of the socialists seemed to the anarchists to be rooted in futile, even treasonable politics. The cleavage was deep. But when the heavy hand of legislative retaliation against anarchism was felt by socialists, then the desire of the latter was to extirpate the influence of the former from the working class movement. That desire became even more intense as the anarchist influence moved into the trade union movement and took its place beside syndicalism. But in fighting anarchism, the socialists could end up fighting unionism unless wisdom and tolerance accompanied their actions.

II

The Marxists in France lost a prize they had seemingly won when the labor unions moved gradually away from their influence to that of syndicalists and anarchists. A rival force of the very first order was thus created on the Left as a barrier to socialist success.

From 1880 when the Marxist socialists were organized into the *Parti Ouvrier français*, their attitude toward unions was extremely paternalistic. They viewed them as useless except in recruiting and educating for the socialist party.²⁸ The desire grew among certain militant union leaders, however, to shake off the political orientation. Already obvious at the very first meeting of the *Fédération nationale des syndicats et groupes corporatifs de France* in 1886, the anti-political spirit grew increasingly under two influences. One was the doctrine of revolutionary syndicalism, which combined belief in militant strike action with contempt for reformist political ac-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, July 24, 1894.

²⁸ Robert Goetz-Girey, *La Pensée syndicale française* (Paris, 1948), p. 32.

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tion.²⁹ The other was the disillusion experienced by certain revolutionaries at the spectacle of socialism integrating itself within the cadre of the existing state, thus exchanging militancy for opportunism.³⁰

The key tactical weapon in the armory of syndicalist theory was the general strike, the highest form of united economic action by the workers. First proposed in 1886 by Joseph Tortellier, an anarchist worker much attracted to violence,³¹ it became the most decisive point of separation from political participation. And the most important centers for the diffusion of syndicalist ideas were the *bourses du travail* or labor exchanges; originating in Paris in 1887, fourteen *bourses* were combined by 1892 into the *Fédération des Bourses du Travail*, which became the great source of anti-political propaganda.³² Out of this movement came the greatest of the early syndicalists, the almost legendary Fernand Pelloutier, who, rejecting social reforms as useless and delusive,³³ sought the instrument for a revitalized society in the workers' economic organizations.³⁴

The separation between the socialist and labor movements culminated in the early congresses of the *Fédération nationale des syndicats et groupes corporatifs de France*, which the Guesdists had hoped to dominate. The syndicalists, many of whom had passed through some phase of anarchism, managed to win support at the Marseilles Congress in 1892 for a resolution favoring the general strike. Introduced by a young disciple of Pelloutier, Aristide Briand, it was sharply attacked by Guesde. In an open letter published in his own paper, he summed up his contempt for syndicalist panaceas by calling the general strike "a deceptive mirage."³⁵ Such was the setting

²⁹ Dolléans, *op. cit.*, II, 23-24.

³⁰ Goetz-Girey, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

³¹ Georges Suarez, *Briand, sa vie, son oeuvre*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1938), I, 110.

³² Dolléans, *op. cit.*, II, 33-34.

³³ F. Pelloutier, *Histoire des bourses du travail* (Paris, 1902), pp. 53-54.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

³⁵ *Le Socialiste*, October 16, 1892.

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for the schism which finally took place two years later at the Congress of Nantes. When the delegates again voted the general strike, the Marxists withdrew, and "from that day one can date the anti-statist supremacy within the French labor movement."³⁶

The line of demarcation between anarchists and syndicalists was a wavering one in the 1890's, even after the shift in anarchist tactics following the repressions of 1894 and 1895. Not all anarchists were syndicalists; nor was the reverse true. But anarchists did find their way into organizations like the *bourses du travail* in sufficiently large number to impress their very strong anti-political attitude on those institutions. In fact, it was not until 1907 that the syndicalists openly sought to oust them from their organizations.³⁷ There was thus some justification for the confusing tendency among French socialists to lump anarchists and syndicalists together. But this oversimplification damaged the chance for socialists to collaborate with serious syndicalists.

The growth of syndicalism was unmistakable, even though the *bourses* never enrolled more than a small minority of the French workers.³⁸ As the succeeding Ministries of the Third Republic seemed uniformly mediocre or corrupt, workers could be expected to find revolutionary trade unionism attractive.

Beholding, as the whole nation did, the sorry spectacle of political inefficiency, incompetence, and frivolity . . . , they placed no trust in the state. . . . And to those who had overcome their bourgeois propensities, syndicalism was much more attractive than any of the available species of straight socialism the sponsors of which bade fare to reproduce on a smaller scale the games of the bourgeois parties.³⁹

³⁶ Maitron, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283, 302-305.

³⁸ Goetz-Girey, *op. cit.*, p. 40. By 1907, in fact, the *Confédération générale du travail* had enrolled only 400,000 workers. J. Delevsky, *Les Antinomies socialistes et l'évolution du socialisme français* (Paris, 1930), p. 437.

³⁹ J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York, 1942), p. 339.

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Even within the socialist movement itself the brush of syndicalism had left some very real marks, especially on one group, the Allemanists. At its Paris Congress of 1891, this group had affirmed its strong belief in the efficacy of the general strike, a position reiterated annually until the party dissolved in 1897. The Allemanists also took an active part in syndicalist organizations, providing thereby a very real link between socialism and revolutionary unionism.⁴⁰ Infected thus within their own ranks and jolted by rivalry from without, the political socialists (as one can call those who stressed electoral victories), found themselves facing a real struggle for the control of the French working class movement. The Congress of London of 1896 provided one significant chapter in that struggle by its clear limitation of those who could claim to be socialist.

III

In the Second International, in which the German party with its Marxist theories was dominant, so-called anarchist tendencies were strenuously fought from the beginning. At the very first Congress, held in Paris in 1889, a socialist leader like the Netherlander Domela Nieuwenhuis, a critic of the political and centralizing notions of the Marxist faction,⁴¹ was "isolated, since, as was well known, . . . he had fallen into an anarchist, antimilitarist, and antiparliamentary position. . . ." ⁴²

By the time of the Congress of Brussels in 1891, the offensive against anarchists had picked up steam; the Marxists, certainly the strongest group, were determined to purge the movement of rival elements. Thus the Spaniard Fernandez Gramos, who represented some fifty labor organizations, was expelled after he had shouted his preference for anarchist

⁴⁰ Charnay, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-64.

⁴¹ F. Domela Nieuwenhuis, *Le Socialisme en danger* (Paris, 1897), pp. 32-253.

⁴² E. Vandervelde, *Souvenirs d'un militant socialiste* (Paris, 1939), p. 140.

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martyrs over socialist deputies.⁴³ The decisive move by the Marxist leadership, however, came finally at the Congress of Zurich in 1893. The organizing committee, in drawing up rules of eligibility for unions and socialist groups, insisted on recognition of political action as one basis for qualification. The aim was very clearly to exclude the anarchist representatives. When the question was raised on the floor at Zurich as to the exact meaning of political action (one delegate pointing out with mock innocence that the assassination of the Tzar was political action), the German leader Bebel defined it as the use of legislative machinery by the proletariat for the conquest of power.⁴⁴ With real opposition coming only from the Spanish and French delegations, the qualifying rule was adopted.⁴⁵

Despite the resolution, however, some anarchists managed to slip through the barrier. The political socialists showed as little generosity or compromise as their rivals. Perhaps pride in doctrine or concern over the direction of the proletarian movement were their overpowering considerations. But "at the very first session they used physical force to oust them (the anarchists) and while the latter met at their own tiny opposition meeting in a nearby cafe, the socialist congress carried on its somewhat dull discussions without the least incident in an atmosphere of complete calm."⁴⁶ Thus did a Belgian socialist imply many years later that the price of unity was the sapping of real internal criticism and stimulation.

But the issue of anarchist influence persisted, and the Fourth Congress, held at London from July 26 to August 1, 1896, was "the occasion for violent arguments."⁴⁷ For French socialism it was the occasion for even more; it was the time of

⁴³ Léon de Seilhac, *Les Congrès ouvriers en France de 1876 à 1897* (Paris, 1899), p. 221.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

⁴⁵ On the strong anarchist tendency in Spain, see A. Hamon, *Le Socialisme et le Congrès de Londres* (Paris, 1897), pp. 50-55.

⁴⁶ Vandervelde, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁴⁷ Dolléans, *op. cit.*, II, 102.

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deep conflict, which lined up on one side Guesdists, Broussists, Blanquists, and Independents, all of whom favored political action, and on the other side, the Allemanists and the representatives of the unions, who eschewed the political solution in favor of such economic action as the general strike.

The syndicalists had for some time made two basic charges against political socialism. Bringing into play a note of national resentment of Germany, they charged that their rivals were dominated by the impressive German delegation, for whom socialism was not libertarian but authoritarian, not revolutionary but bureaucratic. One anarchist critic even resorted to racialism in underscoring the danger of German leadership.

Their [German] desire to dominate in everything, above all in the socialist world, is in part a product of race. If one studied the leaders of German Social Democracy, one would doubtless find a trace of their belief in themselves as a superior race.⁴⁸

The other charge centered on the opportunism which grew out of political participation. When the socialists elected some fifty men in 1893, the Allemanists had sharply warned them about the limits of their role, seeing in the victory the opportunity not for reforms but for the spread of revolutionary propaganda.⁴⁹ The Allemanist party press attacked as futile and deceptive socialist campaigns in the Chamber of Deputies for piecemeal reforms like the income tax or the nationalization of sugar refineries.⁵⁰ The doctrinaire anarchists went even further in charging the socialists with outright duplicity. *Le Libéraire*, the paper of the devout anarchist, Sébastien Faure, bluntly discredited the motives of the Parliamentary socialists: "Their reelection interests them more than the emancipation of mankind."⁵¹

⁴⁸ Hamon, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁴⁹ *Le Parti Ouvrier*, September 11, 1893.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, March 27, 1896, and February 5, 1897.

⁵¹ *Le Libéraire*, November 16-22, 1895.

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The socialists responded either by denouncing their rivals as factionalists and impractical revolutionaries or by defending their own program of legislative reforms. Jaurès repeatedly called social reforms an institutional and educational preparation for socialism.⁵² But reasonable discussion, which was continuously hampered by the tensions of personal and power rivalries, was almost completely absent by the time the opposing factions reached the Congress of London. A struggle within the French delegation was almost certainly assured beforehand when part of the Allemanist group made alliance with some Parisian unions to support the general strike as an instrument of socialist policy.⁵³ Neither side seemed to realize how seriously debilitating a schism could be.

In making the arrangements for the London meeting, the organizing committee sent out two circulars to all prospective delegating groups. The first repeated the resolution adopted at the conclusion of the Congress of Zurich, making only those trade unions and socialist organizations eligible which recognized "the necessity of political action."⁵⁴ The second circular declared that "each organization desiring to be represented at the Congress must send to the organizing committee the names of the organization and the number of their delegates on or before July 1."⁵⁵

The French reaction to these regulations was mixed, as might have been anticipated. The Zurich resolution, which had been moved and pushed by Bebel, was strongly supported by the Guesdists and their allies, while the Allemanists and the *Fédération des Bourses du Travail* opposed it.⁵⁶ Since the right to speak for the French working class in London seemed to be at stake, full-scale discussion of outstanding dif-

⁵² *La Petite République*, June 5, 1897.

⁵³ Charnay, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

⁵⁴ International Socialist Workers and Trade Union Congress, *Report of Proceedings* (London, 1896), pp. 1-2 [hereafter cited as *Proceedings*].

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Hamon, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-81.

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ferences might have been fruitful. Much remained to be studied and known about the nature or natures of socialism. Yet fruitful discussion never materialized. The doors were too quickly shut against it. Rouanet, the Independent, writing in *La Petite République* on July 15, 1896, said that the forthcoming Congress was for socialists alone, which, he hastened to add, meant only those who wanted to conquer political power for the workers. Hamon, that prolific sociologist turned anarchist, replied testily in *Paris* on July 24 that anarcho-communists were certainly socialists and fully entitled to attend the Congress.⁵⁷ There was a real danger, according to the view of anarchists and syndicalists, of centralizing all thought around one sacred Marxist doctrine. Domela Nieuwenhuis summed it up very pointedly when he wrote: "If one excludes from socialism men like Kropotkin, Reclus, Cipriani, Louis Michel, and Malatesta, he becomes ridiculous. Who, after all, has the right to monopolize socialism?"⁵⁸ As the battle lines grew tight, the objective of a better social order seemed increasingly dwarfed by the desire to maintain ideological purity. It was an arrogance that in various degrees affected all factions.

The first session of the Congress of London opened on July 27, 11 A.M., Queen's Hall, Langham Place. In the chair to greet the delegates was Covey of the British Miners' Federation, who made a plea for collaboration: "I am rather afraid," he warned, "that we sometimes speak hastily. I am rather afraid that ambition to a very large extent influences our motives. I believe that we ought to lose sight as far as it is possible in human nature, of our parties. . . ."⁵⁹ That plea was swept aside almost at once, however, as Paul Singer, the 280-pound delegate of German socialism, insisted on unmodified adherence to a political program.⁶⁰ In fact, so bitter did the

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.

⁵⁸ Domela Nieuwenhuis, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁵⁹ *Proceedings*, p. 7.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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very first session become over discussion of the Zurich resolution that one French trade unionist, Delesalle, was hurled down the stairs as he tried to reach the platform to speak.⁶¹

When the first session ended, the French section met separately to certify delegates and chart a program. Conflict had already flared up among the French before the first session of the Congress had opened, when trade unionists challenged the right of certification for four of the most prominent socialists, Jaurès, Millerand, Viviani, and Gérault-Richard. Eugene Guérard of the Railway Workers' Union urged their exclusion since they had not been chosen by a specific union or socialist group. Jaurès replied that, as deputies, they had a right to attend, while Guesde was heard to shout angrily that the electoral mandate was worth more than delegation by a union.⁶² The four deputies were finally admitted after many hostile words had been exchanged.

But the French section suffered a fatal cleavage on the issue of the Zurich resolution. It was the struggle which the anarchists were to describe as "the most significant episode in the conflict between Marxists and revolutionary socialists, between politicians and workers' delegates."⁶³ Pelloutier led the attack against the resolution, while Deville, a Guesdist, undertook the reply. When the final poll was taken, the Zurich resolution was voted down by the slightest possible margin, 57 to 56. So close and indecisive was this victory by the unionists that the political socialists would have had to exercise the greatest restraint to accept it. But a party like the *Parti Ouvrier français*, which had won municipal elections in Roubaix, Montluçon, Narbonne, and Marseilles, and had scored a good vote in the national elections of 1893, would hardly

⁶¹ International Socialist and Trade Union Congress, *Illustrated Report of the Proceedings of the Workers Congress* (London, 1896), p. 15 [hereafter referred to as *Illustrated Report*].

⁶² Hamon, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-101.

⁶³ "Les Revolutionnaires au Congres de Londres," *Conférences Anarchistes* (Paris, 1896), p. 10.

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share or relinquish leadership of the socialist movement.⁶⁴ As might have been foreseen, a schism in the French delegation followed the close vote.

During the night of July 27, the minority which had favored the Zurich resolution met separately at the Horse Shoe Hotel to draw up a manifesto of its own. At that session Jaurès accused the anarchists of having infiltrated the Congress by obtaining fraudulent designation from unions, since many of them had only the most marginal connections with the groups they purported to represent. Charging that their objective was disruption, Jaurès, who would do more than any other socialist to bring party unity a decade later, insisted that there could be no deals with anarchists.⁶⁵ The result of the meeting was the formation of another French delegation, prepared to support the Zurich resolution. Thus, the French socialist movement, which had suffered from an undersupply of members, found itself with an oversupply of delegations.

When the full sessions of the Congress resumed on July 28, the debate over the controversial resolution went on apace, Jaurès and Hyndman of the Social Democratic Federation supporting political action, Tom Mann of the Independent Labor Party and Domela Nieuwenhuis warning against so rigid a formula. The vote was by delegation, and the final tally showed support for the Zurich resolution by a vote of 17 to 2 with one abstention.⁶⁶ In the wake of that strong action the expulsion of certain anarchists took place despite some very strong protests.

At the same session the French problem exploded before the entire assembly. Millerand was spokesman for the minor-

⁶⁴ On Guesdist strength, see Léon de Seilhac, *Le Monde socialiste* (Paris, 1896), pp. 34-42.

⁶⁵ *La Petite République*, July 31, 1896.

⁶⁶ *Proceedings*, pp. 10-12. For the resolution were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bohemia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain (by the split vote of 223 to 104), Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.S.A. Against were France (57 to 56) and Holland (9 to 5). Italy was divided and abstained.

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ity group, which now demanded recognition as a separate delegation.⁶⁷ The Belgian Vandervelde, who was himself strongly oriented toward political action, nevertheless opposed Millerand's request. Not only did he consider this a bad example to other split delegations, but also he questioned, as did the Blanquist Vaillant, the facile designation of trade unionists as anarchists.⁶⁸ Yet the Congress voted 15 to 5 for Millerand's proposal, and the schism was thereby formalized.

On July 30 the report of the Political Action Commission was adopted, calling "upon workers of all countries to unite, independent of and apart from all bourgeois political parties, and to demand universal adult suffrage. . . ."⁶⁹ The French, of course, divided by delegations. Tortellier, the well-known anarchist now representing the Carpenters' Union, attacked politics, charging that "all promises made at election time by candidates are forgotten after election."⁷⁰ In reply Jaurès made what was perhaps the most cogent defense of the political instrument heard at the London Congress. He urged his fellow delegates to face up to the realities of power. With the machinery of coercion firmly in the hands of the capitalists, economic action by itself was useless. It was effective only when protected by socialist political influence.

You may have traitors in any party, but the worst traitor and most dangerous foe is he who, as you go out to fight, says "Leave your weapons at home." . . . Formerly in cases of strikes all the political machinery was used against the men. Now there are socialist members of Parliament who can stand by the side of the workers and use some of the political machinery on their behalf.⁷¹

In this attempt to combine the two approaches to existing power, to paint a picture in which political action and syn-

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁸ Hamon, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-149.

⁶⁹ *Proceedings*, p. 31.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* Jaurès considered it ludicrous that an anarchist like Tortellier, known to be hostile to socialism, should be delegated to a socialist congress. See *Le Motin*, July 31, 1896.

⁷¹ *Proceedings*, p. 32.

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dicalism supplemented each other, Jaurès tried to heal wounds at a very late hour. Perhaps the delegates sensed this attempt, for "burst after burst of applause followed him all through both speech and translations, and finally nearly the whole Congress rose to their feet waving hats and handkerchiefs in one tremendous roar of cheering. It was the speech of the week."⁷²

With the commitment to political action safely made, the Congress turned on the last day, August 1, to the supplementary issue of economic action. The majority report, presented by Brocklehurst of the Independent Labour Party and later accepted by the majority, stressed the importance of unions though placing final liberation for workers in a collectivist future. But that future was to be prepared "by a system of legislative measures."⁷³ It was the French syndicalist Guérard, who pressed futilely for acceptance of the minority report, advocating wide use of the general strike.⁷⁴

As a last act, the call for the next meeting was adopted, and its meaning was clear. Only those unions and groups could take part which upheld the validity of political action. For the well-disciplined German delegation this was almost a piece of formalism. For French socialism it perpetuated the serious threat of internal division.

The evaluations of the Congress were evidence enough that the French working class movement, far from being unified at London, had been deeply split. Jaurès, whose boundless optimism often led him to find order where chaos reigned, summed up what he considered the beneficial results of the Congress. Above all, it had given guidance to socialists of all countries in matters of ends and means. But if unity was desirable, how could one justify the creation of two delegations at London? At this critical juncture, Jaurès, though a freedom-

⁷² *Illustrated Report*, p. 23.

⁷³ *Proceedings*, p. 46.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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loving intellectual, demonstrated the socialist tendency to accept centralization, even imposition of party doctrine.

A Congress meets to take certain common decisions on the basis of common principles; it is not an Academy where contradictory opinions are debated. . . . That is why we asked to be constituted as a separate delegation where the intervention of anarchism would not decide the vote.⁷⁵

In effect, Jaurès took the position that anarchists were not socialists and thus could be excluded. However true the allegation, the doctrine of exclusion on behalf of unity would often come to block the variety of approaches for which Jaurès persistently fought over the years.

On the other side of the fence, there was no such feeling that the Congress had been constructive. The trade union leader Guérard charged that the "minority delegates" had "created a very deep division between the syndicalist and political elements."⁷⁶ The Allemanists hit directly at the absence of party democracy. Even if the syndicalists were the minority, they should have been part of the French delegation. "What would one think," asked the Allemanists, "if a republican majority prohibited a monarchist minority from sending representatives to Parliament?"⁷⁷ In fact, the derogatory remarks about unions, attributed at London to some of the political socialists could only aid the reactionaries, they insisted, as they cited quotations from Guesde and Jaurès in *Le Temps* and *Le Figaro*. "With all good faith we ask on whose side they are, who furnish such ammunition to the enemy."⁷⁸

The anarchists were even harsher in their judgments. Faure bitterly assailed the personal ambition behind the socialist interest in politics and foresaw the day when the inquisitorial Guesde would be Minister of the Interior, the

⁷⁵ *La Petite République*, August 9, 1896.

⁷⁶ Eugene Guérard, *Le Congrès de Londres* (Paris, 1896), p. 31.

⁷⁷ *Le Parti Ouvrier*, August 16, 1896.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, August 27, 1896.

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learned Jaurès Minister of Education, and the patriotic Rouanet Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁷⁹ Hamon found the socialists personally opportunistic and collectively abject in their subservience to German direction.⁸⁰

Thus did the Congress of London fail to unify the French working-class movement. But its consequences were nonetheless important. The anarchists, who were quite correctly considered a thorn in the socialist side, especially in the era of *attentats*, were once and for all ousted from the socialist movement. In fact, they dwindled thereafter into sectarian ineffectiveness, except insofar as they made their way into unions. But in their insistent devotion to political action, the socialists drove a wedge between themselves and the syndicalists, even denying to the latter the right to be considered socialists.

The gulf seemed very wide; but a working co-operation, based on mutual tolerance, might have yielded impressive results. The syndicalist insistence on revolutionary objectives might have acted as a brake on socialist opportunism. "All power is oligarchic," wrote Duverger.⁸¹ And it was true of socialists, as well as of bourgeois leaders, that their exercise of power at times diverted them from their initially stated purposes. The syndicalist conscience might well have been valuable to them. On the other hand, the socialists might have saved syndicalists from a doctrinal asceticism which scorned every improvement in the worker's life as a deception, while plunging men into dramatic and often useless strikes.

The co-operation was not created at London. Instead, a certain socialist style was accentuated, which tended to graft onto the movement some significant characteristics. A spirit of intransigence developed, which the enemies of socialism came to consider as its essential nature. It was especially true among the Marxists who, considering their actions in tune

⁷⁹ *Le Libéraire*, August 8-14, 1896.

⁸⁰ Hamon, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.

⁸¹ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London, 1954), p. 160.

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with the flow of history, were prone to close their ears to other points of view. To the intransigence were added the habit of placing conflicting propositions in a single resolution (with the hope that rhetoric would blanket the inconsistency) and the tendency of smoothing away the rough edges of fact to ensure the fine, rounded corners of theory.⁸²

Out of London, French socialism derived direction and division, devotion to political action and deafness to opposition, international support and national weakness.

IV

In the decade that followed the Congress of London the divisions in theory were frequently stated. Utilizing the pages of a journal like *Le Mouvement socialiste*, the syndicalists lampooned the close collaboration of many Parliamentary socialists with the Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes Ministries during the Dreyfus crisis. Lagardelle, in particular, painted the picture of a socialist party resting on the petty bourgeoisie and on middle class intellectuals, while its action was only mildly reformist.⁸³ The socialists, of course, struck back. Jaurès, though far more sympathetic to autonomous labor organization than many of his colleagues, undertook a careful analysis of the general strike, which ended by denying its effectiveness.

To delude oneself into imagining that a social revolution can result from a misunderstanding, and that the proletariat can be led beyond its depth is . . . pure childishness. The transformation of social relations cannot be the result of a manoeuvre.⁸⁴

Jaurès and especially Millerand went even further in their opposition to syndicalist theory by supporting legislation for

⁸² On these themes, see Drachkovitch, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁸³ H. Lagardelle, "Action de parti et action de classe," *Le Mouvement socialiste*, XV (February 15, 1905), 281-285.

⁸⁴ Jean Jaurès, *Studies in Socialism* (London, 1906), p. 115.

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the compulsory arbitration of strikes.⁸⁵ In defending the proposal Jaurès viewed it as a way of equalizing economic bargaining power, just as universal suffrage could equalize political power. He saw it also as a step towards action which would no longer be "tumultuous, and spontaneous, but deliberate, reflective, and planned."⁸⁶ What was a hope for Jaurès was an abomination for syndicalists, who felt that "the strike is a war, and it cannot be transferred to the level of peaceful action."⁸⁷

As the years passed, the breach between syndicalism and socialism began to lessen. For if union leaders were to produce a better order for workers, it had to be done with practical reforms. A reformist tradition thus grew up within syndicalism, which looked more and more to the state for helpful laws.⁸⁸ But some of the scars of London were too deep even for the years to heal.

⁸⁵ The defense by Jaurès of compulsory arbitration can be found in "La Réglementation des grèves et l'arbitrage obligatoire" *La Revue socialiste*, XXXIII (May, 1901), 513-538; also see his interview on that subject in Jules Huret, *Les Grèves* (Paris, 1902), pp. 149-154.

⁸⁶ Jaurès, "La Réglementation . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 520.

⁸⁷ Ernest Lafont, "L'Arbitrage obligatoire," *Le Mouvement socialiste*, XV (March 15, 1905), 385.

⁸⁸ See A. Keufer, "Le Syndicalisme reformiste," *ibid.* (January 1, 1905), pp. 18-41.

Evolution of the Sahib



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Two hundred years of British dominance in India had profound effects on Indian society; the effect on the domiciled English community was much less. One result, however — an attitude of arrogant superiority and authoritarianism — can probably be traced to the social isolation of the English in India. The fact that this attitude has been generally associated with the bureaucracy which assumed the burden of government after the mutiny of 1857,¹ has tended to obscure its earlier origin. Yet its early appearance, among a small group of aliens wielding enormous economic and political power in a society which they completely rejected, is clearly apparent.

At the end of the eighteenth century when the two people had mingled freely, the Indo-Portuguese "housekeeper" was a fixture of many European households. In those days the European who failed to provide in his will for the illegitimate children of such informal unions was rare. In fact, the mother of these families, whether Hindu, Moslem, or Indo-Portuguese, was usually regarded with genuine affection by the master of the house, and in some cases, the illegitimate children were treated more generously than the legitimate. Business partnerships between Indians and Europeans were not uncommon, and often the business arrangement drifted into familiar social intercourse.²

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¹ L. S. S. O'Malley, *Modern India And the West* (London, 1941), p. 766; H. N. Brailsford, "Indian Question," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, VII (1949).

² Holden Furber, "A Note on the Stewardship of the Company's Servants," *John Company At Work* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 327-329. For an account of a

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Calcutta, however, in the first half of the nineteenth century, provides a particular example of British social isolation and the peculiar attitude toward "natives" which it was beginning to breed. Job Charnock had established his original trading post beside a few weavers' huts, but when Calcutta was captured by Siraj-ud-daula in 1756 it had about seventy English houses, and after Clive's victory the town continued to expand. Fort William was built and the grounds around it cleared; along the border of the clearing the Marquis Wellesley erected Government House. By 1780 the sight of crowded shipping on the Hooghly and many elegant mansions on the bank greeted the newcomer.³

In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, Britishers in India were acquiring a sense of imperial responsibility and self-consciousness. The king's birthday was an important celebration; Charles Grant was laying the foundations of the Protestant missions in Bengal; and a social routine was evolving. Breakfast was at nine; then gentlemen went about their business, while ladies whiled away the time in fashionable undress, as in London, except that corsets were not worn in the East. Dinner was at two, washed down with generous quantities of wine, after which everyone dozed off for the afternoon. A walk in the streets served to revive consciousness. After tea, cards or music filled the void until supper at ten.⁴

In the 1840's the topography of the so-called Christian city suggested a coffin placed alongside the Hooghly River with its head to the north. It was about six miles long and two miles wide. Within this European city was a commercial district constituting roughly an acute triangle with the apex to the north at the New Mint, and the base on a line running from

typical European liaison with a native woman see William Hickey, *Memoirs of William Hickey*, IV (New York, 1925), 6-7, 26-29, 89, 115-116, 132-133, 140, 159.

³ Robert Orme, *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan* (London, 1763), II, 8; Eliza Fay, *Original Letters From India* (E. M. Forster, ed.; New York, 1920), p. 180.

⁴ Fay, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-22.

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Chandpal Ghat on the river to the intersection of Chowringhee Road and Dhurumtolla Streets.⁵

The fashionable "west end" was actually south in a quarter called Chowringhee. But in contrast to the splendid homes here, there was a tough enclave about the middle of Wellesley Road frequented by native sailors, prostitutes, and riff-raff. A considerable number of Moslems and low-caste Hindus lived in the European section, but relatively few Europeans had their homes in the Oriental part. In the native city the streets were narrow, with shops or storerooms on the lowest level and living quarters above with loop holes instead of windows.

Tank Square, named for the great water reservoir located there, dominated the center of things. The famous Black Hole dungeon nearby had been destroyed in 1818, and the site was occupied by the customs house. An obelisk had marked the spot, but it had been pulled down in Lord Moira's time (1812-1823). Calcutta was not a walled city, but in 1742 a ditch had been dug around a considerable portion of it in case the Mahrattas attacked; they never did, but the obstacle remained and was known as the Mahratta ditch. In case of trouble Fort William could contain the whole Christian population, probably something in excess of 13,000. The garrison was usually composed of one or two European regiments, although an Indian corps stood a few miles up the river. The interior of the fort was open, presenting a pleasant prospect of large lawns, gravel walks, rows of trees, and piles of munitions.

English store fronts were beginning to distinguish places of business from residences, particularly along business streets in the commercial district. One marked difference from London was that each establishment had its own warehouse inside a closed yard, masking the ceaseless activity within. Traffic was choked along the main arteries with bullock carts, carriages, buggies, whatever would haul, plus swarms of pedestrians,

⁵ "Calcutta and its Environs" (Calcutta, 1842). Lithograph map in possession of the author.

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which caused the European to navigate carefully, even without the added hazard of the motor car. Above the milling crowds, a faint odor of excrement hung in the air.

A few Europeans lived in the suburbs where they laid out miniature representations of English parks. Garden Reach was the most desirable of these. Farther to the northwest were towns occupied exclusively by natives "interspersed with the garden houses or suburban retreats of wealthy merchants and other men of the aborigines."⁶

Hotels were run as nearly as possible like their English counterparts and catered to Europeans only. In 1845 a man and his wife could live very comfortably and inexpensively at any one of four leading hostelries. A boarding house on Chowringhee offered food and lodging at modest rates on a membership basis.⁷ If a European were going up the river he might find temporary quarters on a barge or accommodation boat without contact with Indians.⁸

The English felt that their prestige would suffer if they travelled afoot. Some kind of conveyance seemed necessary, and if one could not afford a buggy or a chaise the best alternative was a palanquin. This was a sort of ubiquitous Indian sedan chair about which Captain Basil Hall had commented early in the century, "Every resident possesses a palanquin as a matter of course, just as we in Europe own a hat or an umbrella."⁹

At the beginning of the century Negro slaves imported from Mauritius were common, but by the forties they were gone. Still every European but the least favored needed three servants. An Indo-Portuguese cook, a Hindu accountant, and a Moslem steward were thought to chime well together.¹⁰

⁶ *The Calcutta Star Almanac* (1845), pp. 7 and *passim*.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸ Douglas Dewar, *Bygone Days in India* (London, 1922), pp. 270-271.

⁹ Basil Hall, *Travels in India, Ceylon, and Borneo* (H. Rawlinson, ed.; London, 1931), p. 172.

¹⁰ *Star Almanac*, p. 23.

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Newcomers, especially, had to be careful not to pay more than the going rate for servants lest they bring down on their heads the wrath of old residents. Of course, the number and variety of attendants varied with social status, and by the 1840's there were at least three levels of European society, the middle class being largest. All classes commonly beat and abused their native servants, although a few wiser heads recognized the futility of the practice.¹¹

Lord Clive had in 1766 introduced a postal system, mainly for official use. A public post office was set up in 1837 which served to link the various English communities and further isolate the Europeans from the Indians. By mid-century elaborate care was habitually exercised to prevent native messengers from stealing mail or money en route to or from the post office.

Distrust of the Indian was a general attitude by this time. The European was warned how agents (*banias*) discovered in advance what articles a newcomer intended to buy, then bought them themselves, made out fictitious bills of sale, and sold them on credit to the stranger at swollen profits. On the other hand, if the European merchant planned to swindle the Indians with fictitious or "salt water" invoices, he was merely advised that native merchants could recognize the signature of genuine English suppliers on sight. The Englishman was also advised that his charwoman was patiently waiting to find out his besetting sin "so that she may ruin you by it."¹²

It was only to be expected that the English community would provide its own newspapers. In 1780 Calcutta was the birthplace of the first English journal, a rowdy weekly called the *Bengal Gazette*. By 1839 there were twenty-six European newspapers, six of which were dailies. Bombay had ten European journals, Madras nine, and Ludhiana, Moulmein, Agra, and Serampore each one.¹³

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Margarita Barnes, *The Indian Press* (London, 1940), p. 230.

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In the forties Calcutta had become a journalistic center. The domiciled Briton could choose from three dailies: *The Englishman*, the *Bengal Hurkaru* (Messenger), and *The Calcutta Star*. In addition there was a bi-weekly *Gazette* and half a dozen weekly commercial advisers. No less than eighteen monthly publications originated in the city, including *The Bengal Sporting Magazine*, *The Hurkaru Overland Summary of News*, *The India Journal of Medical and Physical Science*, and missionary publications of various denominations. There were also available miscellaneous handbooks offering commercial information and general advice.¹⁴ The town was not lacking in booksellers and bookbinders, and even boasted an English paper manufacturer.¹⁵

Despite this wealth of publications, news for the European community was scarce. Telegraphic communication with India was delayed for twenty years after roadside telegraph poles had ceased to be a novelty in England. Editors had to wait for the arrival of the monthly English mail, and in the meantime often filled their columns with qualified billingsgate. Government restrictions had been lifted in the thirties and the colonial journalists took full advantage.

Probably more than anything else, the development which completed the cleavage between the European and the Indian community was the advent of English women in large numbers. In 1763 there were only three unmarried ladies of European extraction in Calcutta, but twenty years later they were not uncommon.¹⁶ It is obvious that by 1845 the presence

¹⁴ These manuals are yet to be properly exploited. See George Hadley, *A Compendious Grammar of the Current Corrupt Dialect of the Jargon of Hindustan [commonly called Moors]* (London, 1809); Capt. Thomas Williamson, *The East India Vade Mecum, or complete guide to gentlemen intended for the civil, military or naval services of the Honourable East India Company* (Calcutta, 1810); J. B. Gilchrist, *The General East India Guide and Vade Mecum* (London, 1825); George Parbury, *Handbook for Egypt and India* (London, 1841); J. H. Stocqueler, *The Handbook of India: A Guide for the Stranger and Traveller, and a Companion to the Resident* (Calcutta, 1844).

¹⁵ *Calcutta Trade List*, 1845.

¹⁶ Dewar, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

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of English women was taken for granted. Advice regarding the choice of nurse maids indicates that families were being reared. Ladies chose an Indo-Portuguese maid rather than Hindu, because the former had no scruples about washing out stockings or fine linen. Many of the schools listed women's names on their faculties.

The East India Company had always provided religious services for its European servants, but Calcutta had no Christian churches in 1780.¹⁷ By 1840, however, there were sixteen: five Anglican, four Roman Catholic, three Baptist, one Presbyterian, one Independent, one Greek, and one Armenian.

Recreational facilities for the domiciled community were not lacking. From time to time concerts were played by a mixture of professionals and amateurs at the Sans Souci Theater. A public library had been organized at the suggestion of J. H. Stocqueler.¹⁸ It occupied the second floor of Metcalfe Hall, named after the liberator of the Indian press and one of the outstanding buildings in Calcutta. Perhaps the Grecian effect was heightened by the unfinished colonnade, left incomplete due to lack of funds. The Agricultural Society Museum occupied the lower floor; elsewhere there was a museum sponsored by the Asiatic Society, a Lyceum, and the Company's Botanic Garden.

For those less intellectually inclined, physical sports offered a popular pastime. From November until May the Briton attired in a red coat with a French gray collar could hunt to his heart's content for sixteen rupees a month. In fact, he could ride to hounds at three different meets. A Racket Club was situated in Chowringhee where there were two courts, one for the game played after the Madras fashion, the other after the Bengali. And opposite the Town Hall was the Cricket Club. Cricket began in November and ended in

¹⁷ Fay, *op. cit.*, note by Forster, p. 301.

¹⁸ Prominent British-Indian journalist (1800-1885).

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March. A large tent was pitched beside the field where players and spectators had a chance to enjoy a picnic tiffin.¹⁹

Every Englishman had heard about the nautches, but they were no longer respectable. At the end of the eighteenth century,

When a gentleman gives an entertainment, he often gives a dance (nautch) performed by dancing-girls, with *jewels in their noses and rings on their ancles* (*Hkulh Kaul*), as mentioned in Scriptures. The entertainer generally compliments his guests with the liberty of chusing their partners for the night.²⁰

By the middle of the nineteenth century the European community was too morally superior to condone such performances.

One thing Indian which the British could not ignore was the climate. Various devices were used to fend off the sun. The pith helmet eventually became a sort of unofficial badge of the English colonial. The *kuskus tatty* was another popular defense. This was a primitive evaporative cooler made of aromatic *khaskhas* grass, soaked and placed so that any breeze would blow through the woven grass to cool the atmosphere. Used throughout the century, it appeared in a modified form in first-class railway carriages in Kipling's day.²¹ And, of course, the ever present punka served to stir the air and drive away the insects. Bathing once a day was necessary, but frequent ablutions were no defense against the heat. Those who sought the solace of a smoke had to be careful lest the water pipe be spiced with a little opium.

In the early days the British in India depended heavily on Company doctors for medical care. In fact, the duties of the Company surgeons for more than a century from the first charter were exclusively concerned with caring for the writers and the merchants in the factories. The French war of the seven-

¹⁹ *Star Almanac*, p. 31.

²⁰ George Hadley, *Grammar*, quoted in Dewar, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

²¹ Arley Munson, *Kipling's India* (New York, 1918), pp. 11-12.

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teenth century changed the situation by creating a demand for military medicine.²² By mid-nineteenth century the medical service was occupied to a great extent with matters of public health, but Europeans who fell sick in Calcutta could resort to seven surgeons in private practice and two hospitals.

In the closing days of Company rule Calcutta had a well-established private school system. La Martiniere was opened in 1836 under the will of Major General Claude Martin for the instruction of at least ninety boys and fifty-five girls whose parents were Christians and residents of Calcutta. The school building, one of the city's handsomest, was situated near the Circular Road. It was a two-story edifice with a large dome, housing a library, class rooms, refectory, and quarters for masters. The high school, founded six years earlier, offered European languages, Bengali and Hindustani, mathematics, geography, bookkeeping, and drawing. The English course included reading, spelling, grammar, the history of the Western world, the history of India, and Scripture. By 1845 there were in Calcutta eighteen European schools ranging from the Medical College to the Hooghly Infant School.²³

The time had passed when great retinues of liveried servants were keys to patronage. Many tradesmen in Calcutta still lived as they fancied English lords lived, but they were exceptional. One gets the impression that the bulk of Europeans were small middle class people intent upon a comfortable retirement. Above them was a thin layer of officialdom and high society; below them the failure, the trooper, the ne'er-do-well. A European working class was conspicuously lacking. All classes shared the conviction that evident British power reflected British superiority.

Two decades before the Mutiny, then, Calcutta contained a bustling European community, speaking English, reading English newspapers locally produced, enjoying English sports,

²² Malcolm Seton, *The India Office* (London, 1926), pp. 213-220.

²³ *Star Almanac*, pp. 34, 137.

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worshipping in English churches, and sending its children to local English schools. A swashbuckling society of adventurers, at first mixing freely with the Indian people, had become the well-known caste of "white brahmans," isolated by their own arrogance and with few exceptions disdaining the rich Indian culture around them.

The Mutiny introduced a new element into the British attitude, that of fear. The bureaucracy and the Indian army came to believe with most of the civilian community that India could be held only by force, and while this did not create, it strengthened the pukka sahib attitude. With the passage of years Indians understandably felt a growing resentment at their practical exclusion from high office while the British grew ever more class-conscious. The European agitation against the Ilbert Bill in 1883, which would have allowed Indian judges to try Europeans, is a case in point.

There were salient exceptions. Some British liberals like Allan Octavian Hume, co-founder of the Indian National Congress, appreciated Indian culture and potential. As a matter of fact, most Englishmen were friendly, in a patronizing sort of way, toward the humble Indian cultivator who posed no threat to their political power. It was the educated Indian, whom they had created, that they particularly despised.²⁴

An essential question remains as to whether the arrogance of the domiciled British grew out of their social isolation from the Indians, or whether an already-present arrogance tended to make for social isolation. Undoubtedly, Victorian Englishmen were somewhat smug, but their feeling of superiority was not nearly as intense nor as specific as the attitude of the co-

²⁴ See Valentine Chirol, *India Old and New* (London, 1921), pp. 88-89: "The great bulk of the population, mostly a simple and ignorant peasantry whose horizon does not extend beyond their own village and the fields that surround it, accepted with more or less conscious gratitude the material benefits conferred upon them by alien rulers. . . . Another class of Indians, chiefly dwellers in large cities . . . saw, however, in an autocratic form of government, of which it even questioned the efficiency, an insurmountable barrier to the aspirations which Western education had taught it to entertain."

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lonial. In the latter-day constitutional struggle only the die-hard Tory section of opinion in England saw eye-to-eye with the Indian bureaucracy. For example, in 1919 while liberals in England were striving to advance Indian political aspiration, a reactionary bureaucracy in the field hung like a millstone around their neck.²⁵ The truth seems to be that it was the isolation which bred the pukka sahib attitude. Insulated, by and large, from native culture, and never exposing their values to challenge, the English in India developed an exaggerated form of ethnocentrism. It is interesting to speculate on what might have been if there had been a social as well as an intellectual fusion.

²⁵ M. Naidis, O'Dwyer vs. Nair: A Comment on the Indian Bureaucracy (Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D. C., Dec. 28, 1952.) Good examples of the pukka sahib mentality can be found in the reports of this trial, *London Times*, May 2, 1924-June 6, 1924.

Paul Cambon, Coordinator of Tunisia



DWIGHT L. LING*

I

IN the late nineteenth century France, Italy, and England were all interested in Tunisia. Nationals of all three had commercial interests there and were represented on the international financial commission¹ which was created when the Bey pleaded bankruptcy. Besides their common interests in Tunisia, each of the countries had particular reasons for increasing its own influence. Italy had more nationals in the Regency than any other European nation and spoke nostalgically of the time when the Roman Empire embraced North Africa. France spoke earnestly of the need to control events in the Regency in order to insure the security of her Algerian departments. Unlike the others, England expressed no desire to extend her political power over the Bey of Tunisia, but did view with apprehension the possibility of this land belonging to Italy. This might jeopardize British trade routes since the waters between Tunisia and Sicily could be controlled by one power. In agreements made during the Congress of Berlin in 1878, England and Germany had given promises that they

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¹The international financial commission was established on July 5, 1869. This commission was charged with the complete control of Tunisian finances. There was an executive committee composed of the prime minister, a representative of the Bey and an inspector of finances who was nominated by France and appointed by the Bey. This committee represented the rights of the Bey, established the budget and ruled over the expenses of the state. A six member committee of control included equal representation from France, England, and Italy. This body supervised the revenues designated by the state for the payment of the European creditors. See Henri Cambon, *Histoire de la régence de Tunis* (Paris, 1948), pp. 120, 121; and France, Chambre des Deputes, *Journal officiel*, Aug. 1882, p. 2103.

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would not interfere in French interests in Tunisia. France was waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of these assurances.

The border between Algeria and Tunisia was the scene of tension even before the French had occupied Algeria. This frontier, which lacked any natural barrier, invited tribes of both areas to raid and pillage their neighbor's lands. Using these incidents for propaganda purposes French troops crossed the boundary and invaded Tunisia in April, 1881. In the Bey's palace on May 12, 1881, France and Tunisia concluded the Treaty of Bardo,² which is usually cited as the document ushering in the French protectorate. This treaty granted France some power over Tunisian internal security, finances, and international relations; however, these powers were vague and essentially nominal. The word protectorate did not appear in Franco-Tunisian negotiations until the Convention of La Marsa in 1883, and many problems required solution before France obtained satisfactory power in the Regency of Tunis. This laborious task fell to the capable Paul Cambon, who later became the famous French ambassador in England prior to the First World War.

Paul Cambon began a long public career in September, 1870, when Jules Ferry, then prefect of the Seine, chose him as his secretary general. In 1877 Cambon was named head of the department of the North, one of the most important prefectures in France. While serving in this capacity he was appointed resident minister in Tunisia on February 25, 1882.³

Since the Treaty of Bardo only provided the foundation for a protectorate, many legal and administrative problems required solution before construction could begin. These problems were solved primarily through the efforts of Paul

² The full text is published in France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, Afrique, arrangements, actes et conventions, 1881-1898* (Paris, 1898), pp. 3-5.

³ The biographical material on Paul Cambon was taken from, Par un diplomate, *Paul Cambon, ambassadeur de France, 1843-1924* (Paris, 1937).

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Cambon and his able assistants, Maurice Bompard and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.

Maurice Bompard attracted Cambon's attention as the intelligent, hard-working secretary general of the prefecture of the North. Cambon persuaded him to enter the diplomatic service and accompany him to Tunis. Later, when the Tunisian administration was organized, Bompard held the important post of secretary general of Tunisia. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was not acquainted with Paul Cambon until he served with him in Tunisia; however, they soon became close friends and the baron was the administrative assistant to the resident minister. Formerly Estournelles had been attached to the French embassy in London. His diplomatic experience as well as his personal contacts in the British Foreign Office proved valuable to the government of Tunisia.

A great deal of confusion shrouded the French policy in Tunisia when Cambon was appointed resident minister. The Freycinet ministry was non-committal concerning future plans. Cambon, who was above all an administrator, despised this uncertainty and vowed to establish a definite policy before he sailed for Tunis. For a month and a half he interviewed various government officials to discover what the future policy for the Regency might be. Prime Minister Freycinet temporized, and the minister of war, General Billot, felt that the expedition to Tunisia had been a mistake, but commented on Cambon's appointment, "He is a superior man, he will succeed . . . perhaps. . . ."⁴ President Grévy comforted the new minister by saying, "The task is difficult but nothing is beyond your intelligence and capacity."⁵

Since the government had no definite program Cambon advanced some ideas of his own. He wrote to his wife on March 1, 1882, stating that if France only wanted to exert diplomatic influence it was hard to see why she planned to send 40,000

⁴ Paul Cambon, *Correspondance, 1870-1924* (Paris, 1940), I, 164.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 164.

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men and a former prefect. On the other hand, if France really wanted to extend control it was necessary to establish a definite policy for Tunisia.⁶ In his estimation, three steps had to be taken before an effective protectorate could be realized: (1) the Tunisian debt should be guaranteed and converted, (2) consular jurisdiction and capitulation rights must be abolished and French justice established, (3) the power of the resident minister must exceed that of the military.

II

Resident Minister Cambon immediately inaugurated his program to accomplish these objectives. His initial efforts to bring about Tunisian debt redemption were frustrating. After much debate, an extra-parliamentary commission under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Freycinet was established to study the problem. They considered the following proposals: abandonment of the idea of annexation in favor of maintaining the Bey's government; subordination of military authority to that of the resident minister; creation of a Tunisian army; establishment of French courts; and guarantee of the debt. These reforms were recommended by Paul Cambon and gradually, during his four years in the Regency, all were instituted.

When the time came for Cambon to leave France, the commission had not yet reached a decision on the question of the Tunisian debt, a decision which Cambon considered fundamental. He reluctantly agreed to go under these circumstances, but warned that if he could not adapt himself to the international financial commission he would be forced to say so.

Cambon's trip to Tunis began and ended amid great fanfare. At Toulon his train was met by an official delegation in-

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 161. Cambon's semi-invalid wife did not accompany him to Paris and only spent brief periods with him in Tunis, therefore his correspondence with her is a valuable source of information.

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cluding his predecessor in Tunisia, Theodore Roustan. He had breakfast at the prefecture and that afternoon, April 1, 1882, in the company of Bompard and Estournelles, boarded the dispatch-boat *Hirondelle*. Saluted by the strains of La Marseillaise, the ship glided between two flag ships and pointed toward Tunisia. About twenty-four hours later the *Hirondelle* anchored off La Goulette, the port city of Tunis. The cannon of the Bey's timeworn forts fired salutes while shabby Tunisian soldiers presented arms. At the railroad station in Tunis French soldiers snapped to attention as Cambon walked between them to the Bey's carriage. At the carriage he was greeted by the Bey's interpreter, Elias Musalli, who escorted him to the residence.

The following morning he visited the Bey at the Bardo Palace. The Bey was restive because his horoscope had predicted his downfall, and upon hearing the cannon salutes for Cambon he thought the end was surely at hand. Informed that his rule would be protected, he and Cambon, in truly oriental fashion, engaged in fifteen minutes of flowery compliments through the intermediary, Elias Musalli.⁷

The French official's first reaction to conditions in Tunis was one of dejection. Ten days after his arrival Cambon wrote to his wife:

The more I examine this Tunisian question the more I find it insoluble if the Government does not make great decisions. Misery, waste and ruin exist throughout. . . . This year the deficit will be fifteen millions. They will not be able to extricate themselves if the French government does not take the debt into its charge along with the financial administration and the suppression of capitulations.⁸

He threatened that unless there was early government action he would ask for another post. Bompard's estimation of the situation was just as discouraging:

⁷ Par un diplomate, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁸ Cambon, *Correspondance*, I, 170, 171 (author's translation).

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The public fortune had been given over to pillage, the offices of the state put up for sale, justice confined to venal hands, all the jurisdiction of the government weakened or broken, the country the prey of anarchy, the population squeezed by exactions or relieved of all authority. . . .⁹

The financial commission obliged Tunisia to pay European debts first, which left little money to carry on the administration. Foreign consuls, exercising old capitulation rights, had power to rule over their nationals and protégés. Commerce was sluggish, numbers of the people were weakened by famine, while others fled to Tripoli.¹⁰ There were no vital statistics, births and deaths were not even registered, and the central government exercised only theoretical power in the provinces.

To a former French prefect this was an intolerable situation, and Cambon set out to change it. In June of 1882, he returned to Paris to induce the government to sign a treaty with the Bey establishing a definite protectorate and guaranteeing the debt. He had launched an adventure that seemed like a nightmare before it was over. Freycinet was hopelessly embroiled in the Egyptian problem since England had invited France to undertake a joint expedition to Port Said for the protection of the Suez Canal. The situation was a strain on Freycinet, and Cambon added to the pressure by suggesting that France demand English renunciation of capitulation rights in Tunisia in return for French help in Egypt. After a debate in the chamber Cambon wrote to Estournelles, "You do not realize the physical and moral state that Freycinet is in since the session on Egypt. . . . His days are numbered."¹¹ Indeed the premier's political days were numbered and his cabinet fell in August.

This was a frustrating visit for Cambon. Nobody was will-

⁹ Maurice Bompard, *Législation de la Tunisie* (Paris, 1888), p. xi (author's translation).

¹⁰ D'Estournelles de Constant, "Les débuts d'un protectorat," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXIX (1887), 787.

¹¹ Cambon, *Correspondance*, I, 174.

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ing to forget Egypt and talk about Tunisia. Even his repeated threats of resignation failed to break this preoccupation. Undaunted, Cambon returned to Tunisia and, with the help of Elias Musalli, laid the groundwork for the Bey's signature of his proposed treaty. After the Bey had conferred upon Cambon the order of the *Aman*, and in return, had received a sabre, along with assurances that his sovereignty would be respected, he signed on July 8, 1882. Cambon had no authority to negotiate this treaty. He planned to present the confused French government with a *fait accompli*.¹²

The Bey was cooperating handsomely, but Cambon still lacked the approval of his own government. Freycinet's toppled ministry was replaced on August 7 by that of Duclerc, who took the portfolio of foreign affairs, and Cambon renewed his efforts to gain approval of the treaty. In a disturbed mood he wrote to his wife that if the international financial commission was not suppressed the only alternative would be to organize a purely military government in Tunisia.¹³ It was his theory that no efficient civil government could exist unless it had complete financial autonomy, and he plainly indicated he would fight for this independence.

The situation in Paris was uncertain but at least the Bey had signed the treaty. While Cambon was finding some comfort in this, the Bey died on October 27, 1882. Now his accomplishments were reduced to zero. Ignoring this reversal, he used the death of the Bey as an excuse for alterations in Tunisia. Cambon gave an investiture ceremony in the name of the French president for the new ruler, Ali Bey. In this ceremony he presented the foreign consuls to the new sovereign. This unprecedented ceremonial strained the self-control of the Italian consul.

March, 1883, found Cambon back in Paris bargaining with the second Ferry ministry in behalf of his faltering conven-

¹² Henri Cambon, *Histoire de la régence de Tunis*, p. 173.

¹³ Cambon, *Correspondance*, I, 180, 181.

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tion. At last the idea was supported by the government, so he returned to Tunisia and concluded the Convention of La Marsa¹⁴ with Ali Bey on June 8, 1883. This convention was that essential first step toward an actual protectorate. Article one read: "His Highness the Bey of Tunis promises to proceed with the administrative, judicial and financial reforms that the French government will judge necessary." For its part the French government guaranteed a loan to the Bey of 125 million francs for the conversion or reimbursement of the consolidated debt, and of the floating debt up to a maximum of 17,500,000 francs. In the future the Bey could not contract any loans without the authorization of France (article two). The Bey could deduct from the revenue of the Regency (1) a sum necessary to service the loan guaranteed by France, and (2) the sum of 1,200,000 francs for his civil government. The remainder was to be used for the expenses of the protectorate (article three). Article four simply confirmed the Treaty of Bardo, and the last article provided for the submission of the treaty to France and the remittance of the ratification as soon as possible.

The brief delay became an eleven month vigil. Although the convention had not been ratified, Cambon put article one into operation in the summer of 1883. The following spring he hurried to Paris and spoke to the chamber in behalf of ratification. Here, before the chamber, Paul Chambon displayed his administrative and political ability. He abhorred the usual gibberish and babbling that characterized parliamentary debate, and decided to base his arguments on fact rather than oratory. As commissioner of the government, he took the tribune on April 2, 1884, in defense of the convention. First he reviewed the financial situation of Tunisia. When France occupied Tunisia there was no budget, simply a list of expenses and receipts. This list of receipts was seldom

¹⁴ The full text is published in France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, Afrique, 1881-1898*, pp. 7-8.

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accurate because the government was often faced with insurrections that prevented tax collection. Consequently he told the deputies that his first task was to establish a budget. The budget for 1884 allowed an excess of receipts over expenditures amounting to 183,000 francs.¹⁵ Some important economies were introduced. By abolishing the ministry of marine and cutting the expenditures for the office of foreign affairs, whose functions were now performed by the resident minister, enough money was saved to permit the creation of a forestry service and a service of public works, and still show a favorable balance.

Cambon skillfully undermined the reputation of the international financial commission. He told the French deputies that the commission did not allow the state enough revenue to carry on public services. Furthermore, they were not interested in internal improvements, but only in paying off the Bey's creditors. From a political point of view this organization hurt France since, ". . . it is composed mainly of foreigners; it contains nine members, of which only three are French."¹⁶ This, he felt, was an inadmissible situation in a country which France had occupied for three years. Moreover, the commission had ruined the municipalities by conceding their revenues to the creditors of the Regency. As a result, Cambon added, "If you would visit Tunis, at this time, you would be very unpleasantly surprised by the state of dilapidation of the public streets, the absence of sewers, of public lighting, and we have been there three years."¹⁷

He observed that if France guaranteed the Tunisian debt the *raison d'être* of the financial commission would be removed. Moreover, if the debt were guaranteed, France could convert it and realize an economy of about two million francs, by servicing the debt under a new interest rate. This would

¹⁵ *Journal officiel*, April 2, 1884, p. 1001.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1003.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

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leave a substantial amount for the operation of the government. Cambon assured the chamber that if the debt were converted and France controlled the finances, there was no doubt that "Tunisia could exist by herself."¹⁸ He claimed:

. . . this guarantee is not only necessary to operate the conversion, it also allows us to put into operation indispensable economic reforms in Tunisia; it is necessary finally, in order to allow us to exercise an effective political action in the country under our protectorate.¹⁹

The chamber approved the Convention of La Marsa. Jules Ferry, then prime minister, defended the measure before the senate in what Cambon reported as a very short and satisfactory discussion, and the convention was formally ratified on April 10, 1884.

III

Simultaneous with the resident minister's efforts to win acceptance for his convention was his vigorous work for the abolition of capitulation rights. Under these rights foreign powers through consular courts maintained jurisdiction over their nationals and protégés. This privilege had existed for centuries; French capitulation rights were established in Tunisia as early as the sixteenth century. The Treaty of Bardo guaranteed the existing treaties between Tunisia and foreign powers, thereby recognizing these privileges.

Since the original and ostensible reason for capitulation was to protect foreigners from Moslem law, the French reasoned that with the establishment of their courts the need for consular jurisdiction would disappear. Besides, consular jurisdiction was confusing and annoying. The new administration could not arrest anyone under foreign jurisdiction except in the presence of his consul's janissaries. If the consul refused

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1002.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1003 (author's translation).

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to furnish janissaries the pursuit of his protégé had to be abandoned. Sometimes Negroes, Arabs, or native Jews, who did not speak any European language, would associate themselves with a European nationality to escape native law, taxes, and military duty.²⁰ More annoying still was the fact that consular jurisdiction paralyzed the sources of revenue for public improvements. Municipal authority was challenged by the consuls. Ordinary municipal laws were inapplicable without consular consent. If the municipality wanted to tax carriages, it was of no avail. Those who owned carriages were exempted by their consul, and the people who did not have a consul usually traveled on foot.²¹ If a toll bridge was built the natives alone paid. One consul used his right of protection to maintain a house of ill fame.²²

Numerous incidents resulted from this complexity of jurisdiction. To add to the confused pattern the French minister of war, General Billot, decided that incidents involving French soldiers would be referred to the council of war. A short time later, Meschino, a Sicilian barber, who fancied himself a comic, stole a sabre from a *zouave*, and took it to his consul. The next morning gendarmes knocked at his door and placed him under arrest. The Italian consul protested the barber's arrest, asserting that he alone had the right to judge the case. The council of war, unmoved by the humor of the situation, sentenced Meschino to a year in prison. The prankster wrote a letter of apology to the French general; nevertheless, it looked like a year in a smelly Tunis jail for him. Cambon defended the right of the council of war to judge such cases. However, the affair did not end there; Italy made it a political issue. The Italian charge d'affaires asked Minister of

²⁰ Constant, "Les débuts d'un protectorat," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXIX (1887), 804.

²¹ G. Valbert, "Le Régime du protectorat en Tunisie," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXVIII (1886), 197.

²² France, Chambre des Députés, *Documents parlementaires*, Aug. 1882, p. 2106.

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Foreign Affairs Duclerc for Meschino's pardon. Duclerc had been misinformed and, believing that the Sicilian had attacked a French soldier, refused to intervene.²³ Telegrams from the French charge d'affaires in Rome finally persuaded Duclerc of the serious nature of this affair in the opinion of the Italian government, and he telegraphed a pardon for Meschino.²⁴

Later, at La Goulette, a drunken Italian picked a quarrel with a French sentry. A passing patrol tried to corner him but he escaped and took refuge with his consul. The consul clandestinely sent the offender to Sicily in order to escape French military justice.²⁵

These and similar incidents indicated that no efficient law enforcement would exist until the central government had a stronger position. Cambon advocated replacing consular jurisdiction with a system of French courts. Only a weak government, he claimed, would tolerate this hopeless confusion.

The first step toward abandonment of capitulations was taken when a commission of the chamber of deputies recommended the establishment of a French civil tribunal and six justices of the peace in Tunisia. This was accomplished by the law of March 27, 1883, which created a tribunal of the first instance at Tunis, and justices of the peace at Tunis, La Goulette, Bizerte, Sousse, Sfax, and Kef, to preside over magistrate courts. The law further provided:

These tribunals shall form part of the jurisdiction of the Court of Algiers. They shall take cognizance of all civil and commercial questions between French and French protected subjects.

They shall take cognizance likewise of all proceedings instituted against the French and French protected subjects for infractions of the law, misdemeanours, or crimes.

²³ France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914* (Paris, 1882), 1st. series, IV, 493.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 494 note.

²⁵ Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, *La politique française en Tunisie* (Paris, 1891), p. 374.

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Their authority may be extended over all other persons by Edicts or Decrees of His Highness the Bey, issued with the assent of the French Government.²⁶

The last clause was important because the Bey issued such a decree on May 5, 1883, announcing that "The nationals of the friendly powers of which the consular tribunals are suspended become amenable in the French tribunals under the same conditions as the French themselves."²⁷

The basis for the renunciation of consular jurisdiction was now established and only consent of the major powers was needed. French officials felt English renunciation would persuade the other powers to follow suit. Therefore, Cambon was greatly disturbed when he learned that Consul Thomas Reade, the British representative in Tunis, and the English journalist A. M. Broadley were conducting a press campaign against abrogation. On November 24, 1883, Cambon wrote to Ferry requesting permission to send Estournelles de Constant to England for conferences with his friends in the foreign office. The resident minister felt sure that Estournelles and Ambassador Waddington could persuade the English government to renounce consular jurisdiction.

In England, Estournelles was faced with the request that in return for abolition of capitulations France should arbitrate a large number of English claims in Tunisia. Cambon wrote that if the number of cases could not be limited, he would prefer keeping capitulations which would also mean keeping the financial commission since it was their only safeguard against foreign consuls.²⁸

Having heard from Rome that if England suppressed capitulations Italy would follow, and placing great confidence in Estournelles, Cambon felt that abrogation could be an-

²⁶ Great Britain, *Accounts and Papers, Papers by Command of Parliament*, Tunis, 1884, no. 3843, p. 15.

²⁷ Arthur Girault, *Principles de colonisation et de législation coloniale* (Paris, 1928), V, 109.

²⁸ Cambon, *Correspondance*, I, 198-202.

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nounced by January 1, 1884. Late in December, Estournelles wired, "Rejoice and embrace Depienne. Reade and Broadley erased. Will leave London Tuesday."²⁹ Cambon was elated. England informed her vice-consul in Tunis that her consular jurisdiction would be abolished from the first of January.

During a New Year's Day conference between Cambon and Bompard, the Italian consul, M. Mancini, arrived with the news that Italy agreed to end capitulations. This arrangement was signed on January 25, 1884, providing for the suspension of consular jurisdiction, a suspension which would last as long as the French protectorate existed. All other immunities which had been accorded Italians would remain in existence.³⁰ With the exception of the United States³¹ all major powers joined England and Italy in their renunciation.

IV

Even before he departed for his new post Cambon sought in vain for assurance that he would have power over the military. A bitter conflict developed over this very problem. No definite rules separated the military from the civilian sphere in Tunisia. Cambon had always questioned the ability of the military to govern, and jealously tried to eliminate any semblance of their invasion of the civil realm. Negotiations in Tunisia designed to place the military under civil authority were unsuccessful, and most of the Tunisian interior remained under military rule.

At first the occupation forces were commanded by General

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 211; Depienne was director of Tunisian finances.

³⁰ Bompard, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

³¹ The House of Representatives passed a joint resolution ending consular jurisdiction which the Senate amended. The House took no action upon the amended resolution, so it failed to become law. *Command Papers*, 3843, Tunis (1884), pp. 7, 8. The American consulate in Tunis was discontinued by Congress on July 19, 1882, and reopened in 1890; therefore, the failure of the resolution to pass was of no consequence until 1890, and then only of minor consequence; United States, Consular Letters, XII, July 19, 1882, dispatch 107, National Archives.

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Forgemol, and when the army corps was replaced by a division, General Logerot was placed in command. Relations were cordial between the minister and these commanders, but in February 1884, General Logerot was named to another post. In his place General Georges Boulanger, the man who later seriously threatened French republicanism, was sent to Tunis. Before General Boulanger left for his new post, Prime Minister Ferry, acting on Cambon's request, cautioned him that civilian authority should take precedence in Tunisia. The general remembered this warning, at least until the Ferry ministry fell.

General Boulanger was aggressive and it was this very trait that worried Cambon. When Paul Cambon had been a prefect he and Boulanger, then a colonel, attended a military dinner. As the guests were ready to sit down Cambon noticed the Colonel switch seating charts in order to move a step closer to the corps commander.³² Now Boulanger was moving a step closer to Paul Cambon.

Although General Boulanger moved cautiously at first he soon began to assume a more prominent role in Tunisia. Fourteenth of July celebrations were made for men like him, (or vice versa), and mounting his black horse, which was soon to be famous, he rose to the occasion by leading a military parade through Tunis. That evening a great reception was held at the residence, and the general, arrayed in military splendor, seemed to be everywhere.

The defeat of the French forces at Lang-sou in Tonkin, highly exaggerated by the opposition journals, resulted in the fall of Ferry's cabinet on March 30, 1885. The late president of the chamber, Henri Brisson, formed a ministry with Freycinet in the foreign office. General Boulanger, encouraged by the mention of his name as a possible minister of war, began to act more aggressively in Tunisia.

A short time later the general exercised his newly-felt

³² Par un diplomate, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

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power. In the course of an argument in a Tunisian cafe a French officer was insulted by an Italian law clerk named Tesi. The Italian was sentenced to prison for eight days. The public minister in charge of the prosecution felt that the French uniform should command more respect, and appealed to the court at Algiers under the minimum penalty. Boulanger appeared to be satisfied. However, that evening the general informed Paul Cambon that he intended to order the troops henceforth to unsheath their swords in the face of an insult. Cambon requested that this order be held up only to discover that it had already been sent to the troops. The next day it was posted in public places, and the Havas Agency had the news in Paris in time for the evening papers. The news spread rapidly through Tunis and the excited consuls met to discuss measures to protect their nationals. There was talk of revoking the agreements on consular jurisdiction.

Cambon struck back and asked Freycinet to recall Boulanger, a request that he was powerless to fulfill without the consent of the minister of war. Cambon also proposed a decree that would fix the position of the resident minister in Tunisia. This suggestion was fruitful; President Grévy issued such a decree on June 23, 1885, conferring on Cambon the title of resident general and giving him command over the armed forces and all administrative services concerning Europeans and Tunisians. Except for purely technical affairs, he, and he alone, was given the right of correspondence with the French government.⁸³

In accordance with the provisions of this decree Cambon asked Boulanger to consult with him for the purpose of drawing up a list of technical affairs about which the general could communicate directly with the minister of war. His pride hurt by the decree, General Boulanger's reply was curt:

I have been ordered by the Minister of War to continue to send directly to him all my military correspondence. I consider there-

⁸³ Bompard, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

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fore that there is no need to establish the list requested in your aforementioned letter.³⁴

Upon receipt of this note, Cambon asked to be returned to Paris. On July 16, 1885, he reached the capital, pledging never to return to Tunis until his power was fully recognized. He was certain that either he or the general would have to leave his post. Boulanger also came to Paris with the declaration that he was going to defend his officers. For six months the antagonists carried on their dispute in France. Boulanger was supported by the president of the magistrates, M. Pontois, Solicitor Boerner, and General Edouard Campenon, the minister of war; Cambon depended upon the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the foreign minister.

Emotions were inflamed over the affair and a series of newspaper conflicts broke out in August and September of 1885. Cambon was bitterly attacked by the radical journal, the *Lanterne*, which was later joined in the attack by Henri Rochefort's *Intransigeant*. The editor in chief of the *France* supported Cambon so strongly that he fought a duel with M. Bonhoure of the *Lanterne*. Tempers continued to flare as M. Lamothe of the *Temps*, a defender of Cambon, challenged the director of the *Gil Blas* to a duel.

Cambon reported to Bompard on his talk with Foreign Minister Freycinet. In the course of this conversation Freycinet weakly backed out of the quarrel and advised Cambon to see Premier Brisson. Cambon was satisfied with Brisson's attitude, but felt the premier did not fully recognize the dilatory tactics of General Campenon, who remained loyal to Boulanger and repeatedly offered to resign everytime the affair was discussed in council.

President Grévy took a stronger stand and in late October told Cambon, "Fear nothing, we will not allow anything to

³⁴ G. Valbert, "Le Régime du protectorat en Tunisie," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXVIII, 202, 203 (author's translation).

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be done to you, Tunisia progresses and there is so little that is progressing that we will not compromise to your disadvantage in this affair."³⁵

Paul Cambon made it clear that he would resign as resident general if Boulanger returned to Tunis. It soon was evident that the general would not resume his Tunisian post, and later the newspapers announced that he had been assigned to the command of an army corps. The fight was not ended. Cambon's enemies were determined to discredit his work in Tunisia. M. Pontois accused the resident general of extortion in connection with the company supplying water for Tunis. This affair reached feverish proportions and Cambon threatened to cane Pontois. He wrote Bompard that their honor was at stake because, "Boulanger and Pontois have organized a system of scandal on the water affair and they make their impression on public opinion."³⁶ Cambon loudly announced that if Pontois did not stop his attacks he would smash his head and then sue him for committing an outrage against a public official.

Furthermore, Cambon asked the government to turn over the water affair to the council of bridges and roads, recommending that they send an inspector general to Tunisia. Freycinet formed an investigating commission of three men, including the president of the council of bridges and roads, ". . . to make a report on the administrative situation of Tunisia."³⁷ Their report was a great triumph for the resident general. One colonist appeared before the commission armed with some complaints about water faucets and meters, but no evidence supporting the alleged extortion was uncovered. Cambon insisted that Foreign Minister Freycinet write a letter setting forth the results to President Grévy. This letter was published in the *Journal officiel*:

³⁵ Cambon, *Correspondance*, I, 257.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 261.

³⁷ Par un diplomate, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

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Mr. President,

The commission charged by the *arrêté* of November 23, 1885 to make a report on the administrative situation in Tunisia have communicated to me on December 24 the result of its [sic] labors. The documents placed before me by them verify that, in spite of the conflicts happening recently between different services and of which the government will prevent a recurrence, the general direction of affairs in our protectorate has been entirely satisfactory. The commission took this occasion to mention the high qualities used in this delicate work by the resident general.

I have in consequence the honor to propose that you confer the cross of the commander of the Legion of Honor on M. Cambon . . . ⁸⁸

In January 1886, Cambon was named commander of the legion of honor, and General Boulanger became minister of war.

General Boulanger continued to rave about the resident general. As minister of war he tormented Freycinet, who had recently formed his third ministry, to send Cambon anywhere, but get him out of Tunisia. Finally in February the general said he would resign if Paul Cambon remained in Tunis. The following June, Cambon was appointed ambassador at Constantinople, but the sultan refused to receive the organizer of the French protectorate in Tunisia. In the fall, however, Cambon became ambassador at Madrid and turned his back on turbulent Tunisia.

In his farewell speech to the French colonists in Tunisia Paul Cambon summed up his work there and revealed his philosophy of a protectorate:

The country of Tunisia is an old country organized for a long time, having its laws and regulations, possessing a policed society. Her industry had been ruined by the caprices of her last sovereigns, she was the prey of a corrupt administration; but it was possible to recover under the sons of the Beys and to adapt the old legislation to the new state. It is what we have done, and it is why all our

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* (author's translation).

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reforms have been favorably received by the natives. They were all connected more or less to the local traditions.³⁹

He regretted leaving Tunisia, but was satisfied that his years there were not sterile. He proudly announced, "The inhabitants of Tunisia appreciate the benefits of the new administration and live in peace under a regime respectful of their religion and their customs."⁴⁰

When Cambon left Tunis he enjoyed the satisfaction of having completed his main objectives. France had guaranteed the Tunisian debt thereby ending the rule of the international financial commission. Capitulation rights had been wiped out and French justice established. The power of the civilian resident was superior to the military. Without his tireless efforts the nature of the protectorate might have remained ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Although the government in Paris was often indifferent, or even antagonistic toward his program, he finally achieved gratifying success.

³⁹ *Journal des débats*, Nov. 16, 1886 (author's translation).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1886.

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Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought. By Peter N. Riesenbergh. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp. viii, 243. Bibliography, index. \$3.75)

Professor Riesenbergh's book is a notable addition to the growing number of studies by American scholars in the field of Roman and canon law, and in the influence of these two laws on the constitutional and legal development of the western monarchies in the period, 1100-1500. The field is a controversial one. The modern day civilians and canonists have maintained in part that romano-canonical maxims played a large, if not a dominant, role in the rise of representative principles in western government, in the restrictions placed by feudal lords on kings, and in the elaboration of the kingship idea. An opposing group of scholars holds that a long tradition of feudal practice, the empiricism of necessity, and local conditions produced the evolution of these institutions and ideas. The canonists and civilians have sometimes been guilty of working too much in the realm of ideas, with insufficient attention to feudal custom and practice. The feudalists' cause has suffered at times because its adherents have refused to recognize that an idea, once evolved, can affect practice. The controversy is nevertheless a real one and will doubtless continue.

Riesenbergh appears disposed to let the canonists and civilians carry the day in this work. He has made an impressive and thorough study of the romano-canonical sources and commentators, and has sought to show that their work produced the idea of inalienability of sovereignty in the western world. By the very nature of the title, the author devotes his attention to "medieval political thought." One wonders, therefore, what cognizance he will take of "medieval political action," and what reconciliation, if any, will be made. He develops his argument through several stages, beginning with the evolution of a concept of office, and the element of inalienability which grew out of it. He then moves to the ecclesiastical theory of inalienability and shows that the canonists — and not the civilians — first developed the idea of inalienability. They were earlier concerned with the necessity of explaining, justifying, and buttressing the office of pope, bishop, and even of the cathedral chapter.

In the chapter on lay theory, the author develops one of the clearest passages in his study when he maintains that it was the canonists who first developed the theory of national independence of monarchies as opposed to the universal control of the Empire. He returns to this theme in discussing the continuity of office and state, and concludes with com-

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ment on revocation and restraint. It must also be said that he lets the *Intellecto* concept play an important role in kingship and the idea of inalienability attached to the office of the crown. Riesenbergs supports his arguments throughout with abundant citations from canonists and civilians. The study almost suffers from this practice for, at times, his argument reads much like a roll call of all the available defenders of a particular point.

As to the relationship between the world of romano-canonical ideas, and that of feudal custom and practice, the author writes at the outset, "Stated originally in feudal terms, what later became a theory was at first in reality a *modus operandi* embodied in feudal custom" (p. 20). We are led to believe that the two opposing camps will be reconciled. This hope is almost sustained (especially p. 167). But the over-all impression is that the concepts of the canonists and civilians (for example, p. 174 and Conclusion) strengthened the actions of kings because they were now theoretically justified, and in the end made possible a program of action and attitudes which might not otherwise have been possible.

There are a few technical matters which should be mentioned. In a work of this nature, where dozens of proper names are used, there is always the problem of orthography. We are all agreed, for instance, in writing Pierre Dubois instead of Petrus de Bosco. Then, by the same token, we know Petrus de Bellapertica well enough to call him Pierre de Belleperche. There are other cases of this sort. Can the debate held at Vincennes in 1329 be referred to as the "Council of Vincennes"? And finally, one suspects that Riesenbergs has been immersed too long in the canonists and civilians, when one comes upon phraseology such as "degrees of essentiality of a prince's regalia" (p. 6), "the legality of necessitous alienation" (p. 53), and "which could hypostatize hieratic levels of reality" (p. 86).

The author is to be complimented on his mastery of a very broad and difficult field. All scholars interested in the development of medieval political ideas, whether they are adherents of the romano-canonical or of the feudalist school, should give this work a careful reading. It is a very able presentation of the thesis that inalienability of sovereignty owes much to Roman and canon lawyers.

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Frank Pegues

The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Edited by H. G. Alexander. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. lvi, 200. Appendices, index. \$4.75.)

A modern reader perusing the exchange of opinions which occurred in 1715-1716 between Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Dr. Samuel Clarke is apt to be mildly amused and slightly bored. He will agree with Leibniz that "it is men's misfortune to grow, at last, out of conceit with reason itself, and to be weary of light" (p. 92). He will heartily endorse

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the sentiment expressed toward Dr. Clarke by the royal *salonnière* Caroline of Ansbach, "He talked to me a very long time in an effort to convert me to his opinion and wasted his breath" (p. 193). But then the reader may also ponder the question: how much closer to a justification of science, philosophy, and religion are we than were those quaint old gentlemen, the philosopher of Herrenhausen and the rector of St. James's?

The small volume here noticed consists of five letters, or rather papers, written by each of the disputants, to which the editor has appended an explanatory introduction, selections from Newton's *Principia* and *Opticks*, and a thin but delightful sampling of the private correspondence which accompanied the philosophical dissertations. Clarke, an ardent Newtonian and keen controversialist, sought to extend to the area of general philosophy the discredit which Englishmen had already thrown upon Leibniz' mathematical claims. The argument centered upon Leibniz' principle "that nothing happens without there being a sufficient reason why it happens, and why it happens thus rather than otherwise" (p. 197). Space, time, gravity, the vacuum, and the concept of God in the universe provided the clubs with which the two parties belabored one another. Clarke enjoyed some prompting from Newton but won little favor with the Princess of Wales to whom both men addressed themselves. Caroline pithily summed it up by observing that "great men are like women, who never give up their lovers except with the utmost chagrin and mortal anger. And that, gentlemen, is where your opinions have got you" (p. 194). In short, Leibniz died while the battle yet raged, and Clarke published their letters in 1717. This is the first printing in English since 1738, though Leibniz' portion of the correspondence was published last year (L. E. Loemker, ed., *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, Vol. II, University of Chicago Press).

Philosophy students may welcome an accessible edition of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. The issues and arguments therein were much discussed in the Age of Reason. The historian will find in the correspondence a neat example of that philosophic crisis of the European conscience which Paul Hazard popularized some years ago. Clarke's arguments strike a sympathetic note of modernity against Leibniz' old-fashioned literary superiority, but current scientific theories lead away from the materialism of the Newtonian world-machine into the field of relativity in which the German would have been more at ease than his opponent. Every reader will appreciate Mr. Alexander's analyses of the problems and the rival frames of reference; his notes are scholarly and enlightening. The selection of supplementary correspondence might better have been incorporated into an historical introduction than tacked on as a seeming afterthought. In the philosophic as in the parliamentary warfare of the period, the "tack" is often more interesting than the bill of particulars.

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English Historical Documents, under the general editorship of David C. Douglas. Volume XII, Part 1, 1833-1874, edited by G. M. Young and W. D. Handcock. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. xxiii, 1017. Select general bibliography, index to texts. \$15.20.)

This is the first of two volumes dealing with the Victorian period, in a general series which is attempting to make available a broad selection of the basic sources of English history from the beginning to 1914. These mid-nineteenth century source materials have been drawn primarily from public documents such as *Hansard*, the *Parliamentary Papers*, and the *Statutes of the Realm*. In their judicious choice of documents, in their comprehensive bibliographies, and in their admirable general introduction to the period, the editors have selected as their theme the twin impacts of industrialism and democracy upon English society.

The theme is clearly indicated in the twelve major sections which deal with the development of the monarchy and Parliament, central and municipal administration, the churches, the penal code, Chartism and free trade, the poor law, public health, education, and industrial conditions. The whole subject of Ireland has been left for the succeeding volume; imperial history and foreign policy also have been omitted because authoritative collections on these subjects already exist and because they do not constitute "the central thread of Victorian history."

With regard to this "central thread," it is interesting to note that Dr. Young, as a collaborator with Mr. Handcock, and after a little more than twenty years of reflection, has shifted his emphasis somewhat from the brilliant interpretation in his "Portrait of an Age," the concluding chapter of *Early Victorian England* (1934). In the earlier work Young suggested the joint importance of moralistic evangelicalism and philosophic radicalism for the early Victorian period. In the volume under review Young no longer stresses evangelical respectability but does reaffirm substantially his belief in the importance of Jeremy Bentham and the Philosophic Radicals.

Bentham did not share Adam Smith's laissez faire view of a "natural harmony of interests" among men. Instead, he recognized a disharmony of interests between the employer and the factory worker which could only be reconciled by an "artificial identity of interests." Governmental intervention was necessary in order to achieve the "greatest good for the greatest number." To this end, Bentham argued on the eve of the Great Reform bill for universal suffrage. His disciples, men like Edwin Chadwick, implemented their master's "philosophic" views in the poor law of 1833, the factory legislation of the thirties and forties, administrative reform measures, the Chartist movement, and the campaign for sanitary reform.

The story of the industrialization of Victorian England is not, however, as the editors rightly tell us, the simple unfolding of philosophic radicalism. Tory paternalism and *noblesse oblige* played their parts, too.

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Furthermore, toward mid-century the Manchester men, such as Cobden and Bright, stoutly resisted the intervening hand of the state. Ironically, as the state was urged more and more to put its hands on domestic affairs, it was simultaneously urged to take its hands off foreign commerce and to remove imperial regulations. Had this volume of documents included the empire, this paradox would have been more apparent.

The editors of this volume have been most successful in directing their editorial comments in the main "towards making the evidence intelligible;" they fortunately have not subscribed to their general editor's alleged goal of "not . . . drawing conclusions" from the evidence.

Indiana University

Leo F. Solt

James Logan and the Culture of Provincial America. By Frederick B. Tolles. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957. Pp. x, 228. Note on sources, index. \$3.50.)

This is an excellent little book. The only quarrel that the reviewer can honestly pick with it would be over its ambiguous title. As with the thirteen biographies previously published in this *Library of American Biography* series, it is apparently supposed to treat an historical figure as typical of an important movement in American development—in this case, according to general editor Oscar Handlin, of the transformation of European culture into something new and distinctively American. Fortunately, Professor Tolles does not allow this formula to betray him into a page by page defense of the validity of his sub-title; for the most part he allows the facts to speak for themselves. His book, therefore, is not an essay on the culture of provincial America, but a simple and straightforward biography of James Logan. In spite of its brevity and the absence of specific documentation (an omission which is partly excused by the excellent "Note on the Sources" chapter), it is the best biography of Logan now in print.

James Logan is a truly great but generally neglected figure in American history, much in need of a good biographer. As the agent for the Penn business interests in their trans-Atlantic province, his integrity and devotion were almost super-human, yet he dared to differ with the great Proprietor himself and to express from the beginning his reservations about the practicality of the "Holy Experiment." He was certainly one of the principal architects of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, yet he was a most unorthodox Quaker and untypical provincial. His character included some of the inconsistencies which mar all human action; usually a fair and always an able Indian diplomat, he was nevertheless guilty of perpetrating the infamous "Walking Purchase" on the helpless Delawares. He was equal to every emergency, yet he frequently fell into deep fits of depression over his Sisyphean struggles with faithless governors, rebellious

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assemblymen, trouble-making imperial agents, impractical fellow-Quakers, and even the members of the family whose interests he zealously guarded. That he could, against such odds, maintain the Penn title, organize the fur trade into a highly profitable enterprise, serve as President of the Council and Chief Justice of the province, and still find time for scientific and literary pursuits indicates the measure of the man.

Logan's unique contributions to American culture need to be better known. They ranged from the singularly appropriate and melodious christening of the "Conestoga wagon" to experiments which demonstrated sexual reproduction in the maize plant and were published in the *Transactions* of the Royal Society. Logan apparently imported the first copy of Newton's *Principia* to appear in America, and taught himself calculus. He was deeply interested in astronomy, numismatics, optics, and philosophy. Having learned Latin, Greek, and Hebrew from his schoolmaster father so well that he composed in them readily, he taught himself French, Italian, and Spanish, and even made some progress into the intricacies of Arabic and the Scandinavian languages. Yet all this was not the casual virtuosity of a dilettante but the powerful response of a vigorous mind yearning to escape now and then from the mundane affairs of business and politics which occupied so much of its attention.

Dr. Tolles, himself a Quaker scholar, has employed his unique combination of talent and opportunity to produce a minor classic in American biography. The projectors of the series are to be congratulated on their choice, both of the biographer and the biographee in this particular case. The result, for once, justifies a dust jacket blurb — "By and large, [Logan] was one of the three or four most considerable men in colonial America."

Indiana University

Lynn W. Turner

Delinquent Saints. By Emil Oberholzer, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp. x, 379. Appendix, bibliographical essay, index. \$6.00.)

The chief deduction from this analysis of Massachusetts Puritans (here defined as Congregationalists) is that they "were human." Like most human beings, they had their foibles and frailties, and a fineness too. Except for a few fanatics, frequently the ministers, they seem no more delinquent nor dedicated than many a present-day Christian. Although Oberholzer asserts that "a Puritan had to be either a saint or a sinner . . . not both," he cites many sinners who made "confessions" and were then "restored" to grace and their congregations. A Puritan congregation, in the 1700's, constituted only a part of a community which also contained non-Puritan members. Oberholzer does not compare, either statistically or intuitively, their respective transgressions; and yet shadowy spirits — other sectaries (Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and Shakers), ag-

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nostics, and perhaps an atheist or two — hover in the background. The implied number of persons religiously different or indifferent creates an uneasiness that the place of the Puritans, even in Massachusetts society, has perhaps been exaggerated.

Congregationalism was a contractual religion founded on the "owning" of a covenant with God, and the "breaking" of it provoked both discipline and litigation which filled the congregations' records with matter for this book. Chapters bolstered with tables of statistics about sin and shame describe the fall from grace of many a tough and lusty saint. Three tables classify absences from the Lord's Supper; three more analyze fornication by county, decade, sex, and church; two document alcoholism; and three tabulate persons disciplined and censured. A laborious searching of the sources enables Oberholzer to state that "the records disclose a total of 1,242 cases of fornication between 1620 and 1839." When one considers the time-span involved, the diversity of the congregations, the extensive lacunae in the records, the ratio of the Puritans to the non-Puritans, to say nothing of the undetected and hence unrecorded instances among the Puritans themselves, the fallacy and futility of recourse to a statistical method of writing history seem apparent.

Careful as Oberholzer is in his use of such data, he succumbs to the temptation to play games with them. "Although the incompleteness of the records makes accurate statistics impossible," he writes, "some trends are clearly apparent." A further contention seems modest enough: statistics about one congregation are "useful guides to the trends in the morality and discipline within that one church." But what is a "trend"? To detect a "trend" in an increase from three "confessions" a year before Whitefield's 1740 revival at Westfield to eight or nine afterwards seems neither convincing nor very illuminating. And do "more frequent" references to "unfermented grape juice" really reflect "a trend in the churches' attitude" towards alcohol?

Delinquent Saints includes many passages that tell just what individual men and women thought and did, what actually happened to them, how and why; and these accounts have an impressive validity. They will be useful to students and scholars of Massachusetts history as accurate illustrations of Puritan delinquency. Here is much matter ready to be woven into a narrative, perhaps even a plot, instead of being presented as an imperfect catalogue of sins. To smother a simple historical tale with a pseudo-scientific apparatus and its inevitable concomitants — specious deductions and an inappropriate terminology — seems a poor substitute for selection, theme, and plot. By treating human beings and human frailties on a personal, rather than a taxonomic basis, historians may avoid the dullness of abstract sociology and set forth the excitement and fascination inherent, but left latent, in such lively subjects as delinquent saints.

Yale University

William Huse Dunham, Jr.

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The Origins of the American Party System. By Joseph Charles. (Williamsburg: The Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956. Pp. 147. \$2.50.)

The *William and Mary Quarterly* performed a great service in 1955 when it printed portions of the late Joseph Charles's doctoral thesis on the party origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, now published in this volume. It contains a discussion of the roles of Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson as political leaders, and a detailed analysis of the Jay Treaty as a factor in the development of political parties. The essays are invaluable, not so much because of the research presented — although it is there in good measure — but because it represents the thinking of an original mind applied to a period of history about which there has been more repetition of assumptions than of real thought. The essential key to Charles's approach to the period, and the only valid one, is stated on the first page: "The contest of later parties for the sanction of one or the other of the Founding Fathers has given us a false perspective, and has caused us to emphasize, not the problems which faced the leading figures in the 1790's and not the courses which they followed in solving them, but rather the rationalizations and the propaganda by which they sought to justify themselves and win support. Thus the figures of this period are tagged and labelled for us in advance."

Charles looked behind the arguments of the 1790's to the realities, and produced some remarkable analyses of the men and measures of the times. Not every one will agree with all his interpretations, but no one can afford to ignore them if he has any pretensions to an understanding of the period. Most striking, for those who think of Hamilton as a promoter of sound finance, is the evidence that Hamilton was perfectly willing to use fiat money and was quite indifferent to the sad financial plight of the government in the 1790's which so shocked his successor in the treasury department. Hamilton was concerned with the creation of a strong central government, and he used the funding system to attach a powerful group of men to such a government. He apparently neither knew nor cared whether his policies were economically sound.

Equally interesting are the questions raised about Washington's role in the politics of the times. Charles suggested that if we are to make a final estimate of Washington in the last decade of his life, the question of his relation to political parties is not the vantage point to use. If we do that, we must deal not with his greatness, but with a weakness which he would not have shown in his prime. If we concentrate on his political significance, "Washington himself is obscured and crowded out by the legendary figure which was so cleverly manipulated. An aged military hero who symbolizes national unity and independence becomes one of the most dangerous figures possible to representative government if he gets into the hands of a group who protect with the magic of his name

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whatever furthers their ends, and then use the denunciations of him which follow as a further political weapon." This was written in 1942!

With regard to John Adams as president, the relevant statement is that if we are to understand him and his years in office, we must abandon the usual accounts "which rest mainly on charges of Adams's vanity and unreasonableness. It is not the conflicts of John Adams's personality, but the conflicts of outlook and purpose within his administration which we should explore." The analysis of Adams's political thought is brief but lucid.

As for Thomas Jefferson, there are equally remarkable interpretations, and particularly of his role as a political leader. Charles pointed out that the opposition to Hamilton's program was not led by Jefferson and that when a popular opposition party did come into being, "it was the product of adjustment and growth . . . it did not spring full-blown from the forehead of Jefferson or of anyone else." After a careful analysis, Charles' conclusion is that "Jefferson did not create a party; a widespread popular movement recognized and claimed him as a leader."

Enough has been summarized and quoted of this all-too-short book to show that it is a remarkable contribution to the interpretation of the 1790's. Those who wish to understand the period must read and ponder it; those who prefer the old assumptions will of course continue to use them although their contributions will be slight.

University of Wisconsin

Merrill Jensen

Freedom's Fetters. By James Morton Smith. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956. Pp. XV, 464. Appendix, index. \$5.00.)

Those historians convinced that fields of study in eighteenth-century America had been worked until barren of fertility learn otherwise in James Morton Smith's *Freedom's Fetters*, the first of a planned two-volume work on the Alien and Sedition laws. The subject is hardly new, but with the exception of Frank M. Anderson's article (in the American Historical Association *Annual Report* for 1912 and John C. Miller's recent work, the field had been little tilled. Miller's book *Crisis in Freedom* is, as Smith says, "a brief, popular survey which stresses readability over analysis."

In *Freedom's Fetters*, the author writes that his purpose is to assess the influence of the Alien and Sedition laws "in shaping the development of the political process of republicanism, with its dual goals of majority rule and individual rights." He concludes that the laws "played a prominent role in shaping the American tradition of civil liberties. Based on the concept that the government was master, these laws provoked a public response which clearly demonstrated that the people occupied that position" (p. 431). Moreover, their severity turned into a boomerang which

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the Democratic-Republicans "used to incite the American people to legal 'insurgency' at the polls; the election resulted in the repudiation of the party which tried to protect itself behind the Sedition Law . . . the Age of Federalism was at an end."

Smith acknowledges that in such a history it is easy to be "overpersonalized and overdramatized," and this reviewer detected a decided effort to avoid these pitfalls. Nevertheless, the author believes that John Adams and Alexander Hamilton have been assigned improper roles in our past understanding of the laws and their enforcement. He shows that Adams did much "to incite anti-Republican sentiment. Although he neither recommended nor fathered this [sedition] law, Adams approved it willingly, and later he specifically authorized its use against his critics." Yet within a decade Adams sought to disclaim any "credit" for the then-obnoxious laws, preferring to shift such responsibility to the late leader of New York Federalism, Hamilton. The author further contends that Hamilton has been erroneously pictured as a champion of a free press; his "biographers have been almost unanimous in absolving him of supporting the [sedition] law" (p. 153). Hamilton actually was a "leading advocate" for enforcement of the laws. "Although Hamilton is generally depicted as a defender of civil liberties who, with Marshall, opposed the Federalist alien and sedition system, it is only too evident that he was ready, willing, and able, in one case [involving the New York *Argus*] at least, to stifle democratic dissent" (p. 417). Indeed, the side of Hamilton which Smith shows us is the tarnished one.

Jefferson moves in and out of the pages, but he is less a hero than a man on a tight rope. As presiding officer in the Senate, Jefferson even had to sign the warrant for William Duane of the *Aurora* (p. 298). A hero's mantle does fall on David Brown, a crude but articulate New Englander who felt the full wrath of the Federalists. Brown was arrested in March, 1799, and Judge Samuel Chase apparently enjoyed pronouncing the subsequent sentence of eighteen months in prison and a \$480 fine. Brown was "the most grievous sufferer from the penalties of the sedition law" (p. 269).

Smith's style is readable, and his research has been prodigious. He has devoted much space to paraphrasing certain debates in Congress and court proceedings, and although this might not suit a work for the general reader it has considerable merit in *Freedom's Fetters*. Having already staked a claim on the history of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions which he intends to treat in a companion volume, readers can expect that the author will hunt for every scrap of evidence that will touch on "the opposition [to the Alien and Sedition laws] . . . the issues which this opposition raised concerning fundamental rights, and the significance of the Resolutions as an exposition upon the nature of the American constitutional system." Smith has demonstrated in this excellent work that the framers of the Alien and Sedition laws, desperately trying to save

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their party, tried to turn the clock back to a pre-Revolutionary concept of limitations on free speech and a free press. Conclusions on the real motives of the supporters of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions may bring a similarly interesting and provocative assessment of their purposes.

University of California Los Angeles

Robert Allen Rutland

Cherokees of the Old South: A People in Transition. By Henry T. Malone. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 238. Illustrations, maps, bibliographical notes, index. \$4.50.)

The evolution of modern historiography seems to form a pattern wherein the followers of Clio interest themselves first in political and military aspects of the development of a people or a nation. The task of rounding out the studies remains for social and cultural historians. Sordid details of the long struggle between land-hungry white men and Cherokees have been studied and recorded by several generations of students. In *Cherokees of the Old South*, Henry Thompson Malone, associate professor of history and assistant dean in the Georgia State College of Business Administration, Atlanta, presents a scholarly account of the "unique social transformation of the Cherokee Nation which resulted in an odd culture, a red-white amalgam, during the early nineteenth century." Malone, incidentally, has been active in the movement, sponsored by the Georgia Historical Commission, to restore the Cherokee capital of New Echota.

Relying primarily upon printed accounts of travellers in the Cherokee country and on secondary sources, Malone rapidly reviews Anglo-Indian relations in the eighteenth century and describes Cherokee folkways and mores. When treaties had to be negotiated after the American revolution, Cherokees were caught between conflicting aims of federal agents and speculators, aided and abetted by agents who represented neighboring states. Then, too, trouble arose when horses wandered away in the company of either white or red men, when raiding parties of either race sought revenge for real or imagined wrongs, and because of the activities of English and Spanish agents.

Benjamin Hawkins, appointed "Principal Temporary Agent for the Southern Indians" in 1796, encouraged the Cherokees to develop agriculture and home industry under Article Fourteen of the Treaty of Holston. The civilizing process was carried farther in the years (1801-1823) that Return Jonathan Meigs served as Cherokee Agent. The author devotes a chapter to the contributions of this hard-working, sincere, and comparatively honest man, for whom he seems to have great respect. Under the leadership of halfbreed chiefs — Ross, Ridge, Hicks, Vann, and others — the Cherokees formed a government modelled after that of their white neighbors. Missionaries, sent into Cherokee country by different

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Protestant groups, found that the Indians would receive religious instruction if their offspring were taught the Three R's. Able students, especially children of well-to-do mixed breeds, studied in eastern schools. One of the superior boys, Galagina (Elias Boudinot) returned to his people, with a white wife, to become editor of the bilingual *Cherokee Phoenix*, which becomes a valuable source for Malone's study. The author appropriately ends his story at the point where Jackson's removal policy went into effect.

Malone seemed to stay well within the quota — whatever it is — of mistakes. Some specialists in the field may accuse him of pouring old wine into new bottles, but his scholarly synthesis is a contribution to Cherokee history. Critics of land speculators may want to award the author a prize for the literary understatement of the year when they come across his characterization of William Blount as a "frontier opportunist" (p. 36). An unusual number of unnecessary repetitions occur: John McDonald marries a prominent Indian woman named Anne Shorey on page 9, and again on page 54; William Bartram discovers and rediscovers that the Cherokee women are "tall," "slender," . . . "and of a graceful figure . . ." (pp. 15, 17). Other repetitions are found in the account of James Vann's gun play on pages 50 and 151 and quotations from William Bartram on pages 16 and 24. The reviewer thinks that Malone could have improved the biographical sketches in the footnotes by going into more detail — novices and tyros would be grateful. The format of the book is attractive, but the notes are improperly placed in the back.

East Tennessee State College

Frank B. Williams, Jr.

Old Bullion Benton: Senator from the New West. By William Nisbet Chambers. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. Pp. xv, 517. Bibliography, index. \$6.00.)

In 1820 two events occurred which would have profound significance in the history of American political development: Congress cleared the way for the admission of Missouri to the Union, and the new state elected Thomas Hart Benton to the United States Senate. The first action temporarily halted a bitter quarrel over the extension of slavery; the second introduced to national politics one of the most controversial and impressive men ever to serve in the Society of Senators. Benton, then thirty-eight years old, could look back on a life that had been characterized by great energy, burning ambition, and a constant desire for self-improvement. Born into a middle-class North Carolina family that moved to the Tennessee frontier, he gave up farming in his late teens to teach school and study law. At twenty-four he opened a law office; within three years he was elected to the Tennessee Senate and was well on the way to becoming a figure of considerable local importance. He had already become a friend and protege of Andrew Jackson.

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Benton's career as a soldier during the War of 1812 was, for him, a frustrating and futile one. He early obtained a colonelcy, but most of his time was spent in trying to get into a battle. Although he never succeeded, he did see action of a kind, for in 1813 his friendship with Jackson exploded in that famous brawl of knives and pistols in a Nashville hotel. Benton moved to Saint Louis in 1815, and within five years he had become a leader of the Missouri bar, a businessman, a politician, an editor of the Saint Louis *Enquirer*, and a director of the Bank of Missouri.

During the longest Senate tenure ever enjoyed by any man up to that time, Benton's name became familiar throughout the country. Although posterity has put him in the shadow of Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, he was, in the opinion of many of his contemporaries, the equal of any of them. As a militant, radical Democrat he became one of the most powerful and colorful spokesmen for the forces of a newly burgeoning democracy. Imbued with the spirit of Jeffersonianism before entering national politics, he soon found himself at odds with Clay and John Quincy Adams. By 1825 he had effected both a personal and political reconciliation with Jackson, and after leading senatorial opposition to the Adams administration, he entered his greatest period of success when Old Hickory went to the White House. Then the political atmosphere was much more salubrious for advocacy of the proposals with which his name was, and still is, identified.

Two of these had been stated as early as the second session of his first term in the Senate: the direct election of the president and the graduation-donation principle for the disposal of public lands. This latter proposal, designed to reduce the price of government lands and make them available to a greater number of people, was much more than an appeal to the West or to his Missouri constituents. It was a reform issue of national import which he associated with other great problems, such as taxation, banks, tariffs, and the public debt. Also, closely identified with it was the money question. As a steady champion of hard money currency he won national fame, and the popular sobriquet, Old Bullion. Essentially, Benton's position on all of these issues was that of a Jacksonian or radical Democrat.

On the bitter controversy over slavery extension he took a position which alienated him from the pro-slavery segments. In 1844, while speaking against the immediate annexation of Texas, he said: "I will not engage in schemes for [slavery] extension into regions where it was never known." Fearful for the Union, he had taken a stand, and he would not retreat.

One closes this excellent book with a feeling of gratitude for its author. Displaying objectivity to a degree that is rare among biographers, he has tried to make understandable a complex man in a complicated political era. And, for the most part, he has succeeded. Without debunking his subject or disparaging former biographers, he has put to rest

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some of the more flamboyant legends surrounding a man whose stormy career inevitably bred them. In putting the record straight Chambers does not resort to argument or special pleading. Instead, he has dug up the facts, some of them never before utilized, and allowed them to speak for themselves. To the author Benton is neither hero nor villain; he is a problem in understanding, a case study in ante-bellum politics. Laudable as Chambers' detachment is, one occasionally feels that he should have attempted more in the way of motivation analysis. Admittedly, this is risky, calling as it does upon the exercise of conjecture and psychological insight, but some effort along these lines might have been helpful in filling in certain question-begging gaps that the facts raise but do not answer.

Temple University

Harry M. Tinkcom

The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865. By Dudley Taylor Cornish. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1956. Pp. xiii, 337. Bibliography, index. \$6.00.)

The Negro who served in the Civil War has never lacked a chronicler. There are three accounts by contemporary Negroes, two of them Union veterans of that conflict. Their value, however, is marred by faulty organization, reliance upon unacknowledged sources, and a lack of objectivity. The excellent studies by Professors Wiley and Quarles have gone far toward remedying these defects, but the Negro soldier question was neither isolated nor analyzed as a self-contained problem by these scholars. Dudley Taylor Cornish, Associate Professor of Social Science, Kansas State Teachers College, has undertaken here to fill this historical hiatus. His purpose was "to examine and describe the slow advance of the movement to arm the Negro; to follow that movement through the maze of difficulties and obstacles that had to be overcome, circumvented, or ignored . . . and, finally, to show the gradual emergence of the Negro soldier as a member of the Union Army and to assess his contribution to that army and to the outcome of the war." That he has admirably succeeded in this rather formidable undertaking is clearly the result of prolonged research in the raw materials contained in a varied number of public and private sources.

Professor Cornish delineates this problem with skill; he utilizes his materials in an effective manner. He writes well and treats his subject with a warmth which is revealed in an obviously sympathetic attitude toward the efforts of Negroes to become soldiers and in generally complimentary conclusions as to the fighting qualities of the Negro. Some readers will find in this an element of weakness, for the contemporary evidence which bears on the Negro's performance as a combat soldier is so conflicting that any estimate of his fighting qualities will very largely depend

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on the individual researcher. Although the desire for freedom was strong, there is some question as to whether the right to fight represented in the minds of the majority of Negroes, many of whom showed a marked reluctance to being impressed into the service, the sort of crusade as is at times implied by the author. The unnecessary inclusion in parentheses of the term "so-called" immediately following "Confederate States of America" (p. 166) will annoy some of his readers.

Cornish has demonstrated that the problem of the Negro soldier was not confined to the relatively simple military plane. Social, economic, ethical, and psychological aspects made it quite complex, but by focusing attention on these less obvious facets, he has given this story the necessary perspective. This is an amply documented book and the inclusion of a critical bibliography adds to its value. Although characterized by sound scholarship, it will make profitable as well as pleasant reading for the general reader and the specialist.

Clark College

Edward F. Sweat

A Commoner's Judge: the Life and Times of Charles Patrick Daly. By Harold Earl Hammond. (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1954. Pp. 456. Bibliography, index. \$5.00.)

Charles Patrick Daly lived from 1816 to 1899. The son of New York Irish immigrant parents, he was orphaned at twelve and soon ran away from his stepmother for two years of adventure at sea. Returning to his native city, he served as a cabinet-maker's apprentice and studied law. At twenty-two he was admitted to the bar and five years later served a term in the New York State legislature. His appointment as a justice in the Court of Common Pleas of New York City came when he was twenty-eight. He served as Chief Justice of the Court the last twenty-seven of his forty-two years in office.

Hammond's life of Judge Daly is a straightforward, sympathetic presentation. It is based on manuscripts whenever possible and well supplemented from newspaper and secondary works. The reader anticipating a volume of legal history will be disappointed, for though the title features Daly's position as judge, less than half the book is concerned with his activities in that role. Glimpses of nineteenth century New York City and attention to Daly's multitude of interests occupy the bulk of the pages. Yet Daly's lasting contributions to law are not neglected. His most important case concerned the Astor Place riots of 1849 which involved a display of violent anti-British sentiment. During the trial which followed, Daly defined "riot" closely, and struck a hard blow at those who maintained that such disturbances were a part of a "right to rebellion" and acted as a "safety valve" for public passions. Other contributions to legal opinion involved such diverse subjects as libel, a telegraph company's

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liability in message transmission, and the keeping of the Sabbath. Daly's legal advice was influential in the reduction of piracy charges against Confederate privateers and his solicited comments on the Mason and Slidell affair apparently influenced Secretary Seward's actions.

Once established as a judge, Daly, who was a Democrat, refused all opportunities for further political advancement. Instead, he turned his versatile energies to leadership in civic and cultural affairs. He helped establish a Shakespearean society, aided Irish immigrants through the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, and was a frequent contributor to Jewish charities. Geographical studies fascinated Daly and he labored to found the American Geographical Society of which he was president for thirty-five years. His wide range of interests brought him into contact with most of the dignitaries and celebrities who lived in or passed through New York. Readers may grow impatient with the many lists of the Judge's prominent associates, but he was an important New Yorker in his own time and his activities and acquaintances make him worthy of a biography. Those interested in the preservation of his memory can be grateful that the task was undertaken by an author who had the patience to examine the evidence, and record not only the life of a conscientious judge, but also his other interests and the setting in which he lived.

Ohio University

George H. Lobdell, Jr.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Shaping Years, 1841-1870. By Mark DeWolf Howe. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 330. Illustrations, index. \$5.00.)

Howe's first volume of his Holmes' biography is as satisfying in its detail as it is deceptive in its greatness. Justice Holmes is made the far greater man by this portrayal of his formative years, because it shows how he preserved his own identity by not allowing himself the moment's pleasure of tempting submission or submergence in his environment. Those maturing years and the completion of his apprenticeship in law were a stage in construction by conflict and struggle; more often than not he went forth to do battle in the puritan belief that subsiding would enfeeble, not strengthen, the man and his intellect.

The essential greatness of *The Shaping Years* is that Howe asks the right questions. What struggles with the environment and experience made Holmes an individual? The first major conflict came between father and son. The delightful *Autocrat* was agreeably emancipated from his ancestral heritage and the New England of which he was so much a part, but not as much as his son Wendell whose "desire to free himself from the rigidities of his father's precepts and inheritance was intense but never fully realized" (p. 15). The son's *summum bonum* was driving one's faculties to the maximum, and he tended to resent the dissipation of his

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father's energies that prevented his reaching his true heights. But both thought big thoughts and Holmes later recognized that his father's training in "the scientific way of looking at the world" had been a predominant influence in his basic skepticism (p. 171).

The war years provided what the stuffy, dogma-ridden Harvard College of the 1850's could never have given him — a basis to intellectualize about the finite, the cosmos, and the divine. The teachings of war were needed, he thought, so that "we may realize that our comfortable routine is no eternal necessity of things, but merely a little space of calm in the midst of the tempestuous untamed streaming of the world." Howe's war chapters are great writing. The portrayal is complete — the horrendous experience of battle, the pathos of the man who twice lay wounded in the midst of battle (the second time within the enemy's lines), the tragedy of losing his fellow officers who with Holmes had been seasoned by the weary months of battle, and the decision — later regretted — not to assume command of his beloved 20th Massachusetts regiment but to waive promotion and leave the army — these are all vividly presented.

Holmes began his study of law with strong misgivings which were not quieted until he found "that a man may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; that there as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable." (Frankfurter, *Of Law and Men*, p. 164.) Philosophy remained the magnetic opposition to law until the two could be joined and brought into focus in Holmes' theory of law. Through the apprentice years philosophic thoughts dominated his off-hours in the company of those seminal thinkers in pragmatic philosophy, William James, Charles S. Peirce, and Chauncey Wright. Holmes' delightful description of those associations as "twisting the tail of the cosmos" understated their significance on the man and his intellect. Undoubtedly, speculative philosophy had a great influence in shaping Holmes' mind, but he later rejected "the earlier illusion that truth was discoverable by metaphysical speculation" and came to believe that law was experience not logic and that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."

Howe's study of the formative influences which molded the mind and temperament of Holmes contains the deep insight and humility gained from years of disciplined scholarship. Those who knew Holmes the man should respond to the essentials of Howe's interpretation. But those whose knowledge and experience is limited to what Holmes has written owe an immeasurable debt to Howe for what his scholarship contributes to a genuine understanding of the great jurist.

Indiana University

W. Howard Mann

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Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State. By Sidney Fine. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. x, 468. Bibliography, index. \$7.50.)

This is an excellent book. A number of valuable monographs have been published dealing with various aspects of this general subject, but Professor Fine has summarized a mass of primary and monographic material so adequately that no student of recent American history can afford to overlook his work.

After a brief summary of the idea of *laissez faire*, the author introduces the arguments presented in its defense in the period 1865-1900. There is nothing new in his description of the role of Herbert Spencer as an advocate of *laissez faire*, but this summary is followed by a detailed analysis of the work of various academic and popular American advocates of the idea. Many of the individuals discussed here have been treated by Joseph Dorfman, Richard Hofstadter, and other scholars, but Fine has diligently combed through a mass of manuscripts and contemporary printed matter and has found a wealth of detail about the idea of *laissez faire* and its popularization in America. He shows how the doctrines of *laissez faire* became the gospel of the American businessman, sanctified by the church and sanctioned by the courts.

The author's assertion that the idea of *laissez faire* was "strongly attacked" in the last third of the nineteenth century is not of course new — nor is his analysis of the social gospel — but his discussion of the "new-school economists," such as Richard T. Ely and Simon N. Patten, is excellent. The student of the period will find in this, and in the following chapter on "Sociology, Political Science, and Pragmatism," ideas and comments which should stimulate him to further reading and research. The ideas of Lester Frank Ward, Edward A. Ross, and Albion W. Small are summarized, and there is a brief section on William James and John Dewey, followed by a lengthy discussion of such reformers as Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and William D. Porter Bliss.

In a chapter on "the legislative record" Fine shows that on this, as on many other subjects, Americans are prone to talk in one fashion and act in another. While protesting their belief in *laissez faire*, members of state legislatures and of Congress were enacting statutes which violated the idea, both by supporting business and by regulating the conditions under which business men were allowed to operate. As the author succinctly states it, the federal government "was no slave to the negative state" during this period.

Fine sees four major aspects to the protest against *laissez faire*. There was a strong ethical element, best represented by the social gospel movement; a scientific protest, led by the new social scientists; a strong public feeling that a system which had been adequate for an agricultural society was quite inadequate to cope with the problems of industrialization and urbanization; and a conviction that the arguments which in the past had

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been advanced against a strong state were applicable to an absolute monarchy but not to a democracy. Critics admitted that laissez faire had been important in the revolt against monarchical control, but they asserted that state action in a democracy "partakes of the nature of self-help and is not to be construed as paternalism." Not all Americans will agree with this observation, or with the author's attempt to attribute much of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal to Ely, Ross, Commons, and their associates.

Perhaps it is merely captious to suggest that the subtitle of this work, "A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865-1901," is neither exact nor quite appropriate. Perhaps the difficulty is inherent in the problem, but as the author has organized his work it consists of a section on arguments in support of laissez faire followed by a section presenting arguments against the theory, rather than an analysis of the conflict between adherents of the two faiths. A study of the conflict as it raged in legislative halls, courtrooms, and editorial columns would have extended his task to impossible limits, but as a summary to the arguments of the two opposing groups in one of the sharpest controversies of the last half of the nineteenth century, Fine's work has not been surpassed.

Vanderbilt University

H. L. Swint

Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. By Howard K. Beale. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956. Pp. xxi, 600. Index. \$6.00.)

This volume, which brings to print in expanded form the 1953 Albert Shaw lectures on diplomatic history at Johns Hopkins University, is the product of years of painstaking study of Theodore Roosevelt. In it, Professor Beale, eschewing for the most part the role of advocate and letting the sources speak for themselves, gives us the most comprehensive and balanced view of Theodore Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign relations yet to appear. Although scarcely "revisionist," the book assigns to Roosevelt a more important role than have some diplomatic historians, and it will doubtless stir controversy. This reviewer, although not fully persuaded of T.R.'s stature as a world statesman, put the volume down with the growing conviction that his role in world affairs is currently undervalued.

Beale's Roosevelt is a fascinating study in conflicting motivations. In common with Mahan, Kipling, Brooks Adams, and other late nineteenth century prophets of imperialism whose writings he admired, Roosevelt early embraced the Tory doctrine that it was the mission of the white, English-speaking "race" to carry civilization to the rest of the world. The "will to power" rather than economics guided his expansionist thinking; the "White Man's Burden" rationalized a chauvinistic nationalism di-

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rected toward making the United States the make-weight in the world balance of power. In pursuit of this goal T.R. chafed at the restrictions of formal usage: as Assistant Secretary of the Navy his jingoism bordered on insubordination; as President he slashed red tape, substituted "shirt sleeve" diplomacy for protocol, and sometimes by-passed his entire diplomatic establishment. Ordinarily he worked directly through his close friends: Henry Cabot Lodge, imperialist-minded Senator from Massachusetts and co-conspirator of jingo days; Speck von Sternburg, the one-time German consular official whom Kaiser William II elevated to ambassador to please Roosevelt; French Ambassador Jean Jules Jusserand, who could hike, ride, swim the Potomac, and engage in intellectual discussions with the ebullient Theodore; Cecil Spring Rice, whom the British government unaccountably refused to make ambassador at T.R.'s behest; Arthur Lee, British M.P. and old Cuban tent-mate of Spanish War days; and Henry White, the American diplomat whom T.R. regarded (although Beale does not say it) as the most useful man in the United States diplomatic establishment.

Beale believes that Roosevelt, despite his nationalistic and racist prejudices, "saw with remarkable perspicacity many of the world's problems that his contemporaries missed." Some points the author makes: (1) President Roosevelt, for all his friendliness toward the German Kaiser, was alert to the threat posed by that "jumpy" (T.R.'s word) sovereign's neurotic fears of British and French aggression; (2) he subordinated his racism to admiration for the aggressive Japanese (the Chinese he despised for the "backwardness") and early recognized them as a force to be dealt with in the Pacific; (3) the Portsmouth Treaty was a signal triumph for his diplomacy. More important, Beale is inclined to accept the controversial Roosevelt version of his handling of the Anglo-German intervention in Venezuela of 1902-1903.

From the above and other evidence the author deduces that Theodore Roosevelt was a man of "prophetic insights" (hazardous words!), "uncanny" in his ability to separate the essential from the non-essential, a man who did not bluff nor "jump into international situations excitedly." That T.R. in the end failed in his objectives was not due to any lack of ability, but rather "the trouble lay . . . in his values and in the setting in which he worked. . . ." Though diplomatic historians will want to quibble with some of the author's judgments, the book makes a valuable addition to our knowledge of American leadership during a crucial period of world history.

Washington College (Maryland)

William M. Armstrong

The Historian

Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality. By John Morton Blum. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. Pp. vi, 199. Note on sources, index. \$3.50.)

This book is a worthy contribution to the *Library of American Biography*, a series designed to portray the lives of those who have embodied basic American traditions. The statesman who perhaps more than any other embodied the American traditions of justice and morality — and at a time when those traditions were under great stress — is analyzed in a vivid and incisive manner. Wilson's background and training, his rise to positions of prominence, and his courageous crusade for political morality are traced in nine brief chapters. "A Longing to do Immortal Work," which characterized his formative years, was whetted by his term as "Prime Minister" of Princeton. As governor of New Jersey he made "Giant Strides" in progressivism and toward the presidency, where the unprecedented legislative reform program of his first administration achieved the "Crown of the Common Theme." His struggle to uphold "The Force of Moral Principle" in American foreign relations brought him face to face with "The Fearful Things" of international power politics, which eventually enmeshed him in the trials of "A People's War." Following this ordeal he labored as "The Only Disinterested Person" at the Versailles Conference, and then, in one last supreme effort, spent himself in the fight for the League of Nations — "The Final Grapple of Principle."

The story of Woodrow Wilson's crusade, as interpreted by Blum, is both inspiring and depressing. The inspirational power of the Wilson who pitted his vast store of intellectual morality against the political, economic, and social evils of his era is weakened — but not destroyed — by the Wilson who, presuming that "men everywhere . . . held his ideals" (p. 162) and convinced that truth is obvious, saw his own dogmatism shatter the noblest creation of his life.

The volume contains little that is new. But its presentation of the strengths, weaknesses, and eccentricities of a man whose numerous biographers long since gleaned most of what the records can reveal about him is distinguished by its superb style and scrupulous objectivity. Wilson's virtues — his qualities of leadership, his devotion to truth, justice, and morality; as well as his flaws — his inability to compromise, his reluctance to work with men whose stature rivaled his own, the frequent "innocence of his assumptions" (p. 94) — are clearly and impartially recorded. If there is a point on which Blum's Wilson differs from the traditional textbook Wilson it is in the portrayal of him as a fundamentally conservative statesman, as revealed by his "nullification of liberal legislation by conservative administration" (p. 80).

Altogether, *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality* is a perceptive analysis of the man, his career, and the political and moral crises of his era. Although it is designed primarily for the enjoyment and en-

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lightenment of the nonprofessional, the serious student will find in it a very helpful summation of the best historical research and thought that have gone into the effort to analyze a fascinating American.

Culver Military Academy

Hugh M. Ayer

Forest and Range Policy: Its Development in the United States. By Samuel Trask Dana. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956. Pp. xi, 455. Appendices, bibliography, index. \$6.50.)

The dean emeritus of the School of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan makes a substantial contribution to the American Forestry Series. His book "is intended primarily for use as a text and for reference purposes for students of forestry, range management, and other fields of natural-resource management," but it contains materials of importance to persons in many specialties.

Forest and Range Policy is rich in materials for the historian. The author is master of the standard sources on the history of American forests and public domain, and he makes use of many fresh, out-of-the-way documents. In straight, clear, textbook style, with plenty of dates, figures, and quotations from original publications, Dana covers the entire history of forest policy in what is now the United States from the earliest colonial legislation in New England, through the Broad Arrow controversy, on down through the long story of acquisition and disposal by the Federal Government of its domain, and finally to the development of modern programs for conservation of forests and all other natural resources.

Since policy is Dana's subject, he gives relatively little space to the years before the Civil War, when there was little official concern for trees. He deals at length with the agitation and legislation for forest reserves, beginning in the 1870's, and the work of men like Franklin B. Hough, Bernhard Fernow, Gifford Pinchot, and the two Roosevelts. There is proportionate space for the Oregon land frauds, the Ballinger Case under Taft, the achievements of a series of chief foresters (such as Henry S. Graves), and for the many twentieth-century organizations—Federal, state, industrial, and scientific—that concern themselves with one or more aspects of forest use. Dana summarizes well, not only in each chapter but also in his two appendices. Both the first, "Survey of Federal Policy on Wildlife, Soil, Water, and Minerals," and the second, "Chronological Summary of Important Events in the Development of Colonial and Federal Policies Relating to Natural Resources," compress in chronological form a vast array of data.

By its nature and intention the volume omits such topics as big fires, labor organizations, logging methods, or the methods of pioneer settlement. But for matters of policy and historical significance the book is full of keen insights and indisputable conclusions: public regulation of

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forest industries was much more common during the colonial period than during the nineteenth century; in 1817, by authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to reserve lands containing red cedar and oak, the United States embraced the principle of Great Britain's hated Broad Arrow policy; forest products played crucial roles in both world wars; forestry became a profession in America in 1900 when seven men organized the Society of American Foresters; by 1940 Federal forestry was well established, and thereafter came marked progress on the part of state governments and private owners. In making observations like these and supporting them with analyses and data, Dana writes a sound, impartial history of a basically important subject—the function of forests in America and the rise of a many-sided policy for the preservation and use of forests.

Los Angeles City College

Richard G. Lillard

Book Notes



Bluegrass Cavalcade. Edited by Thomas D. Clark. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1956. Pp. xv, 377. \$5.00.)

Clark, an indefatigable collector of Kentuckiana, has brought together in this volume sixty-four delightful selections, ranging in time from John Filson to the last gubernatorial campaign in the Bluegrass State. Novelists, historians, biographers, humorists, and newspapermen are among those represented, and each author is introduced with a perceptive thumb-nail sketch.

The editor chose wisely; the selections are rich, colorful, entertaining, and often enlightening. The Press deserves a word of praise for a very attractive volume.

The Elegant Oakey. By Croswell Bowen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. 292. Illustrations, bibliography, index. \$5.00.)

A well-known journalist has presented a spritely and fast moving account of the career of A. Oakey Hall, mayor of New York during the Tweed era and the epitome of male fashion of the period. Hall was a man of numerous talents who seemed destined for a long and prominent political career until the exposure of the Tweed ring all but ruined him. There is little new in the volume, but it provides a few hours of entertainment along with an insight into the workings of New York city politics and social life.

Thomas A. R. Nelson of East Tennessee. By Thomas B. Alexander. (Nashville: Tennessee Historical Commission, 1956. Pp. xi, 186. Illustrations, map, bibliography, index. \$3.00.)

The subject of this biography was never highly important on the national scene, but for three decades T. A. R. Nelson, 1812-1873, played a prominent part in the political life of Tennessee. A conservative and unionist, he refused to go with his seceded state. He never became as radical as his fellow East Tennessean, Brownlow, and when the Confederacy was in control in East Tennessee Nelson counselled *de facto* recognition of that government. During the war and after he supported a former political opponent, Andrew Johnson, and was the only individual personally chosen to defend Johnson during his impeachment trial. Nelson was an able lawyer who disliked extremes; perhaps no other man in the state was more highly respected by friend and opponent.

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Nelson deserved a biography, and Alexander has made the most of scanty material. In a good prose style the author has been moderate in his conclusions and evaluations.

American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885. By Charlotte Erickson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. x, 269. Appendices, index. \$4.75.)

In this volume, the fruit of very extensive and intensive research, the author indicates that industrial spokesmen were not the leading promoters of labor recruitment schemes during the Civil War period. Groups more interested were: private labor agencies, consuls seeking commissions, steamship and railroad companies, and the immigrants themselves. Other topics explored include the activities of the American Emigrant Company; the relations between the American and British unions; the distribution practices of the private agencies (where it seems the most indefensible tactics and procedures are to be found); the efforts of federal, state, local, and philanthropic agencies; and the passage of the anti-contract labor law of 1885.

The scholarship of the study seems unusually sound and thorough, but the volume suffers from a considerable amount of repetition and from a heavy style.

News of Phi Alpha Theta



New Chapters

Phi Alpha Theta has added another new chapter since the last issue of *THE HISTORIAN* to bring the total to 154. On May 10th, Zeta Kappa was chartered at the University of Houston. Charter members included: C. B. Ransom, Robert Giesberg, Helen Douthitt, Louis Kestenberg, Robert Haynes, Virginia Levitt, Janet Ramey, Millicent Robertson, Jimmie Hicks, Neal Young, Ramon Hulsey, Sammie Hope, Christine Estes, Roger Daniels, Dorothy Perry, Ara Verner, Gloria Biles, Jean Davis, James Moore.

National Activities

Professor Richard Grant Long of Beta Nu (Davis and Elkins College) died suddenly on March 13, 1957. Born in 1902, a native of Delaware, Professor Long received his A.B. degree from the University of Delaware, the M.A. from Princeton, and had completed all the work for the Ph.D., except the thesis, at McGill University. He had taught at Allegheny College, Milwaukee State Teachers College, and McGill University before joining the faculty at Davis and Elkins College in 1949.

Phi Alpha Theta has awarded the \$50.00 prize for the best undergraduate paper for the 1956-57 contest to Larry Alan Siedentop, Gamma Omicron (Hope College), for his paper, "Disraeli and Bismarck." Mr. Siedentop, planning to do graduate work in history or political science, was a delegate to the 1956 convention in St. Louis.

Regional Activities

Xi Chapter of the University of Southern California played host April 5, 1957, to the Eighth Annual Regional Meeting for the southern California area. Participating chapters came to join in the event from Santa Barbara (University of California), San Diego State, Occidental, and Immaculate Heart Colleges. Fraternity members from neighboring institutions, Claremont, Long Beach State, Mount St. Mary's Colleges, El Camino and Valley Junior Colleges, and Loyola University, also participated. Vanderbilt University was represented in the person of Professor Clarence Nixon who chaired a session on European History.

After a stimulating afternoon of scholarly papers presented by graduate and undergraduate students from the various participating schools, the event closed with a dinner meeting. The speaker, Professor Merrill

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Jensen, University of Wisconsin, currently on a Huntington Library research fellowship, delivered the address entitled, "Some Interpretations of the American Revolution," to a capacity gathering. Dr. Jensen was introduced to the dinner guests by Professor Arthur R. Kooker, Chairman of the USC History Department.

Chapter Activities

Alpha (University of Arkansas).

On October 18, 1956, Frances Shirley, Randy Robertson, Sheffield Lander, Jimmy Williams, Martha Rice, Charles Evans, Curtis Ridgway, Mary Manneschmidt, Ralph Turner were initiated.

Mrs. Frances Butler, Tom Oliver, Don Richards, Harry Randall, Ann Foster, Nancy Vinzant, Frances Curtis, John Matthews and George Walker were initiated on March 16, 1957.

Beta (University of Pittsburgh).

Samuel Astorino, Donald Averbach, Judith Cohen, Mrs. Nancy De-Angelis, John Golden, Cleveland McDonald, Philip Marshall, Thomas Provost, Donald Shrager, Rau Sprigle were initiated on May 17, 1957.

Epsilon (University of Illinois).

Donald Aaronson, Jane Bitterman, James Blakely, David Brawner, Paula Bresee, Ralph Brill, Shirley Brown, Thomas Brzyski, Benjamin Byerly, Lamonte Corum, James Fricke, Stanley Fritz, William Gouty, Martha Hoerd, Ronald Howe, David Jareq, Joseph Jones, Maurice Lebowitz, Morris Levy, William McAfee, Susan Moore, Arthur Patoff, Theodore Reuter, Harry Schanning, Ralph Stone, Alan Wakstein, Stanley Yates were initiated on May 11, 1957.

Kappa (Muhlenberg College).

John LaFaver has received an Elihu Root-Samuel J. Tilden Scholarship, valued at \$7,200, for three years of study at the New York University School of Law.

On March 25, 1957, James Balliet, Alvin Coleman, Joe Pitman, Barry Sireta, Luis Torres, Eric Vadelund, Henry Williams, and on April 29, 1957, Kenneth Semmel and David Senger were initiated.

Iota (Colorado State College of Education).

Russell Ackerman, Robert Creamer, Harry Erickson, Earl Harris, Louis Koeppe, Donald Orr, Mildred Snow, Thomas Stirton, Robert Wirsing, Walter Yuhl, Jr. were initiated January 17, 1957.

Mu (Arkansas State Teachers College).

Tommie Nipper was initiated March 12, 1957.

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Nu (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College).

On March 15, 1957, Leola Corley, Clark Dunn, Fledelle Gayes, Lloyd Goss, David LeMaster, Georgia McClintock, Ruth McCoy, Donnie Mowdy, Raymond North, Mary Storie, Ann Underwood, Darrel Woodward and Frankie Young were initiated.

Omicron (University of Omaha).

James Bolton, Sandra Fisher, Richard Paynter, Dorothy Scoville were initiated May 1, 1957.

Sigma (University of New Mexico).

Blair Boyd, Jr. and Maralyn Budke were initiated May 1, 1957.

Upsilon (Waynesburg College).

Barbara Thompson was initiated on March 13, 1957.

Chi (University of California, Berkeley).

On December 11, 1956, Gloria Burchard, Ruth Dean, Ihsan Ali Saib, Wilmar Shiras were initiated. Dianne Cowgill, Robert Fricke, Robert Harris, Robert Hennings, Douglas McCormick, Raymond Matsuhara, Forrest Miller, Joyce Olson, Jeffrey Russell, Art Silversmith were initiated on January 11, 1957.

Psi (Kent State University).

Betty Gatchel, Bernice Gatewood, Robert Hilliard, Joseph Petrilli, Marcus Roberto, Sally Cahur, John Sapp were initiated on February 20, 1957, and Mary Eichenberg on April 2.

Omega (Gettysburg College).

Kenneth Anderson, Richard Goff, Ethel Gotwald, Robert Kauffman, Kenneth Newbould were initiated on April 11, 1957.

Alpha Alpha (Lehigh University).

Donald Bauder, James Fry, Joseph Horvath, Joel Newman, Michael Oshatz, Robert Schwartz, Karl Weiss, Jr. were initiated April 16, 1957.

Alpha Delta (Marquette University).

On March 24, 1957, Philip Kennedy, Bernard Lutzke, Robert Miller, and Sandy Navin were initiated.

Alpha Eta (Upsala College).

Albert Ahlstrom, Phyllis Edelson, Marilyn Gordon were initiated December 2, 1956; Joan Engle, David Carlson, Harold Jensen, Augustus

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McGinnis, Paul Nelson, Gertrude Osmers, Berger Pearson, Ronald Rudolph, Eleanor Sprossler were initiated April 14, 1957.

Alpha Theta (Hofstra College).

Ronald Green, Bernard Maquire, Dorothea Prior, Joseph Ryan, Robert Sobel were initiated February 28, 1957.

Alpha Lambda (North Texas State College).

Charles Cole, Glenda Hebert, Nancy Murdock, Paul Palmer, Robert Shook were initiated March 1, 1957.

Alpha Xi (Westminster College, Penn.).

On February 20, 1957, Robert Detrick was initiated.

Alpha Pi (Augustana College).

Glenn Bergmark, Suzanne Bois, Martin Katz, Doniver Peterson, John Schou, Marjorie Summers, Janice Warner were initiated February 3, 1957; Jon Bronser, Elmer Feltskog, Gary McLamarrah on May 9, 1957.

Alpha Sigma (Washington and Jefferson College).

Richard Brown, James Duncan, Vincent Franz, Jr., Chester Handelman, George Morrison, Jr., Alexander Murdoch, Jr. were initiated February 17, 1957.

Alpha Tau (Winthrop College).

Mary Jackson and Barbara Senn were initiated April 11, 1957.

Alpha Phi (Michigan State).

Charles Russell, Reynold Jeltema, Malvin Monette, James Provan, Truman Strobridge, John Clingerman, Harold Porter, Mary Nelligan, Gary Peltier, Charles Spaniole, James Garner, Jr., Raymond Wilder, Dorothy McQuillan, Frederick Mangol, Elizabeth Schneider, Ann Tukey, Donald Walters were initiated May 23, 1957.

Alpha Chi (Cedar Crest College).

Jane Schlegel and Betty Wesley were initiated April 24, 1957.

Alpha Omega (University of Rhode Island).

Anthony Fusaro, Arthur Gilbert, Kenneth Langer, Frederick Taylor were initiated on May 4, 1957.

Beta Beta (Stanford University).

Milton Meyer, Alexander Riasanovsky, Barnes Riznik were initiated September 1, 1956, while on the following December 1st, Eleanor Alton,

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Nancy Arndt, Catherine Elwood, Thaxter Goodell, Marjorie Kendall, Howard Koch, Jr., John Pence, Roberto Romeo, Hugh Ross, Lawrence Walker were initiated.

Beta Gamma (William Jewell College).

George Boltnew, Carroll Clark, Russell Eaton, Mary Frith, Billy Morgan were initiated March 19, 1957.

Beta Epsilon (University of Colorado).

On October 19, 1956, James DeBell was initiated; Jean Alexander, George Barany, Alberta Byington, Bruce Boggs, Mary Christner, David Eakins, Jane Furey, Sue Gormley, Charles Hough, J. Dennis Hynes, Eva Leslie, James Todd were initiated April 4, 1957.

Beta Zeta (Otterbein College).

Alan Norris has received an Elihu Root-Samuel J. Tilden Scholarship, valued at \$7,200, for three years of study at New York University's School of Law.

Beta Kappa (San Diego State College).

Margaret Eriksson, Kathryn Palmer, Gale Sheldon, Ronald Smith, Frances Svoboda, Donald Walker, Alonzo Wood, III, were initiated on January 20, 1957.

Beta Mu (University of Richmond).

Beverly Ambler, Kenneth Burks, Jr., Ruth Powell, Marcia Salven were initiated on March 3, 1957.

Beta Nu (Davis and Elkins College).

Clemens Bartollas, Flora Butt, Marshall Emm, Leonard Hood, II, Donald Luloff were initiated November 1, 1956; Bruce Gilley on April 11, 1957.

Beta Omicron (University of Alabama).

George R. Abernathy, Jr., has been awarded a grant-in-aid by the Huntington Library and Art Gallery for research, 1957-58. Thomas B. Alexander, Georgia State Teachers College, located at Collegeboro, Georgia, has been appointed visiting associate professor for 1957-58.

John F. Ramsey is serving as program chairman for the European section of the Southern Historical Association and A. B. Thomas is serving on the program committee of the American Historical Association.

Beta Pi (Georgetown University).

David Abshire, Frederic Beaudoin, Margaret de Fief, Richard Foertch, Ruth Lowry, Robert McKean, Henry Mirbach, Jean Murphy, Lawrence

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Olvany, Jr., Donald Paulus, George Prpic, George Svejda, Robert Wood were initiated April 13, 1957.

Beta Rho (Carroll College).

John Heinl, Nancy Peters, Jenny Wagener were initiated October 17, 1956; Robert Jester and Jessie Stoddart on March 20, 1957.

Beta Tau (Queens College).

Jerome Acker, Diana Chiarelle, Wilma Fussteig, Barry Goldman, Robert Hessen, Leopold Hoenig, Solomon Lutnick, Rocco Russo, Robert Schneittiger, Eli Seifman, Vera Simon were initiated June 2, 1957.

Beta Phi (Monmouth College).

Dorothy Beveridge, Harold Bodeen, Jo Hamilton, Margery Heaton, Gertrude Morrill, Sally Platt, Sheryl Stripe were initiated May 12, 1957.

Beta Chi (Drury College).

Howard Childers, Jr., was initiated May 24, 1957.

Beta Omega (University of Maryland).

During the course of the academic year, 1956-57, the chapter sponsored four outstanding lectures as part of its local activities: John Davidson spoke on "Wilson's Campaign Speeches of 1912"; Donald Gordon presented a slide-lecture on England; Charlotte Smith delivered a paper on "Carl Becker and the Paradox of Progress," and Norman Parmer spoke on "The Problems of Southeast Asia." At the closing banquet, Mr. Ronald Bailey, head of the British Chancery in Washington, gave the evening's major address on the "Near Eastern Crisis" before some one hundred member-guests.

As one of the major features of the year's chapter activities, Beta Omega hosted a regional convention for some eight participating colleges and universities.

Gamma Beta (Bradley University).

Patricia Norton was initiated April 23; Harry Anderson, June 1; Barbara Detrick and Elaine Speck on October 31, 1956; Howard Miller on March 28, and Robert Becker and Gary Best on April 30, 1957.

Gamma Gamma (Mississippi State College for Women).

Ann Lewis, Barbara Livingston and Jane Spight were initiated March 13, 1957.

Gamma Delta (Woman's College, University of North Carolina).

Edith Ausley, Barbara Gabriel, Martha Jester, Donna Snyder, Barbara Terwilliger, Jordan Kurland were initiated March 20, 1957.

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Gamma Epsilon (Texas Western College).

Irvin Barrington, Allan Friedman, Thomas McEachern, Bruce Nusbaum, Dale Roberts, Margarita Urrutia, Ann Watkins were initiated February 21, 1957.

Gamma Zeta (Wittenberg College).

Joan Beadling, Edith Campbell, Florence Fray, Robert Hartje, James Haucke, Henry Marcum, Lenore Morris, Richard Ogle, Jane Richardson, Patricia Ridge, Marc Swartzbaugh, Joan Wigger were initiated on May 8, 1957.

Ann Brown, delegate to the 1956 national convention has been awarded a scholarship to study in Mexico for a year under the Buenos Aires Convention program.

Gamma Theta (University of Minnesota at Duluth).

Roger Anderson, James Banovetz, Donald Carlson, Ruth Kent, Elizabeth Smith, Katharine Zumbrunnen were initiated April 23, 1957.

Gamma Iota (University of California, Santa Barbara).

Stanley Daily and Bryce Patten were initiates on March 1, 1957.

Gamma Omicron (Hope College).

David Dethmers, Charalene De Vette, Joyce Leighley, Jane MacEachron, Paul Treest, Robert Lugt were initiated April 24, 1957.

Gamma Pi (University of Cincinnati).

Nancy Anderson, Margaret Boyer, Ann Ferguson, Sandra Ferguson, Morton Gusweiler, Jean Lea, Rosalie Perez, Arnold Schrier, Diane Shaver, Helan Tuch, Edward Vaught, Donald White, Virginia Wolfe were initiated on November 2, 1956. Haskell Bazell, Alice Horn, Robert Hymes, Jr., William Keener, Ann Kircher, Carolyn Keener, Carolyn Kreienbaum, Nancy Malycky, Roger Parry were initiated on April 18, 1957.

Gamma Rho (University of Wichita).

Robert Barcus, Herman Bonett, Charles Fairless, Robert Johnson, William Mather, Betty Murray, Richard Tanksley, Elisabeth Zuger were initiated on November 1, 1957.

Gamma Tau (Westminster College, Mo.).

Donald Back, Alan Kimbrell, John Mennell, William Painter were initiated March 5, 1957.

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Gamma Psi (Washington State College).

Dorothy Sheely was initiated April 10, 1956; Gordon Lindeen, Shirl McArthur, Marcia Norwood, Mary Rademacher, Peggy Raun, Marianne Skewis, Robert Swanson, Ardith Wilkins, John Yost were initiated on February 21, 1957.

Delta Alpha (University of Miami, Fla.).

Martin Obrentz and Alan Bronner were initiated March 22, 1957.

Delta Beta (Occidental College).

Anthony Campana, John McDonnell, Velma Montoya were initiated on February 25, 1957.

Delta Delta (Doane College).

Georgianna Bruhn, Virgil Marshall, James Pallett were initiated on March 10, 1957.

Delta Eta (University of Dayton).

Dally DeWine and Barbara Gilbert were initiated March 10, 1957.

Delta Epsilon (Indiana University).

Joseph Burke, Roy Burkholder, Loren Campion, Helen Cerda, Alfred Cohen, Robert Frederick, Bernard Goldberg, Charles Heinlein, James Riesmeyer, Joan Rogers, Mary Seldon, Arnold Smith, Donald Steiner, R. Suzanne Van Meter were initiated April 3, 1957.

Delta Zeta (College of the Ozarks).

Carrie Baskin and Mary Dewett were initiated March 15, 1957.

Delta Kappa (University of Tulsa).

Larry Alexander, William Almen, Roxanna Brenkman, Ahnawake Bradshaw, Diana Davis, Eugene Kiser, Anna Leka, Pam Manhart, Ronald Robertson, William Schrama, Roger Scott, Richard Shoemaker, Louise Smith, Lucille Stuermann, Don Sullivan, Eula Wilson, Harold Wright were initiated March 15, 1957.

Delta Mu (Boston University).

Gil Allardice, Philip Backstrom, Norman Bennett, June Broderick, Lawrence Campbell, Phillip Cole, William Cole, Alfred Crosby, Jr., Raymond Crosby, Jr., Graham Dolan, Louis Doyle, Barbara Goldberg, Aaron Jacobs, Erwin Krasnow, Frederick Maloof, Robert Moore, G. Douglas Nicoll, Helen Nowak, Thomas O'Connor, Stuart Quint, Jr., Manuel Rosenfield, Carol Rottner, Sheldon Shapire, Martha Semans, Eliot Somers, Ruth Toombs, Norman Trusty, Ann Wein were initiated April 25, 1957.

News of Phi Alpha Theta

Delta Pi (University of North Carolina).

John Adams, Josephine Albert, Quincy Ayscue, Girard Boudreau, Jr., Charles Bowman, Jr., Larie Brandner, William Brigman, Claudius Carlton, Jr., Max Chandler, Leslie Hale, Marian Hobeck, Richard Hudson, Cecil Johnson, John Kerr, III, Thomas Lambeth, Robert Lavietes, Mary Lucy, James Martin, Jr., Malcolm Partin, Bobby Rose, Joanne Saunders, Brett Summey, John Vann, III, John Zollicoffer, Jr., were initiated on December 4, 1956.

Delta Sigma (Kansas State College).

Sonia Brown, Ronald Christiansen, Judy Crawford, Janet Engwall, Jimmie Frazier, Marilyn Geiger, Nancy Howard, Dobie Keck, Charlotte Miller, Donnard Mannings, Frances Meegan, James Shane, Gerald Smith, Larry Steele, Marvin Swanson, Mary Whitelaw, Lawrence Williams, John Wright were initiated May 13, 1957.

Delta Phi (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee).

Richard Haas, Margaret Koegel, Marjorie Gove, James Stark, John Fellner, Frederick Witter, Jeri-Ann Pollak, Louanne Strobosch, Gustav Berweiler, Cynthia Chudy, Lee Lawrence, Jean Piepenberg, Donna Dauer, Barbara Tessmer were initiated on March 8, 1957.

Delta Psi (Union University).

Maurice Coleman was initiated on April 5, 1957.

Delta Omega (Mount Mary College).

Virginia Schuldenberg, Mary Timmerman, Memoree Rubel, Letitia Arnold, Jeanne Hoffman, Joyce Kemp, Bernadine Grady, Margaret McNamara, Caroljean Wagner, Barbara Draczka, Margaret Gould, Claire Biederman, Camille Oliver, Joyce Burggraf, Rosemarie Hinner were initiated on March 27, 1957.

Epsilon Beta (Ohio University).

Jon Anderson, William Barlow, Ellen Berg, Ruth Chastain, Levitte Clapham, Judith Ewell, Nancy Gerhard, Martha Hoopman, Gary Kaser, Gordon Keller, Rita Lefke, Donald Lisio, Robert Mahn, Barbara Mann, Patricia Mihalick, Beverly Orndorff, Terry Perkins, Shirley Tessmer, George Coinowich were initiated on March 28, 1957.

Epsilon Gamma (Wilmington College).

Elbert Dennis was initiated January 12, 1957; Mary Morgan, Grace Botts, Charles Purvis, Roland Barile were initiated on April 13, 1957.

Epsilon Delta (Judson College).

June Miller was initiated on April 9, 1957.

The Historian

Epsilon Epsilon (Central State College, Ohio).

Walter Atwood, Alice Bettis, Robert Fitzgerald, Arthur Long, Charlotte McStallworth, Ethel Page, Virginia Phillips, Kenneth Shearer, Raymond Swann, Warren Taylor were initiated on April 9, 1957.

Epsilon Zeta (Ohio Wesleyan).

On January 13, 1957, Alverdas Cheleden, Jr., Frank Frazier, Karen Knutson and Margaret Rushong were initiated; Richard Chrystie, Jr., Marilyn Dixon, Elizabeth Frey, Janice Kaye, Nancy Tozer on March 17th.

Epsilon Iota (Wagner College).

Robert Anderson, Ruth Bartman, Eugene Basini, Sylvia Crewes, Walter Dohmann, Carlo Ferrazzoli, Edwin Hedman, Marie Norris, Paul Qualben, Peter Suchman, Romain Swendenburg were initiated April 13, 1957.

Epsilon Lambda (The Citadel).

On February 19, 1957, Rodney Armstrong, Stewart Kopp, Thomas Miller, Claudius Watts, III, were initiated.

Epsilon Mu (Eastern Illinois State College).

Jane Gibler, John Xeiser, George Shaffer, Carol Wilhite, Noel Montgomery, Mildred Fuqua, George Barbour, Francine Dee Pool, Phyllis Rogers, Blanche Icenogle, Ruth Arganbright, George McKown, Elsie Wong, Anne Bence, Robert Sterling, Alexander Summers were initiated on March 21, 1957.

Epsilon Xi (Southwestern La. Institute).

John Betar, James Dormen, Grady Estilette, Joseph Guillette, III, were initiated on March 11, 1957.

Epsilon Omicron (Catholic University of Puerto Rico).

Felicita de Brandi, Carlos Rodriguez de Jesus, Ramon Arroyo Santiago, Gloria Rivera de Chardon, Carmen de Cardona, Rafael Alberto Roig, Rosa Guzman de Blasini, Alicia Nicet, Lic. F. Manuel Toro, Lic. Luis A. Noriega, Juanita Vecchini were initiated May 4, 1957.

Epsilon Pi (University of Georgia).

William Chafin, Jr., Mary McCarley, Preston Malone, Beth Mobley, Rayford Stinson were initiated on April 28, 1957.

Epsilon Rho (Howard College).

James Auchmuty, Walter Brandon, Mary Carr, Betty Davidson, Melton Deason, Chriss Doss, James Edmonson, A. L. Garner, Raleigh Godsey,

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Nancy Harden, Martha Hayes, Paul Jones, Carolyn Majors, William Murray, Donald Paulson, Robert Perry, Forest South, William Todd, Priscilla Weeks were initiated February 26, 1957; Joe Lawley on March 15, 1957.

Epsilon Phi (Duquesne University).

Gerald Ford, Sister Mary Francina Skergan, S.C., Paul Menion, Jr., were initiated on December 16, 1956.

On April 27, 1957, Eugene Blair, Mary Cunningham, Constance Deucher, William Finister, Charles Kocher, James Langer, Beatrice Marshall, Jessica Matoka, Ruth Osborne, Margaret Parker, Jane Reed, Pauline Reinhraut, Norman Stevans, Francis Ziaukas were initiated.

Epsilon Omega (Long Island University).

Rose Bird, George Bosworth, Heywood Feierstein, Gwenn Friedlander, Michael Goldberg, Alan Lebowitz, Raymond Polin, Leonard Portney, Sal Sanjamino, Michael Wahl were initiated on March 28, 1957.

Zeta Theta (University of Oklahoma).

Sherman Carter was initiated on April 30, 1957.

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CHAPTERS OF PHI ALPHA THETA

1921 Alpha	University of Arkansas
1922 Beta	University of Pittsburgh
1923 Gamma	University of Pennsylvania
1924 Delta	Florida State University
1927 Epsilon	University of Illinois
1927 Zeta	Ohio State University
1927 Eta	Southern Methodist University
1928 Theta	Denison University
1929 Iota	Colorado State College of Education (Greeley)
1929 Kappa	Muhlenberg College
1930 Lambda	Kansas State Teachers College (Pittsburg)
1932 Mu	Arkansas State Teachers College
1932 Nu	Oklahoma State University
1932 Xi	University of Southern California
1934 Omicron	University of Omaha
1934 Pi	Northwestern State College (Louisiana)
1934 Rho	Southeastern State College (Oklahoma)
1936 Sigma	University of New Mexico
1937 Tau	University of Kentucky
1937 Upsilon	Waynesburg College
1937 Phi	University of Minnesota
1938 Chi	University of California
1938 Psi	Kent State University
1939 Omega	Gettysburg College
1940 Alpha Alpha	Lehigh University
1941 Alpha Beta	College of Wooster
1941 Alpha Gamma	Bucknell University
1941 Alpha Delta	Marquette University
1942 Alpha Epsilon	Southeast Missouri State College
1942 Alpha Zeta	John B. Stetson University
1943 Alpha Eta	Upsala College
1944 Alpha Theta	Hofstra College
1945 Alpha Iota	University of Nevada
1945 Alpha Kappa	University of Toledo
1945 Alpha Lambda	North Texas State College
1946 Alpha Mu	College of the City of New York
1946 Alpha Nu	Henderson State Teachers College (Arkansas)
1946 Alpha Xi	Westminster College (Pennsylvania)
1946 Alpha Omicron	University of Kansas
1946 Alpha Pi	Augustana College
1946 Alpha Rho	University of Utah
1947 Alpha Sigma	Washington and Jefferson College
1947 Alpha Tau	Winthrop College
1947 Alpha Upsilon	Temple University
1947 Alpha Phi	Michigan State College
1947 Alpha Chi	Cedar Crest College
1947 Alpha Psi	Muskingum College
1947 Alpha Omega	University of Rhode Island
1947 Beta Alpha	University of Texas
1947 Beta Beta	Stanford University
1947 Beta Gamma	William Jewell College
1948 Beta Delta	University of Puerto Rico
1948 Beta Epsilon	University of Colorado
1948 Beta Zeta	Otterbein College
1948 Beta Eta	Columbia College
1948 Beta Theta	Franklin and Marshall College
1948 Beta Iota	Brigham Young University
1948 Beta Kappa	San Diego State College
1948 Beta Lambda	San Jose State College
1948 Beta Mu	University of Richmond
1948 Beta Nu	Davis and Elkins College
1948 Beta Xi	Lafayette College
1948 Beta Omicron	University of Alabama
1948 Beta Pi	Georgetown University
1948 Beta Rho	Carroll College
1948 Beta Sigma	Franklin College
1948 Beta Tau	Queens College
1948 Beta Upsilon	University of North Dakota
1948 Beta Phi	Monmouth College
1948 Beta Chi	Drury College
1948 Beta Psi	Montana State University
1948 Beta Omega	University of Maryland
1948 Gamma Alpha	Rutgers University
1949 Gamma Beta	Bradley University

CHAPTERS OF PHI ALPHA THETA

1949 Gamma Gamma	Mississippi State College for Women
1949 Gamma Delta	Women's College of the University of North Carolina
1949 Gamma Epsilon	Texas Western College of the University of Texas
1949 Gamma Zeta	Wittenberg College
1949 Gamma Eta	University of Florida
1949 Gamma Theta	University of Minnesota at Duluth
1949 Gamma Iota	Santa Barbara College of the University of California
1949 Gamma Kappa	Tulane University
1950 Gamma Lambda	College of St. Thomas
1950 Gamma Mu	Marietta College
1950 Gamma Nu	Mississippi State College
1950 Gamma Xi	Utica College of Syracuse University
1950 Gamma Omicron	Hope College
1950 Gamma Pi	University of Cincinnati
1950 Gamma Rho	University of Wichita
1950 Gamma Sigma	Georgetown College (Kentucky)
1950 Gamma Tau	Westminster College (Missouri)
1950 Gamma Upsilon	Bowling Green State University
1950 Gamma Phi	Inter-American University (Puerto Rico)
1950 Gamma Chi	Marshall College
1950 Gamma Psi	State College of Washington
1950 Gamma Omega	Texas College of Arts and Industries
1951 Delta Alpha	University of Miami (Florida)
1951 Delta Beta	Occidental College
1951 Delta Gamma	Heidelberg College
1951 Delta Delta	Doane College
1951 Delta Epsilon	Indiana University
1951 Delta Zeta	College of the Ozarks
1951 Delta Eta	University of Dayton
1951 Delta Theta	Manhattan College
1951 Delta Iota	University of Washington
1952 Delta Kappa	University of Tulsa
1952 Delta Lambda	Salem College
1952 Delta Mu	Boston University
1952 Delta Nu	West Virginia University
1952 Delta Xi	Utah State Agricultural College
1952 Delta Omicron	University of Connecticut
1952 Delta Pi	University of North Carolina
1953 Delta Rho	University of Iowa
1953 Delta Sigma	Kansas State College (Manhattan)
1953 Delta Tau	University of Dubuque
1953 Delta Upsilon	Baldwin-Wallace College
1953 Delta Phi	University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
1953 Delta Chi	University of Akron
1953 Delta Psi	Union University
1953 Delta Omega	Mount Mary College
1954 Epsilon Alpha	North Carolina College at Durham
1954 Epsilon Beta	Ohio University
1954 Epsilon Gamma	Wilmington College
1954 Epsilon Delta	Judson College
1954 Epsilon Epsilon	Central State College (Ohio)
1954 Epsilon Zeta	Ohio Wesleyan University
1954 Epsilon Eta	McPherson College
1954 Epsilon Theta	Hunter College
1954 Epsilon Iota	Wagner College
1954 Epsilon Kappa	Oregon State College
1955 Epsilon Lambda	The Citadel
1955 Epsilon Mu	Eastern Illinois State College
1955 Epsilon Nu	Memphis State College
1955 Epsilon Xi	Southwestern Louisiana Institute
1955 Epsilon Omicron	Catholic University of Puerto Rico
1956 Epsilon Pi	University of Georgia
1956 Epsilon Rho	Howard College
1956 Epsilon Sigma	Wake Forest College
1956 Epsilon Tau	Northeast Louisiana State College
1956 Epsilon Upsilon	Pennsylvania State University
1956 Epsilon Phi	Duquesne University
1956 Epsilon Chi	David Lipscomb College
1956 Epsilon Psi	American University
1956 Epsilon Omega	Long Island University
1956 Zeta Alpha	Immaculate Heart College
1956 Zeta Beta	Ablene Christian College
1956 Zeta Gamma	Howard University
1956 Zeta Delta	Adelphi College
1956 Zeta Epsilon	Thiel College
1956 Zeta Zeta	Lycoming College
1956 Zeta Eta	Louisiana State University
1957 Zeta Theta	University of Oklahoma
1957 Zeta Iota	Texas Technological College
1957 Zeta Kappa	University of Houston

